Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group, Inc., 2025 WL3628510 (nonpub. Dec. 15, 2025), review granted (Mar. 25, 2026); S294710/F088971
Petition for review after affirmance of order denying motion to compel arbitration. If an arbitration agreement provides that disputes will be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; the FAA), do the FAA’s substantive provisions apply and preempt inconsistent state laws regardless of whether interstate commerce is involved? Review granted/brief due.
Blunt v. Town of Gilbert (9th Cir. 24-3538 4/3/26) Retroactivity | AZ POBOR
This case raises the issue of whether Arizona’s presumption against retroactivity prohibits application of a 2022 amendment to the Arizona Peace Officers Bill of Rights (POBOR) to an at-will employment contract signed in 2021 between a police officer and his employer. Because the disposition of this appeal turns on an important and unsettled question of Arizona law, we submit this request to the Arizona Supreme Court to exercise its discretion and accept the following certified questions in accordance with Supreme Court of Arizona Rule 27 and Section 12-1861 of the Arizona Revised Statutes:
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Does the presumption against retroactivity prohibit application of the 2022 amendment to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1102 to at-will employment agreements that were signed before the 2022 amendment?
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If the presumption against retroactivity does not apply, does the 2022 amendment void the at-will employment contract between Blunt and the Town of Gilbert because the facts giving rise to Blunt’s termination occurred after enactment of the amendment, such that any discipline imposed against him by the Town must be supported by just cause?
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If the 2022 amendment voids the at-will employment contract between Blunt and the Town of Gilbert, would that result in impairment of a vested contractual right in violation of the Contract Clause of the Arizona State Constitution?
Our phrasing of the questions should not restrict the Court’s consideration of the issues involved. The Court is not limited to the particular questions outlined above, and it may modify or expand upon the questions as it deems appropriate. If the Court decides not to accept certification, we will decide the question as we believe the Arizona Supreme Court would. See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/03/24-3538.pdf
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The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court (CA4/2 E085766N, filed 1/14/26, further mod. 4/2/26) Wage and Hour Class Action | Revocation of Individual Settlement Agreements
On the court’s own motion, the majority opinion filed in this matter on January 14, 2026, is modified as follows:
To the “Disposition,” we add the following sentence: “Each side is to bear their own costs on appeal.”
Except for this modification, the majority opinion remains unchanged. The modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085766N.PDF
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O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-1528 4/1/26) Arbitration | Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel
Reversing the district court’s judgment in a putative class action brought by former employees of a travel-nursing agency against the agency for purported wage-related violations, the panel held that the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements was not compatible with the Federal Arbitration Act.
The agency entered into arbitration agreements with each of its employees, and the agreements contained a clause requiring an arbitrator (not a court) to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement. The district court sent four cases to separate arbitrations. Two arbitrators found the agreements valid, and the other two arbitrators found the agreements invalid. Applying the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, the district court picked the two arbitral awards invalidating the agreements to preclude the arbitration of disputes with respect to 255 other employees who had separate arbitration agreements with the agency.
The panel held that the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel cannot be invoked to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Nowhere in the FAA did Congress contemplate that a non-mutual preclusion doctrine could be deployed to frustrate an arbitration that the parties had agreed to undertake in resolving their disputes. The application of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion would also violate the principle of consent that the FAA incorporates. In addition, the application of the doctrine to deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement is incorrect because the district court’s ruling effectively transformed individualized arbitral proceedings into something akin to a bellwether class action to which the parties never agreed.
Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/01/25-1528.pdf
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Cleare et al. v. Super. Ct. (CA1/2 A173289M, filed 3/25/26, mod.3/26/26) [formerly captioned as West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct.] Teacher Vacancy or Misassignment
THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 25, 2026, be modified as follows:
1. We modify the caption of the opinion, demonstrated above, correcting the parties and titles pertaining thereto.
2. On page 14, the first sentence under “Disposition” shall read as follows: “Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the Superior Court of Contra Costa County to vacate the minute order denying the petition of mandate and to enter a new order granting the petition.”
This modification does effect a change in the Judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(2).)
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173289M.PDF
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Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock (US 24-935 Oral Argument 3/25/26) Last-Mile Delivery Drivers | Arbitration
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce-but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders-"transportation workers" "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption?
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10th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct. (CA1/2 A173289 3/25/26) Teacher Vacancy or Misassignment
This is a proceeding for mandate brought by four teachers seeking to compel the West Contra Costa Unified School District (District) to alter its practices for putting teachers in specified schools in the District, and to direct the District to comply with the statutory scheme governing the subject. At trial, the issue quickly became reframed as whether the District had established that compliance with the relevant statutes made it impossible to put enough qualified teachers in classrooms, thus excusing the District’s non-compliance. The trial court answered this question in the District’s favor.
We conclude the ruling must be set aside because the District failed to establish that it had unsuccessfully tried to comply with all of the governing statutory procedures for filling teacher vacancies. Unless and until the District carries that burden, it is premature to consider whether the doctrine of impossibility will excuse the District’s non-compliance with those procedures.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173289.PDF
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Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson (CA4/3 G064847 3/24/26) Attorney-Client Privileged Material Inadvertently Transmitted
One of the key facets of the legal profession is the robust and ever-growing set of ethical obligations to which attorneys must adhere. Among those obligations, with which every attorney should be very familiar, is one concerning what an attorney should do if they come into possession of seemingly attorney-client privileged material belonging to another that appears to have been inadvertently transmitted.
These employment related cases require us to determine an attorney’s obligations in slightly different circumstances: an attorney receives from their client a seemingly attorney-client privileged email belonging to an opposing party; the email was originally and intentionally sent to the client when the client was an executive employed by the opposing party employer; however, unbeknownst to the employer, the email was subsequently forwarded by the executive employee to their personal email address and, following their termination, provided to their attorney for use in a lawsuit against their former employer.
Appellants Guardian Storage Centers, LLC (Guardian) and John Minar appeal from orders denying disqualification of the law firm representing respondents, Aarons Ward (Aarons), under such circumstances. They contend the trial court abused its discretion by making unsupported factual findings and applying incorrect legal standards in parts of its analysis. From their perspective, the proper analysis compels the conclusion that Aarons should be disqualified because it impermissibly conducted a detailed review of the attorney-client privileged emails, failed to notify Guardian it possessed them, refused to return them upon Guardian’s demand, and has indicated its intent to use them against Guardian and related parties in the instant litigation.
We conclude the denial of disqualification was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. The trial court’s finding that the disputed emails are attorney-client privileged, with Guardian being the privilege holder, is supported by substantial evidence, and respondents failed to demonstrate waiver of the privilege. Although the respondents who received the emails were intended recipients at the time they were sent, the court erred in finding this factor favored denying disqualification and, thereby, implicitly rejecting application of the analytical framework set forth in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644 (State Fund). We find what has come to be known as the State Fund rule, which originated from a situation involving inadvertent disclosure by a party’s attorney, equally applicable to a situation in which it is reasonably apparent the privileged material was impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization. Because the trial court did not analyze the circumstances through that proper legal lens, employed too limited a test for determining whether the content of the privileged emails could likely be used to Guardian’s disadvantage in the instant litigation, and made an unsupported finding related thereto, we reverse the challenged orders and remand the matter so the court may reconsider Guardian’s disqualification motions in accordance with this opinion.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064847.PDF
Pechkis v. Trustees of the Cal. State University (CA3 C103742 3/24/26) Retaliation | Anti-SLAPP
A motion to strike a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP), under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, must “ ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim’ ” and “identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) Plaintiff professors Hyewon Pechkis and Joseph Pechkis sued defendant the Trustees of the California State University based on retaliation from reporting discrimination and harassment by a department chair at California State University, Chico (Chico State). Defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion against two retaliation causes of action; the trial court denied the motion and defendant appeals.
On appeal defendant argues the challenged causes of action must be stricken because they are based “in part” on communications between Chico State employees and employees at another campus relating to an investigation into Hyewon, and these communications are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirm, concluding defendant failed to carry its burden because whether the challenged causes of action are based in part on protected activity does not necessarily establish the causes of action arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C103742.PDF
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The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court (CA4/2 E085766M, filed 1/14/26, mod. 3/23/26) Wage and Hour Class Action | Revocation of Individual Settlement Agreements
On the court’s own motion, the majority opinion filed in this matter on January 14, 2026, is modified as follows:
To the “Disposition,” we add the following sentence: “Each side is to bear their own costs on appeal.”
Except for this modification, the majority opinion remains unchanged. The modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085766M.PDF
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Sandler v. Modernizing Medicine, Inc. (9th Cir. 24-6623 3/19/26) Arbitration
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying a motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration.
The employment contract between the parties specified that any employment-related disputes be subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act. The district court acknowledged that the arbitration agreement delegated the question of the agreement’s validity to an arbitrator to decide. The district court ruled, however, that where the contract contained a severability clause permitting a court to excise an unconscionable provision, the delegation clause did not constitute a clear and unmistakable delegation and thus could not be enforced.
The panel held that the district court misapplied federal law and erroneously relied on state-court decisions pointing to the existence of a severability clause to refuse to compel arbitration. The parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrator resolve any challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement. The clear and unmistakable nature of the delegation was not negated by the presence of a severability clause. The panel rejected the district court’s attempt to adopt a state rule that disfavored arbitration here.
The panel also vacated the district court’s judgment that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The district court should not have addressed the issue in the first place, but instead should have enforced the delegation clause requiring an arbitrator’s resolution.
The panel remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration and to stay the case pending the completion of arbitration proceedings.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/19/24-6623.pdf
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Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (CA5 F089695, filed 2/19/26, pub. 3/17/26) Arbitration
Jazmin Ayala-Ventura filed a putative class action complaint against her former employer, CCS Facility Services-Fresno Inc. (CCS), alleging various state law violations for unpaid wages, meal and rest break violations, failure to reimburse business expenses, and unlawful business practices. CCS moved to compel arbitration of Ayala-Ventura’s claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement she executed when she was hired. The trial court granted CCS’s motion, ordered arbitration of Ayala-Ventura’s individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.
On appeal, Ayala-Ventura contends: (1) the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it is overbroad, lacks mutuality, and indefinite in duration; and (2) the trial court is bound by stare decisis to follow Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook), and erred by finding Cook factually distinguishable, not persuasive, and not binding.
Given the uncertainty of the trial court order’s appealability, we deem the appeal a petition for writ of mandate. We deny the petition on the merits.