Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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The Merchant of Tennis v. Super. Ct. (CA4/2 E085766 1/14/26) Wage and Hour Class Action | Revocation of Individual Settlement Agreements
In May 2022, real party in interest Jessica Garcia (Garcia) filed a third amended consolidated class action complaint against her former employer, petitioner The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. (Merchant), for failure to pay wages in violation of various provisions of the California Labor Code, and other employment-related violations under federal and state law. In May and June 2024, Merchant entered into approximately 954 individual settlement agreements (ISAs) with employees to give up their wage and hour claims against Merchant in exchange for cash payments. Merchant paid over $875,000 in cash payments to former and current employees.
Garcia moved for class certification in May 2024. She also filed a motion to invalidate the ISAs, insisting they were obtained by Merchant through coercion and fraud. The trial court did not grant the motion to invalidate the ISAs in total but agreed that the ISAs were voidable. It ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding a curative notice to be sent to all putative class members advising that they could revoke their ISAs and join the class action lawsuit. The parties could not agree on the language of the curative notice. A hearing was held on February 28, 2025, at which the trial court ruled on the curative notice to be sent to all putative class members who had signed ISAs. The trial court ruled that the curative notice did not need to include that if the parties chose to revoke their ISAs, they may have to pay back the settlement amount if Merchant prevailed. It did advise the class members that the amount of recovery, should they prevail, may be offset by the settlement payments. The trial court agreed to stay its order on the curative notice until March 31, 2025, in order for Merchant to seek review.
Merchant filed a petition for writ of mandate (Petition) asking this court to issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its February 28, 2025, ruling; that the trial court be instructed to comply with California’s rescission statutes, Civil Code sections 1689 and 1691, as part of the curative notice; that the trial court be instructed the curative notice must inform putative class members that if they revoke their ISAs to join the class action lawsuit, they are required to immediately return the settlement payment. Merchant requested a further stay of the trial court’s order until the issue has been resolved by this Court, which we granted. We then issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085766.PDF
Carroll v. City and County of S.F. (CA1/4 A169408M, filed 12/5/25 mod. & review den. 1/14/26) FEHA Age Discrimination | Municipal Disability Retirement
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on November 12, 2025, be modified as follows:
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On page 12, the first sentence under the subheading “Standard of Review” starting, “Plaintiffs state at times in their briefing that the trial court erred in its rulings at summary judgment and after the bench trial on their substantive FEHA claims, but their challenges in this appeal . . . .” is replaced with:
Plaintiffs state at times in their briefing that the trial court erred in its rulings at summary judgment and after the bench trial on their substantive FEHA claims, but the substantive challenges as briefed in this appeal are to the trial court’s ruling after the bench trial.
There is no change in judgment.
The petition for rehearing is denied.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169408M.PDF
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Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Admin. Services (CA2/8 B338584 1/13/26) Arbitration
Plaintiff Sinedou S. Tuufuli appeals from the trial court’s order granting defendant West Coast Dental Administrative Services, LLC’s (West Coast Dental) motion to compel arbitration of Tuufuli’s individual claims and to dismiss Tuufuli’s class claims. The only issue Tuufuli raises on appeal is whether the court correctly found the parties’ arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). As we explain, the court correctly found the FAA governs the parties’ arbitration agreement because they agreed to be bound by the act. We therefore affirm the order granting West Coast Dental’s motion to compel arbitration of Tuufuli’s individual claims and to dismiss her class claims.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338584.PDF
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Spilman v. The Salvation Army (CA1/5 A169279 1/6/26) Non-Profit Volunteer | Wage and Hour
Plaintiffs Justin Spilman, Teresa Chase, and Jacob Tyler (collectively “Spilman”) worked full time for the Salvation Army, a nonprofit organization, in various operations that supported its retail thrift stores. Spilman worked without wages as part of a six-month, residential, substance abuse rehabilitation program. He now alleges that, under California law, the Salvation Army was required to pay him the minimum wage and overtime. The trial court determined that the wage laws do not apply because Spilman was a volunteer, not an employee, and it granted summary judgment to the Salvation Army. We agree that a volunteer for a nonprofit organization can fall outside the wage laws, but we conclude the trial court applied the wrong standard to distinguish a volunteer from an employee. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169279.PDF
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Union Gospel Mission of Yakima v. Brown (9th Cir. 24-7246 1/6/26) Washington Anti-Discrimination Law | Hiring Preference for Co-Religionists for Non-Ministerial Roles
The panel affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) against the Union Gospel Mission of Yakima, Washington —a Christian ministry—for preferring and hiring co-religionists for nonministerial roles.
WLAD prohibits employment discrimination based on several protected grounds, including sexual orientation. Because of its religious purpose, Union Gospel requires its employees to agree with and live out its Christian beliefs and practices, including “abstaining from any sexual conduct outside of biblical marriage between one man and one woman.” Union Gospel brought this pre-enforcement action against the Washington State Attorney General and the Washington State Human Rights Commission, alleging violations of the First Amendment and requesting an injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing WLAD against it.
The panel held that Union Gospel is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that enforcing WLAD against it for hiring only co-religionists violates the church autonomy doctrine, as established by the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses. The church autonomy doctrine encompasses more than just the ministerial exception. It forbids interference with “an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.” In this case, Union Gospel’s co-religionist hiring policy constitutes an internal management decision that is essential to the institution’s central mission. It is uncontested that (1) Union Gospel is a religious institution, (2) Union Gospel has a sincerely held religious belief that only co-religionists may advance its religious mission, and (3) Union Gospel’s co-religionist hiring policy is based on that religious belief.
Under the church autonomy doctrine, Union Gospel may decline to hire as non-ministerial employees those who do not share its religious beliefs about marriage and sexuality. But unlike the ministerial exception, the church autonomy doctrine protects only Union Gospel’s nonministerial hiring decisions based on religious beliefs. Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other ground. The panel emphasized that its decision was limited to religious organizations like Union Gospel and that it did not consider the scope of the doctrine on other types of entities run by religious institutions, such as businesses or hospitals.
The panel held that the remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the public interest and balance of the equities—favored Union Gospel.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/06/24-7246.pdf
NV Resort Ass’n-Int’l All. V. JB Viva Vegas (9th Cir. 24-2791 & 24-3047 1/6/26) Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Nevada Resort Association-International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada Local 720 Pension Trust, and remanded, in an action brought by JB Viva Vegas, L.P., to challenge withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act.
The MPPAA amended the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to impose liability on employers, like JB, that withdraw from multiemployer pension plans, such as the plan administered by the Trust. But an exemption from withdrawal liability exists for employers contributing to plans that primarily cover “employees in the entertainment industry.” The panel held that, under the plain text of the statute, there is no minimum amount of entertainment work required for an individual to be an employee in the entertainment industry under the MPPAA. And even if the text were ambiguous, the best reading of the exception is that “employees in the entertainment industry” are individuals performing any amount of entertainment work. Accordingly, the panel held that the Trust’s plan primarily covered “employees in the entertainment industry” because there is no minimum entertainment-work requirement, and the majority of employees covered by the plan perform some entertainment work.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/06/24-3047.pdf
Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases (CA3 C099436M, filed 12/9/25, mod. & rehrng. denied 1/6/26) Arbitration
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on December 9, 2025, be modified as follows:
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At page 6, in the first full paragraph, modify the third sentence that reads, “On January 31, 2022, the trial court entered an order imposing monetary sanctions of $4,210 against Sierra Pacific for knowingly violating the February 2020 order by failing to provide Belaire-West notices to all non-exempt employees at the Red Bluff facilities” to omit the word “knowingly” so that the sentence reads:
On January 31, 2022, the trial court entered an order imposing monetary sanctions of $4,210 against Sierra Pacific for violating the February 2020 order by failing to provide Belaire-West notices to all non-exempt employees at the Red Bluff facilities.
There is no change in the judgment. The petition for rehearing is denied.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C099436M.PDF
Walker Specialty Constr., Inc. v. Board of Trustees (9th Cir. 24-1560 1/5/26) Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Walker Specialty Construction, Inc., in Walker’s action against the Board of Trustees of the Construction Industry and Laborers Joint Pension Trust, contesting withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, an amendment to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act that imposes liability on employers that withdraw from multiemployer pension plans.
The panel held that Walker was exempt from withdrawal liability under the MPPAA because its asbestos abatement work qualified it for the “building and construction industry” exception to liability. The panel concluded that, as the agency tasked with enforcing the Labor Management Relations Act, the only other statute in which Congress had previously used the term “building and construction industry,” the National Labor Relations Board established a settled meaning for the term to include not only the erection of new buildings, but also maintenance, repair, and alterations that are essential to a building or structure’s usability. The panel inferred that Congress’s intent to incorporate the NLRB’s definition into the MPPA was plain from its use of the same language in both statutes. The panel concluded that, under the NLRB’s comprehensive definition, Walker’s asbestos abatement work was within the building and construction industry, and it therefore qualified for the liability exemption.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/05/24-1560.pdf
American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Trump (9th Cir. 25-3293 and 25-4476 1/5/26) Federal Reductions in Force
In a case in which the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL–CIO and others challenge President Trump’s Executive Order 14210 directing federal agencies to commence large-scale reductions in force (“RIFs”), the panel denied a petition for panel rehearing or en banc rehearing of the panel’s decision (1) denying the government parties’ petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s discovery order requiring in camera production of the Agency RIF and Reorganization Plans of all named agency defendants, (2) vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction, and (3) remanding to the district court.
Respecting the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge W. Fletcher and Judge Rawlinson responded to the dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. First, although the Supreme Court had stayed the district court’s preliminary injunction in an earlier iteration of this case, the Court specifically left open the legality of the documents at issue. Second, the panel assumed that the privilege for predecisional deliberative documents applied to the Agency RIF and Reorganization Plans in question but agreed with the district court’s conclusion that the privilege was overridden in the circumstances of this case. Third, the panel carefully considered the well-established four-factor test set forth in FTC v. Warner Commc’ns Inc., 742 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1984), in determining that the deliberative process privilege was overcome and that mandamus was not warranted. Fourth, the strong showing of a bad faith required for discovery of documents outside the administrative record was irrelevant because in this case there was no administrative record. Finally, the dissent fails to adequately account for the exceptional standard for granting mandamus.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Bumatay, joined by Judges Callahan, R. Nelson, VanDyke and Tung, wrote that, in denying the mandamus petition, the panel made three errors that needed correction by our en banc court. First, the panel majority flirted with the idea that the government’s internal RIF Plans were not even deliberative—a truly extreme position. It wrongly suggested that the government’s internal RIF Plans are not predecisional, deliberative materials. Second, and more importantly, the panel majority severely weakened the deliberative process privilege—a doctrine with deep common-law roots that protects the separation of powers. It failed to adequately address the separation-of-powers concerns in ordering the discovery of intra-executive branch documents. Third, the panel majority created a blueprint for making an end-run around the Administrative Procedure Act’s normal discovery rules. It mangled the law for ordering extra-record discovery and so expanded it to circumvent any limits on the production of internal government documents.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/01/05/25-3293.pdf
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Thompson v. CVSD No. 365 (9th Cir. 24-5263 12/29/25) Retaliation | First Amendment
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Central Valley School District (“CVSD”) and individual school administrators in a suit brought by Randy Thompson, a former middle school assistant principal, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.
Thompson was placed on paid administrative leave and subsequently transferred to a teaching position as a result of his posting on Facebook a comment about the Democratic National Convention that used epithets, slurs, and violent language.
Applying the two-step Pickering framework, the panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Thompson made out a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim for private speech he made on a matter of public concern. The panel assumed, without deciding, that a reasonable jury could conclude that placing Thompson on paid administrative leave could constitute an adverse employment action and that the record supported a finding that the Facebook post was a substantial or motivating factor in that decision. However, CVSD sufficiently showed a reasonable prediction of disruption under Pickering Step Two. CVSD’s interest in creating a safe and inclusive school environment outweighed the public interest commentary contained in Thompson’s speech.
Because Thompson’s First Amendment rights were not violated, the panel affirmed the district court’s finding of qualified immunity in favor of the individual school officials.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/29/24-5263.pdf
Khatibi v. Hawkins (9th Cir. 24-3108 12/29/25) First Amendment | Government Speech
The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc of the panel’s decision affirming the district court’s dismissal of an action, brought by a physician instructor of continuing medical education (CME) courses and a nonprofit comprised of healthcare professionals and policymakers, alleging that the Medical Board of California’s requirement that CME courses eligible for credit include information about implicit bias violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge VanDyke, joined by Judges Bumatay and Tung, wrote that the panel erred in concluding that CME courses are government speech devoid of any First Amendment protection because (1) California has not historically used CME courses to communicate the state’s own messages, (2) those attending CME courses would be unlikely to perceive the instructor’s message as the government’s message, and (3) the state’s regulations otherwise exert very little control over CME instructors’ messages. The panel’s decision puts this circuit out of step with the precedent of the Supreme Court and sister circuits, and even this circuit’s precedent.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Tung, joined by Judges Bumatay and VanDyke, wrote that private instructors of continuing medical education courses do not engage in “government speech,” for the simple reason that they are not the government and they do not speak for the government. A law requiring them to convey a viewpoint they find objectionable thus restricts their private expression and is not exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/29/24-3108.pdf
Employees at Clark County Gov’t Ctr., v. Monsanto, Co. (9th Cir. 25-6625 12/29/25) CAFA
The panel reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court an action brought by a class of individual plaintiffs who alleged they were injured while working at the Clark County Government Center because they were exposed to toxic waste dumped at the site.
Plaintiffs originally brought this case in Nevada state court alleging that some of the waste dumped at the site contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and that the former Monsanto Company (Old Monsanto) manufactured more than 99 percent of all PCBs sold in the United States. Old Monsanto’s corporate successors—Pharmacia LLC, Solutia Inc., and Monsanto Co—removed this case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to remand this case to state court, holding that this case falls within CAFA’s “local controversy exception.”
The panel held that CAFA’s local controversy exception does not apply because plaintiffs cannot satisfy the “principal injuries” element of the exception, which directs the federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction if, among other requirements, the “principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III). Here, the principal injuries of Old Monsanto’s alleged conduct were not incurred in Nevada. Plaintiffs made no allegations suggesting that the injuries from PCBs in Nevada were more significant than those in other States. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s order remanding the case to state court.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/29/25-6625.pdf
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Amazon.com Services, LLC v. NLRB (9th Cir. 25-886 12/29/25) NLRA
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying Amazon.com Services, LLC’s motion for a preliminary injunction to stop administrative proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board (Board) after Amazon was charged with unfair-labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act for refusing to recognize and bargain with the Teamsters Amazon National Negotiating Committee (Teamsters), which represent a group of former Amazon delivery drivers.
Amazon argued that the Board and its administrative procedures for adjudicating labor disputes are unconstitutional and sued to enjoin the Board and its named officials from engaging in unconstitutional administrative proceedings. The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested relief under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113, which strips federal courts of power “to issue any . . . injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”
The panel held that the definition of “labor dispute” set forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113(a), imposes separate mandates for the pending case and the underlying labor dispute, both of which were satisfied here. First, the panel held that section 113(a)’s case-related requirements were satisfied. Both Amazon and the Teamsters are entangled in or implicated in the issues to be decided here because Amazon’s constitutional challenges concern the agency’s adjudication of the ULP claims that the Teamsters initiated. Second, the panel also held that the underlying Board proceeding is obviously a labor dispute. It concerns the terms of employment and the representation of the drivers, and the dispute is between employers and employees, namely, Amazon and the Teamsters. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Amazon’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/12/29/25-886.pdf
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Mendoza v. Bd. of Retirement of the Ventura County etc. CA2/6 B32734, filed 12/3/25, pub. 12/29/25) Public Sector Disability Retirement
Alberto Mendoza appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for a writ of administrative mandate challenging the decision of respondent Board of Retirement of the Ventura County Employees Association (the Board) to deny his application for a service-connected disability retirement based on two work-related back injuries. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5; Gov. Code, §§ 31720-31752.) In denying the petition, the court agreed with the Board’s finding that appellant’s disability was a result of his unreasonable refusal to undergo recommended medical treatment for his injuries, as contemplated in Reynolds v. City of San Carlos (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 208 (Reynolds) and Labor Code section 4056. Appellant contends the court misapplied the law and that the evidence does not support the finding he unreasonably refused recommended medical treatment. We affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B327347.PDF
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