Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Final Bill Signed by Governor (9/30/24)
AB 181 by the Committee on Budget – State employment: State Bargaining Units: agreements: compensation and benefits
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/29/24)
Signed
AB 1843 by Assemblymember Freddie Rodriguez (D-Pomona) – Emergency ambulance employees
AB 2123 by Assemblymember Diane Papan (D-San Mateo) – Disability compensation: paid family leave
AB 2245 by Assemblymember Juan Carrillo (D-Palmdale) – Certificated school employees: permanent status: regional occupational centers or programs operated by single school districts
AB 2499 by Assemblymember Pilar Schiavo (D-Chatsworth) – Employment: unlawful discrimination and paid sick days: victims of violence
AB 2738 by Assemblymember Luz Rivas (D-Sylmar) – Labor Code: alternative enforcement: occupational safety. A signing message can be found here
SB 940 by Senator Thomas Umberg (D-Santa Ana) – Civil disputes.
SB 1303 by Senator Anna Caballero (D-Merced) – Public works
SB 1379 by Senator Bill Dodd (D-Napa) – Public Employees’ Retirement Law: reinstatement: County of Solano
Vetoed
AB 1890 by Assemblymember Joe Patterson (R-Rocklin) – Public works: prevailing wage. A veto message can be found here
SB 782 by Senator Monique LimÏŒn (D-Santa Barbara) – Gubernatorial appointments: report. A veto message can be found here
SB 984 by Senator Aisha Wahab (D-Silicon Valley) – Public agencies: project labor agreements. A veto message can be found here
SB 1022 by Senator Nancy Skinner (D-Berkeley) – Enforcement of civil rights. A veto message can be found here
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/28/24)
Signed
AB 1034 by Assemblymember Tim Grayson (D-Concord) – Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004: exemption: construction industry employees
AB 1137 by Assemblymember Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr. (D-Los Angeles) – Excluded employees
AB 1239 by Assemblymember Lisa Calderon (D-Whittier) – Workers’ compensation: disability payments
AB 1905 by Assemblymember Dawn Addis (D-Morro Bay) – Public postsecondary education: employment: settlements, informal resolutions, and retreat rights
AB 1976 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) – Occupational safety and health standards: first aid materials: opioid antagonists
AB 2063 by Assemblymember Brian Maienschein (D-San Diego) – Health care coverage
AB 2284 by Assemblymember Tim Grayson (D-Concord) – County employees’ retirement: compensation
AB 2326 by Assemblymember David Alvarez (D-San Diego) – Equity in Higher Education Act: discrimination: compliance, regulations, and reports
AB 2407 by Assemblymember Gregg Hart (D-Santa Barbara) – Public postsecondary educational institutions: sexual harassment complaints: state audits
AB 2925 by Assemblymember Laura Friedman (D-Glendale) – Postsecondary education: Equity in Higher Education Act: prohibition on discrimination: training.
SB 988 by Senator Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco) – Freelance Worker Protection Act
SB 1090 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) – Unemployment insurance: disability and paid family leave: claim administration
SB 1100 by Senator Anthony Portantino (D-Burbank) – Discrimination: driver’s license
SB 1162 by Senator Dave Cortese (D-San Jose) – Public contracts: employment compliance reports: apprenticeship programs
SB 1166 by Senator Bill Dodd (D-Napa) – Public postsecondary education: sex discrimination reports
SB 1287 by Senator Steven Glazer (D-Orinda) – Public postsecondary education: Equity in Higher Education Act: prohibition on violence, harassment, intimidation, and discrimination
SB 1350 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) – Occupational safety and health: definitions
SB 1490 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) – Food delivery platforms
Vetoed
AB 2936 by Assemblymember Dr. Corey Jackson (D-Moreno Valley) – Higher Education Reconciliation Act. A veto message can be found here
AB 3031 by Assemblymember Alex Lee (D-San Jose) – LGBTQ+ Commission. A veto message can be found here
SB 227 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) – Unemployment: Excluded Workers Program. A veto message can be found here
SB 1299 by Senator Dave Cortese (D-San Jose) – Farmworkers: benefits. A veto message can be found here
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/27/24)
Signed
AB 1997 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) – Teachers’ Retirement Law
AB 2047 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – Public postsecondary education: discrimination prevention
AB 2048 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – Community colleges: systemic campus reforms: sexual harassment: report
AB 2624 by Assemblymember Marie Waldron (R-Valley Center) – Prisoners: employment: bereavement
AB 2754 by Assemblymember Anthony Rendon (D-Lakewood) – Employment contracts and agreements: sufficient funds: liability
SB 1137 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) – Discrimination claims: combination of characteristics
SB 1177 by Senator Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Public utilities: women, minority, disabled veteran, and LGBT business enterprises
Vetoed
AB 1832 by Assemblymember Blanca Rubio (D-Baldwin Park) – Civil Rights Department: Labor Trafficking Task Force. A veto message can be found here
AB 2182 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) – Public works. A veto message can be found here
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Bills Signed by Governor (9/26/24, 2 of 2)
AB 1815 by Assemblymember Dr. Akilah Weber (D-San Diego) – Discrimination: race: hairstyles
AB 2319 by Assemblymember Lori Wilson (D-Suisun City) – California Dignity in Pregnancy and Childbirth Act
AB 3089 by Assemblymember Reginald Byron Jones-Sawyer, Sr. (D-Los Angeles) – Chattel slavery: formal apology
SB 1340 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) – Discrimination
SB 1348 by Senator Steven Bradford (D-Gardena) – Postsecondary education: Designation of California Black-Serving Institutions
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Bills Signed by Governor (9/26/24)
AB 1888 by Assemblymember Dr. Joaquin Arambula (Fresno) – Department of Justice: Labor Trafficking Unit
AB 2020 by Assemblymember Mia Bonta (Oakland) – Survivors of Human Trafficking Support Act
SB 963 by Senator Angelique Ashby (Sacramento) – Hospitals: self-identification procedure: human trafficking or domestic violence
SB 1414 by Senator Shannon Grove (Bakersfield) – Crimes: solicitation of a minor, human trafficking
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Campbell v. Sunshine Behavioral Health (CA4/3 G0628869/25/24) Arbitration Waiver
Plaintiff Britnee Campbell, a former employee of defendant Sunshine Behavioral Health, LLC (Sunshine), filed the instant lawsuit against Sunshine for wage and hour violations as a putative class action on May 23, 2022. Sunshine proceeded with litigation, eventually entering into a joint stipulation to, among other things, participate in mediation. In November, Sunshine, allegedly for the first time, discovered Campbell had signed an arbitration agreement. Weeks later, Sunshine represented to the court it intended to proceed with mediation. The court signed the mediation order in March 2023. At that point, for the first time, Sunshine stated it would not participate in mediation but instead intended to file a petition to compel arbitration. It did not do so until May 3.
The court determined Sunshine had waived arbitration, and we agree. We conclude there was clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s finding that Sunshine’s conduct waived any right to arbitration. We therefore affirm the order.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G062886.PDF
Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/25/24)
Signed
AB 2005 by Assemblymember Christopher Ward (D-San Diego) – California State University: faculty and employee housing.
AB 2455 by Assemblymember Jesse Gabriel (D-Encino) – Whistleblower protection: state and local government procedures.
AB 2534 by Assemblymember Heath Flora (R-Modesto) – Certificated employees: disclosures: egregious misconduct.
AB 3024 by Assemblymember Christopher Ward (D-San Diego) – Civil rights.
Vetoed
SB 1058 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) – Peace officers: injury or illness: leaves of absence. A veto message can be found here.
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Bills Signed by Governor (9/23/24 and 24/24)
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AB 672 by Assemblymember Dr. Corey Jackson (D-Moreno Valley) – Civil Rights Department: community assistance
AB 2837 by Assemblymember Rebecca Bauer-Kahan (D-Orinda) – Civil actions: enforcement of money judgments
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Miller v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CA4/2 E081230, filed 9/6/24, pub. 9/23/24) FEHA Disability Discrimination
Plaintiff and appellant, Maria Miller, has been employed as a correctional officer with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) at the California Institute for Women (CIW) since 2008. In 2016, she was injured as the result of a slip and fall incident while working off-site in a temporary assignment assisting with officer recruitment. In 2018, CDCR placed plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence shortly after her wage replacement benefits in the worker’s compensation system were exhausted. Eventually, CDCR offered to medically demote plaintiff to an alternative available position that would accommodate her work restrictions. However, plaintiff did not accept the position offered, informed CDCR that she suffered from a previously undisclosed mental disability that prevented her from returning to work while receiving treatment, and has remained on an unpaid leave of absence since that time.
In 2020, plaintiff filed suit against CDCR under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900, et seq.), alleging, in part, disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of CDCR after concluding that it was entitled to summary adjudication of each cause of action asserted in the operative complaint. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment, arguing that the evidence produced in opposition to CDCR’s motion shows a dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude summary adjudication of each cause of action. We find no error in the record before us and affirm the judgment.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E081230.PDF
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/22/24)
Signed
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AB 672 by Assemblymember Dr. Corey Jackson (D-Moreno Valley) – Civil Rights Department: community assistance
AB 938 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) – Education finance: classified and certificated staff salaries
AB 1246 by Assemblymember Stephanie Nguyen (D-Elk Grove) – Public employees’ retirement: Public Employees’ Retirement System optional settlements
AB 2131 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) – Certified nurse assistant training programs
AB 2134 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) – School employees: transfer of leave of absence for illness or injury
AB 2337 by Assemblymember Diane Dixon (R-Newport Beach) – Workers’ compensation: electronic signatures
AB 2364 by Assemblymember Luz Rivas (D-Sylmar) – Property service worker protection
AB 2561 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) – Local public employees: vacant positions
AB 2834 by Assemblymember Anthony Rendon (D-Lakewood) – Public postsecondary education: part-time faculty
AB 2931 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – Community colleges: classified employees: merit system: part-time student-tutors
AB 2971 by Assemblymember Brian Maienschein (D-San Diego) – Classified Employee Staffing Ratio Workgroup: community college districts
AB 3025 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) – County employees’ retirement: disallowed compensation: benefit adjustments
AB 3087 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – California Community Colleges Economic and Workforce Development Program
AB 3131 by Assemblymember Kevin McCarty (D-Sacramento) – Strong Workforce Program: applicants receiving equity multiplier funding
AB 3234 by Assemblymember Liz Ortega (D-San Leandro) – Employers: social compliance audit
SB 1321 by Senator Aisha Wahab (D-Silicon Valley) – Employment Training Panel: employment training program: projects and proposals
SB 1491 by Senator Susan Talamantes Eggman (D-Stockton) – Postsecondary education: Equity in Higher Education Act
Vetoed
AB 2088 by Assemblymember Kevin McCarty (D-Sacramento) – K–14 classified employees: part-time or full-time vacancies: public postings. A veto message can be found here.
AB 2277 by Assemblymember Greg Wallis (R-Palm Springs) – Community colleges: part-time faculty. A veto message can be found here.
AB 2586 by Assemblymember David Alvarez (D-San Diego) – Public postsecondary education: student employment. A veto message can be found here.
SB 1375 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) – Workforce development: records: poverty-reducing labor standards: funds, programs, reporting, and analyses. A veto message can be found here.
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/20/24)
Signed
AB 224 by Assemblymember Blanca Rubio (D-Baldwin Park) – Worker status: employees and independent contractors: newspaper distributors and carriers
AB 2889 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Los Angeles) – Local public employee relations: the City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Board and the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission
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Vetoed
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AB 366 by Assemblymember Cottie Petrie-Norris (D-Irvine) – County human services agencies: workforce development. A veto message can be found here.
SB 636 by Senator Dave Cortese (D-San Jose) – Workers’ compensation: utilization review. A veto message can be found here.
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Keeton v. Tesla, 103 Cal.App.5th 26 (2024), review granted, 2024 WL 4160072 (Mem) (Sept. 11, 2024); S286260/A166690 – Arbitration Fees
Petition for review after affirmance of order vacating submission of dispute to arbitration. Briefing deferred pending decision in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court, S284498. Does the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) preempt state statutes prescribing the procedures for paying arbitration fees and providing for forfeiture of the right to arbitrate if timely payment is not made by the party who drafted the arbitration agreement and who is required to pay such fees? Review granted/holding for lead case.
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Anoke v. Twitter (CA1/5 (A168675, filed 8/27/24, mod. & pub. 9/18/24) Arbitration Fees
To discourage delays in arbitrations, Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.97 provides a remedy when a company’s share of the initial arbitration fees “are not paid within 30 days” of the invoice. (§ 1281.97, subds. (a)(1), (b).) In an employment-related arbitration, counsel for appellant employees mistakenly paid initial fees that should have been paid by the employer, respondents Twitter, Inc., X Holdings I, Inc., X Holdings Corp., X Corp., and Elon Musk (collectively “X”). Upon receipt of that payment, the arbitration provider marked the invoice “[c]losed” and “[p]aid” in its online payment system. In response to the payment snafu, the arbitration provider refunded the mistaken payment to the employees and issued a new invoice to X, which X paid within 30 days. Appellants petitioned the superior court for an order compelling X to pay their arbitration-related attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 1281.97, arguing that X’s payment was untimely because it was not made within 30 days of the first invoice. (§ 1281.97, subds. (a)-(b).) The superior court denied the petition. We affirm.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A168675.PDF
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Dignity Health v. Mounts (CA2/6 B325563 9/17/24) Whistleblower Retaliation
Respondent Dignity Health dba French Hospital Medical Center (“Dignity”) filed its complaint against Troy I. Mounts, M.D. and Troy I. Mounts, M.D., Inc., (collectively “appellant”) an orthopedic surgeon, to recover an advance paid to appellant under their Physician Recruitment Agreement. Appellant filed a cross-complaint alleging Dignity retaliated against him for complaining about the quality of patient care, interfered with his prospective economic opportunities and engaged in unlawful business practices. Dignity filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the cross-complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) The trial court denied that motion. In an unpublished opinion, we reversed the trial court’s order. We remanded the matter for the trial court to determine whether appellant had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. (Id., subd. (b)(1); Dignity Health v. Appellant (Feb. 23, 2022, B289209).)
The trial court concluded appellant had not demonstrated a probability of prevailing because Dignity’s actions were subject to the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subdivision (b)), the common interest privilege (id., subd. (c)), and barred by the statute of limitations. It therefore granted the motion to strike appellant’s cross-complaint and ordered him to pay Dignity’s attorney fees and costs. Appellant contends the trial court erred. We affirm.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B325563.PDF
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/14/24)
Signed
AB 310 by Assemblymember Dr. Joaquin Arambula (D-Fresno) – State Department of State Hospitals: civil service psychiatrists
AB 2573 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – Policy fellows: status of services: associations
AB 2622 by Assemblymember Juan Carrillo (D-Palmdale) – Contractors: exemptions: work and advertisements
AB 2705 by Assemblymember Liz Ortega (D-San Leandro) – Labor Commissioner
Vetoed
AB 2335 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) – Public employment: compensation and classification. A veto message can be found here
AB 2704 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Los Angeles) – In-home supportive services: criminal background checks. A veto message can be found here
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Bills Signed by Governor (9/12/24)
AB 2067 by Assemblymember Diane Dixon (R-Newport Beach) – Financial institutions: service of process
AB 2873 by Assemblymember Eduardo Garcia (D-Coachella) – Breaking Barriers to Employment Initiative: grants
AB 3278 by the Committee on Transportation –Transportation: omnibus bill (human trafficking)
AB 3280 by the Committee on Judiciary – Superior court: lactation rooms: Judicial Council report
AB 3283 by the Committee on Judiciary – Enforcement of judgments: claims of exemption
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Silloway v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (9th Cir. 22-16079 9/11/24) FLSA Overtime
The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for the City and County of San Francisco, and remanded, in two cases in which staff nurses employed by the City allege that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not paying them time-and-a-half for overtime work.
The FLSA provides that employees should generally receive time-and-a-half pay for working overtime, but one of the Act’s exemptions from that requirement applies to employees working in a bona fide professional capacity. The City claims that staff nurses fall into that exemption.
The dispute over whether the professional-capacity exemption applies to staff nurses depends on whether the City has shown that staff nurses were paid on a “salary basis” during the relevant time. The City claims that staff nurses were compensated on a salary basis because their annual compensation figures were documented at the start of every year through employment agreements and published salary ordinances. The plaintiffs contend that the City compensated them on an hourly basis because it divided those annual figures into hourly rates and paid staff nurses only for each hour worked.
The district court concluded that the annual pay figures published in the salary ordinance provided definitive evidence that the staff nurses were compensated on a salary basis.
The panel held that the district court erred. To determine whether employees are compensated on a salary basis, courts must look beyond conclusory language in contracts and similar documents such as the salary ordinance. Courts must instead analyze how employees are actually paid. The proper focus for the salary basis test is whether an employee receives a predetermined amount of compensation on a weekly or less frequent basis, irrespective of any promises made in an employment contract.
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The panel held that material factual questions remain in dispute regarding whether the City satisfied the salary basis test as a matter of practice. Plaintiffs offered evidence showing that the City did not record them as working hours consistent with their full-time equivalencies in a significant number of pay periods. Those discrepancies raise material factual questions as to whether the staff nurses received their predetermined amounts of compensation in those pay periods. The panel remanded for those factual issues to be resolved.
Judge Bea concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that summary judgment in favor of the City should be reversed. But rather than remand for further discovery on whether the plaintiffs are salaried under the FLSA, he would hold that there is no genuine issue of disputed fact as to that question. The plaintiffs are not salaried under that statute because the City does not pay them a predetermined amount of compensation each week that is independent of the number of hours they work. He would remand with instructions to grant the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment on their claim for overtime compensation under the FLSA.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/09/11/22-16079.pdf
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Adams v. County of Sacramento (9th Cir. 23-15970 9/9/24) Public Sector Employment Retaliation | First Amendment
In an interlocutory appeal, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of First Amendment retaliation and derivative conspiracy claims brought by Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova, alleging that she was forced to resign from her post over allegations that while working for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office she sent racist text messages.
In evaluating the First Amendment rights of a public employee, the threshold inquiry is whether the statements at issue substantially address a matter of public concern. Speech involves matters of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.
The panel examined the plain language, form, and context of Adams’s two text messages, and held that under the circumstances presented by this case, sending private text messages to two friends during “a friendly, casual text message conversation,” forwarding offensive racist spam images, and complaining about the images does not constitute “a matter of legitimate public concern” within the meaning of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Adams’s speech was one of personal interest, not public interest. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims.
Dissenting, Judge Callahan stated that Adams should have the chance to hold the County accountable for its harsh reaction to her speech. The public concern test should be applied leniently in this case where Adams’s speech did not fall within the realm of workplace grievances, had no arguable impact on her employer, and touched on matters of social or political concern.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/09/09/23-15970.pdf
Doe v. Horne (9th Cir. 9/9/24 23-16026) Title IX | Transgender Rights
The panel affirmed the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining Arizona from barring Plaintiffs Jane Doe and Megan Roe from playing school sports consistent with their gender identity.
Plaintiffs are transgender girls who have not gone through male puberty and who wish to play girls’ sports at their Arizona schools. In 2022, Arizona enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits “students of the male sex,” including transgender women and girls, from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. The complaint alleges that the Act’s transgender ban violates, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. Plaintiffs challenge enforcement of the Act solely as applied to them. The district court concluded that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection and Title IX claims, and preliminarily enjoined enforcing the Act against them.
The panel held that the district court did not clearly err by finding that, before puberty, there are no significant differences in athletic performance between boys and girls; treating small differences as insignificant; and finding that transgender girls who receive puberty-blocking medication do not have an athletic advantage over other girls.
The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. The district court did not clearly err by finding that the Act was adopted for the discriminatory purpose of excluding transgender girls from playing on girls’ sports teams. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that the Act is subject to heightened scrutiny.
The panel held that Arizona’s transgender ban discriminates on its face based on transgender status. To survive heightened scrutiny, a classification must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The panel held that, given the district court’s well-supported factual findings, the district court properly concluded that Appellants—the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and several legislators—are unlikely to establish that the Act’s sweeping transgender ban is substantially related to the achievement of the State’s important governmental objectives in ensuring competitive fairness and equal athletic opportunity for female student-athletes. The Act’s transgender ban applies not only to all transgender women and girls in Arizona, regardless of circulating testosterone levels or other medically accepted indicia of competitive advantage, but also to all sports, regardless of the physical contact involved, the type or level of competition, or the age or grade of the participants. The district court therefore did not err by concluding that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. Because Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim, the panel did not reach the issue of whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Title IX claim as well.
The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the remaining preliminary injunction factors—the likeliness of irreparable harm in the absence of relief, the balance of the equities, and the public interest. Accordingly, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiffs’ motion for a narrow preliminary injunction.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/09/09/23-16026.pdf
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Simers v. Los Angeles Times Communications LLC (CA2/8 B323715 8/30/24) 998 Motion | Fees and Costs
The defendant and the plaintiff both appeal from a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs to the prevailing plaintiff in this employment discrimination case after nine years of litigation and three trials.
The primary issue is the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff should not have recovered any fees for counsel’s work on the second trial, because the third trial was necessitated by counsel’s misconduct in closing argument at the second trial. Defendant also challenges fees awarded for certain work on plaintiff’s unsuccessful appeal after the first trial.
Plaintiff contends he should recover his attorney fees for this appeal, despite the trial court’s order that he cannot recover any fees or costs incurred after he rejected the defendant’s offer of compromise on December 7, 2021, shortly before the third trial, and failed to obtain a more favorable judgment.
We find no abuse of discretion in any part of the trial court’s order.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B323715.PDF
Hunter v. USDOE (9th Cir. 23-35174 8/30/24) Title IX | Religious Institution Exception
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought by LGBTQ+ students against the Department of Education challenging a religious exemption to Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimination at federally funded educational institutions but carves out an exception for religious institutions whose tenets mandate gender-based discrimination.
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim plaintiffs’ claims that Title IX’s religious exemption establishes a religion in violation of the First Amendment and violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, and dismissed for lack of Article III standing plaintiffs’ challenge to the Department’s implementing regulations of Title IX as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
The panel declined to apply the invited error doctrine— which provides that a party may not complain on review of errors below for which he is responsible—or the waiver doctrine—which provides that issues not presented to the trial court cannot generally be raised for the first time on appeal—and proceeded to the merits of plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause claim. The panel held that Title IX’s religious exemption does not violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause under the historical practices and understanding test set forth in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507 (2022). First, the history of tax exemptions for religious organizations near the time of the Founding suggests that statutory exemptions that operate as a subsidy to religious institutions do not violate the Establishment Clause according to its original meaning. Second, case law evinces a continuous, century- long practice of governmental accommodations for religion that the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly accepted as consistent with the Establishment Clause.
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim that Title IX’s religious exemption violates the equal protection guarantee. The panel held that it need not decide whether intermediate scrutiny or rational basis review applies because the exemption would survive the more demanding intermediate scrutiny standard. The exemption substantially relates to the achievement of limiting government interference with the free exercise of religion. The exemption does not give a free pass to discriminate on the basis of sex to every institution; it contains limits that ensure that Title IX is not enforced only where it would create a direct conflict with a religious institution’s exercise of religion.
The panel held that the district court appropriately dismissed, for lack of standing, plaintiffs’ claim under the APA challenging as arbitrary and capricious an amendment to Title IX’s implementing regulations, the August 2020 Rule, which clarified that institutions are not required to submit a written statement prior to invoking the religious exemption. None of plaintiffs’ allegations suggested that the Rule caused an individual plaintiff harm.
Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/30/23-35174.pdf
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Bills Signed by Governor (8/26/24)
AB 1966 by Assemblymember Laurie Davies (R-Laguna Niguel) – Human trafficking: notice: primary ticket sellers
AB 2631 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) – Local agencies: ethics training
AB 2987 by Assemblymember Liz Ortega (D-San Leandro) – Public postsecondary education: sex discrimination complaints: status updates and notices
SB 1335 by Senator Bob Archuleta (D-Pico Rivera) – The California Cadet Corps
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Ronderos v. USF Reddaway, Inc. (9th Cir. 21-55685 8/22/24) Arbitration
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion brought by defendants USF Reddaway, Inc. and Yellow Corporation (collectively “Reddaway”) to compel arbitration of plaintiff Jose Emilio Rondero’s employment- related claims.
Applying California law, the panel held that Reddaway’s arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable to a moderate degree because the agreement was adhesive, the circumstances under which Reddaway required Ronderos to sign the agreement involved significant oppression, and the arbitration agreement involved some surprise because the cost-splitting provision is substantively opaque. The panel also held that two of the arbitration agreement’s provisions were substantively unconscionable: (1) the one-sided filing provision, which imposes notice requirements and a one- year statute of limitations only on Ronderos; and (2) the one- sided preliminary injunction carve-out, which exempts from arbitration only Reddaway’s claims for preliminary injunctive relief.
The panel also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to sever the unconscionable provisions and enforce the remainder of the agreement.
Dissenting, Judge Bennett would hold that the district court abused its discretion because it misapplied California law in declining to sever the collateral provisions from an arbitration agreement that includes a severability clause. It should have severed those provisions and granted Reddaway’s motion to compel arbitration.
Judge Bennett wrote that both the majority and the district court decisions evince the type of “judicial hostility to arbitration” that led Congress to pass the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, 596 U.S. 639, 649 (2022). Judge Bennett also wrote that both decisions are directly contrary to “the FAA’s edict against singling out [arbitration] contracts for disfavored treatment.” Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 581 U.S. 246, 252 (2017).
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/22/21-55685.pdf
Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (SC S272113 per curiam 8/22/24) Fraudulent Concealment | Economic Loss Rule
At the request of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, we consider a question expressly left open in Robinson Helicopter v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979 (Robinson). Under California law, may a plaintiff assert a tort claim for fraudulent concealment arising from or related to the performance of a contract? The answer to the question is a qualified yes. A plaintiff may assert a fraudulent concealment cause of action based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties’ contractual rights and obligations, and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S272113.PDF
Hernandez v. Sohnen Enterprises, 102 Cal.App.5th 222 (2024), review granted, 2024 WL 3893693 (Mem) (Aug. 21, 2024); S285696/B323303 Arbitration
Petition for review after reversal of judgment. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Hohenshelt v. Superior Court (Golden State Foods Corporation), S284498 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Review granted/holding for lead case.
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Bill Signed by Governor (8/19/24)
SB 1356 by Senator Aisha Wahab (D-Silicon Valley) – Judiciary: training: gender bias
San Jose, City of v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association, 101 Cal. App. 5th 777 (2024), review granted, 2024 WL 3819092 (Aug. 14, 2024); S285426/H050889, Pension Obligation Bonds
Petition for review granted following affirmance of judgment. Is the issuance of pension obligation bonds to finance unfunded pension liability subject to the voter-approval requirement of article XVI, section 18, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution? Review granted/brief due.
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Stone v. Alameda Health System (SC S279137 8/15/24) PAGA| Public Employers
This case concerns whether a hospital authority created by a county Board of Supervisors and authorized by the Legislature to manage the county’s public health facilities may be held liable for wage and hour violations and civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA). We conclude the Legislature intended to exempt public employers such as the hospital authority from Labor Code provisions governing meal and rest breaks (§§ 226.7, 512) and related statutes governing the full and timely payment of wages (see § 220, subd. (b)). We further conclude public entities are not subject to PAGA penalties for the violations alleged here. Because the Court of Appeal reached different conclusions, we reverse its judgment.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S279137.PDF
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U.S. ex rel. Lesnik v. ISM Vuzem d.o.o. (9th Cir. 23-16114 8/12/24) Human Trafficking
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action brought under the False Claims Act and the Trafficking Victims Prevention Reauthorization Act by noncitizen laborers who were brought into the United States to work for construction subcontractor defendants.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the False Claims Act, which creates liability for submission of a false claim to the government for payment, by fraudulently applying for B-1 employment visas that cost less than the petition-based visas for which defendants should have applied. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants made reverse false claims, defined as knowingly and improperly avoiding or decreasing an obligation to pay the government. An “obligation” is defined as an “established duty” to pay. The panel held that defendants did not have an “established duty” to pay the government because even if they should have applied for the more expensive visas, they did not do so, and they therefore had no legal obligation to pay for such visas. Defendants faced only potential liability contingent upon a finding that they violated applicable regulations in applying for the wrong visas.
One plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the forced labor provision of the Trafficking Victims Prevention Reauthorization Act by threatening prosecution and suing him in order to coerce others to continue working. The panel held that the plaintiff did not state a claim because defendants’ actions did not coerce him to provide any labor.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/12/23-16114.pdf
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Parker v. BNSF Railway Co. (9th Cir. 22-35695 8/9/24) Federal Railroad Safety Act
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment in favor of BNSF Railway Company in an action brought under the anti-retaliation provision of the Federal Railroad Safety Act by Curtis Rookaird through his estate representative Paul Parker.
After a jury found in Rookaird’s favor, this court vacated the verdict and remanded for the district court to reconsider its partial summary judgment for Rookaird on the issue whether his performing an air-brake test had contributed to BNSF’s decision to terminate him. On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial on the issue and decided in BNSF’s favor. The district court found that BNSF had conceded that Rookaird’s refusal to stop performing the air- brake test contributed to its decision to discharge him, but the district court nonetheless concluded that BNSF was entitled to an affirmative defense by showing that the air- brake test “contributed very little” to its decision.
The panel affirmed the district court’s evidentiary rulings, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain testimony designations and admitting BNSF’s comparator evidence.
The panel concluded, however, that the district court’s application of the Federal Railroad Safety Act did not comply with the text of the statute, which prohibits the discriminatory discharge of an employee due even “in part” to the employee’s refusal to violate or assist in violating a railroad safety law, rule, or regulation. Nor was the district court’s conclusion consistent with relevant case law. The panel held that BNSF needed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence not merely that it could have fired Rookaird absent his engaging in the protected activity, but rather that it would have fired Rookaird. The panel vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the district court to consider whether BNSF met its burden to prove that the company would have terminated Rookaird absent his refusal to stop performing the air-brake test, given that the test could not contribute even in part to a termination decision.
Dissenting, Judge Graber wrote that the majority misread both the relevant statute and the district court’s decision. She wrote that the record amply supported the district court’s finding that BNSF proved its affirmative defense by presenting clear and convincing evidence that it would have fired Rookaird anyway, even if he had not engaged in the protected activity of testing the brakes.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/09/22-35695.pdf
Taylor et al. v. Tesla, Inc. (CA1/4 A168333 8/8/24) PAGA
In this Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) action, Tesla Inc. (Tesla) appeals from the denial of a motion under the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Seeing no merit to any of Tesla’s arguments, we affirm.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A168333.PDF
Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (SC S271721 8/1/24) PAGA
The California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) has statutory authority to collect civil penalties from employers that violate certain provisions of the Labor Code. The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) authorizes “aggrieved” employees (§ 2699, subd. (a)) — defined in part as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed” (§ 2699, subd. (c)(1)) — to bring an action to recover the civil penalties on the state’s behalf after the LWDA, having been notified of the alleged violations, declines to pursue them (id., subd. (a); § 2699.3). In such actions, the LWDA generally receives the majority of any recovered penalties and “the aggrieved employees” receive the remaining amount.
This case involves what has become a common scenario in PAGA litigation: multiple persons claiming to be an “aggrieved employee” within the meaning of PAGA file separate and independent lawsuits seeking recovery of civil penalties from the same employer for the same alleged Labor Code violations. Tina Turrieta, Brandon Olson, and Million Seifu each worked as a driver for Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) and each filed a separate action seeking civil penalties under PAGA for Lyft’s alleged failure to pay minimum wages, overtime premiums, and business expense reimbursements. In early December 2019, Turrieta and Lyft signed an agreement settling Turrieta’s action and scheduled a settlement approval hearing for January 2, 2020. Before that hearing, Olson and Seifu filed separate motions to intervene in Turrieta’s action and submitted objections to the settlement. The trial court denied the motions, approved the settlement, and later denied the motions of Olson and Seifu to vacate the judgment.
Olson and Seifu appealed, challenging both the settlement and the denials of their various motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had properly denied the intervention motions and that Olson and Seifu lacked standing to move in the trial court to vacate the judgment or to challenge the judgment on appeal. Olson petitioned for our review of the appellate court’s decision, asserting that as a deputized agent of the state under PAGA, he has the right, on behalf of the state, to intervene in Turrieta’s action, to move to vacate the judgment in that action, and to have the court consider his objections to the proposed settlement of that action.
We agree with the Court of Appeal. PAGA provides that an aggrieved employee, after complying with specified procedural prerequisites, may “commence a civil action” to recover civil penalties that the LWDA may assess and collect. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A).) Although a PAGA plaintiff may use the ordinary tools of civil litigation that are consistent with the statutory authorization to commence an action, such as taking discovery, filing motions, and attending trial, we conclude for reasons explained below that the authority Olson seeks in this case — to intervene in the ongoing PAGA action of another plaintiff asserting overlapping claims, to require a court to consider objections to a proposed settlement in that overlapping action, and to move to vacate the judgment in that action — would be inconsistent with the scheme the Legislature enacted. This conclusion best comports with the relevant provisions of PAGA as read in their statutory context, in light of PAGA’s legislative history, and in consideration of the consequences that would follow from adopting Olson’s contrary interpretation. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S271721.PDF
Kennedy v. Las Vegas Sands Corp. (9th Cir. 23-15311 8/1/24) FLSA Exemption
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment, after a bench trial, in favor of the defendants in an action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by five corporate jet pilots.
In Section I, the panel held that the pilots qualified as highly compensated employees exempt from the Act’s overtime requirements, 29 U.S.C. § 207, because they made over $100,000 per year and performed primarily non-manual labor. They also customarily and regularly made discretionary decisions over matters of significance, a duty performed by bona fide administrative, executive, or professional employees.
In Section II, the panel held that the time the pilots spent waiting for a request to fly did not constitute work mandating overtime pay because they could and did freely engage in personal activities during this time, and therefore they did not work more than 40 hours per week.
Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Judge Collins wrote that, even assuming arguendo that the majority was incorrect in concluding that the pilots qualified as having been employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity, their claims still failed for the reasons stated in Section II of the court’s opinion. Judge Collins therefore concurred in Section II and in the judgment.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/08/01/23-15311.pdf
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Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC (9th Cir. 23-55299 7/31/24) Human Trafficking
The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) for relief from judgment in an action under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).
In granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Rubicon Resources, LLC, a United States company, the district court held that plaintiffs, alleged victims of human trafficking, failed to adduce evidence that Rubicon knowingly benefitted from participation in a venture that it knew or should have known was engaged in various acts that violated the TVPRA. This court affirmed, holding in part that the phrase “knowingly benefits” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) could not be read to extend to an attempt to knowingly benefit from a perpetrator’s TVPRA violation. Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159 (9th Cir. 2022) (Ratha I), modifying 26 F.4th 1029 (9th Cir. 2022).
Congress subsequently enacted the Abolish Trafficking Reauthorization Act, or ATRA, new legislation amending § 1595(a) to impose liability on a defendant who knowingly “attempts or conspires to benefit” from participation in a venture that it knew or should have known was engaged in acts that violated the TVPRA. The district court denied plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen the final judgment and apply the new legislation, partially on the ground that ATRA did not apply to events that preceded its enactment.
The panel declined to address the novel question whether a court may reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) based on a legislative change in law, rather than a judicial change in law. Instead, the panel held that ATRA does not apply to events that occurred before its enactment. The lack of an express statutory command to apply the statute retroactively gave rise to a presumption that ATRA should not be applied retroactively. This presumption was not overcome because ATRA did not clarify what § 1595(a) meant all along. The panel reasoned that prior to the amendment, § 1595(a) was not ambiguous and did not generate inconsistent judicial decisions. In addition, no other circumstances, such as textual indicators or timing, showed that ATRA declared what the TVPRA meant at the time it was enacted. The panel concluded that a label designating ATRA as a “clarifying update” suggested a forward-looking change. Because ATRA would not apply to the conduct that was the basis of plaintiffs’ claims, the district court did not err in declining to reopen the final judgment.
Dissenting, Judge Graber wrote that she would reverse and remand for further proceedings because the amendment in question has retroactive effect. She wrote that the TVPRA was ambiguous because Congress intended to make the criminal and civil provisions coextensive, but, in one place, the civil provision omitted a phrase regarding “attempt.” Two other circuits implicitly concluded that this omission was an oversight, ruling that an attempt to benefit from human trafficking creates civil liability. This court disagreed in Ratha I, creating a circuit split. As soon as the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari in Ratha I, Congress acted immediately to resolve the ambiguity and correct this court’s error, and it did so with the label “technical and clarifying.” In addition, Congress made the amendment effective immediately.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/07/31/23-55299.pdf
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Bailey v. S.F. Dist. Attorney's Office (SC S265223 per curiam 7/29/24) FEHA Racial Harassment and Retaliation
Plaintiff Twanda Bailey sued the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office, former District Attorney George Gascon, and the City and County of San Francisco (collectively, the City) for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq. Under FEHA, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to harass an employee because of their race. (§ 12940, subd. (j)(1).) It is also an unlawful employment practice for an employer to retaliate against an employee for engaging in protected activity, such as making a complaint of racial harassment in the workplace. (§ 12940, subd. (h).)
Bailey, who is African-American, alleges that a coworker with whom she shared an office and job duties called her the N-word. Bailey further alleges that, after she reported this incident, the human resources manager for the District Attorney’s Office obstructed the filing of a formal complaint, engaged in a course of intimidating conduct, and ultimately threatened Bailey that she was “going to get it.” Bailey’s action against the City alleges she was subjected to racial harassment by her coworker and retaliation by the human resources manager after complaining of the harassment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the City, finding Bailey had failed to make a prima facie showing on her FEHA claims. The Court of Appeal affirmed, and we granted review.
This case asks us to assess whether certain conduct may be actionable under FEHA. First, we assess whether a coworker’s one-time use of a racial slur may be actionable in a claim of harassment, that is, whether such an incident may be so severe as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that an isolated act of harassment may be actionable if it is sufficiently severe in light of the totality of the circumstances, and that a coworker’s use of an unambiguous racial epithet, such as the N-word, may be found to suffice. Second, we assess whether a course of conduct that effectively seeks to withdraw an employee’s means of reporting and addressing racial harassment in the workplace is actionable in a claim of retaliation, that is, whether such conduct may constitute an adverse employment action. We conclude that it may. Applying these standards, the record presents triable issues of fact on Bailey’s harassment and retaliation claims. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S265223.PDF
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Saurman v. Peter's Landing Property Owner, LLC (CA4/3 G061561 7/26/24) ADA | Unruh Act | Disabled Persons Act | Successor in Interest
In this case we hold that a successor in interest of a disabled person who was allegedly killed by an unlawful barrier in a place of public accommodation has standing to commence a lawsuit for injunctive relief (i.e., barrier removal) in a California superior court under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA).
Kathleen Saurman suffered from medical conditions that made it difficult for her to walk. Kathleen was celebrating her 60th birthday with her husband Robert at a restaurant. While Kathleen was walking to their table, she fell on a small stairway leading to a slightly elevated area of the dining room. Robert took Kathleen to a hospital, where she contracted a fatal infection after a surgery and died.
In a wrongful death lawsuit, Robert sued the restaurant’s owner, who later sold the restaurant. In the instant lawsuit, Robert is suing both the former and the present restaurant owner, Peter’s Landing Property Owner LLC (“Owner”), alleging ADA violations, as well as violations of state disability access laws: the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the Unruh Act), and the Disabled Persons Act (the DPA).
Owner filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for sanctions against Robert’s attorney for pursuing a frivolous lawsuit. The trial court granted both motions. Robert and his attorney filed this appeal.
The trial court granted Owner’s summary judgment motion as to Robert’s ADA cause of action because the court found Robert lacked standing to bring a lawsuit for injunctive relief. We disagree.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G061561.PDF
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Ruelas v. County of Alameda (9th Cir. 21-16528 7/26/24) Detainees | Minimum Wage
The panel reversed the district court’s order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss claims brought by a putative class of non-convicted individuals who work or worked without pay for a private company, Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (“Aramark”), while detained in Alameda County’s Santa Rita Jail.
Plaintiffs filed suit against Aramark, Alameda County, and Sheriff Gregory J. Ahern, alleging, among other things, that they were entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay under California’s Labor Code.
In response to the panel’s certified question asking whether plaintiffs have a claim for minimum wage and overtime, the California Supreme Court responded that under the law as it currently stands non-convicted incarcerated individuals performing services in county jails for a for-profit company to supply meals within the county jails and related custody facilities do not have a claim for minimum wages and overtime under Section 1194 of the California Labor Code, even in the absence of a local ordinance prescribing or prohibiting the payment of wages for these individuals.
The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s response made clear that plaintiffs’ minimum wage and overtime claims failed. The California Supreme Court concluded that section 4019.3 of the California Penal Code, which permits counties to compensate prisoners for work done in county jail at rates far below minimum wage, applies broadly to all county inmates, including pretrial detainees, working in the county jail. Further, the California Supreme Court clarified that application of the statute does not turn on the identity of the employer and, therefore, applies to work performed for a private company like Aramark.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/07/26/21-16528.pdf
Morell v. Board of Ret. of the Orange County Employees' Ret. etc. (CA2/1 B331080M, filed 7/10/24, mod. 7/26/24) Public Sector Retirement Compensation
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on July 10, 2024, be modified as follows:
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On page 21, in the first full paragraph under section B, insert the word “valid” after “even though Resolution 90-1551 itself may have remained retrospectively” so that the last part of the sentence reads:
even though Resolution 90-1551 itself may have remained retrospectively valid.”
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On page 28, in the second full paragraph, in the fifth line from the bottom, change “Morrell” to Morell.
There is no change in the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.
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https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B331080M.PDF
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