Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
See prior archived alerts by clicking on "Blog" under menu. For alerts older than one year, please request under Contact tab.
Chang v. So. Cal. Permanente Medical Group (CA2/1 B340770, filed 4/9/26, pub. 4/28/26) Respondeat Superior Liability for Employee Tort | Going and Coming Rule
Plaintiff Kai-Lin Chang appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG). Chang sued SCPMG over a vehicular accident allegedly caused by SCPMG employee Brittany A. Doremus while she was driving to work in the morning. The trial court ruled SCPMG was entitled to summary judgment under the “going and coming rule,” which exempts employers from liability for employee torts committed while commuting to and from work.
On appeal, Chang contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because SCPMG failed to offer admissible evidence negating the possibility Doremus was talking or texting with coworkers on her employer-issued cell phone at the time of the accident. Alternatively, Chang argues the going and coming rule should not apply because SCPMG allowed Doremus to work from home as well as at her office, and thus she was not commuting but traveling between job sites.
It was not SCPMG’s burden to negate all possibility Doremus was working at the time of the accident. It was sufficient that SCPMG made a prima facie showing Doremus was not working, a burden SCPMG met through Doremus’s deposition testimony. The burden then shifted to Chang to provide contradictory evidence demonstrating a triable issue. Chang did not meet this burden.
We disagree that Doremus sometimes working from home converted her home to a second worksite for all purposes. Her uncontradicted testimony established that on Mondays, the day of the week the accident occurred, she did not work from home but at her office. Thus, at the time of the accident, she was engaged in an ordinary morning commute, not transitioning between worksites.
Accordingly, we affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B340770.PDF
Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC, et al. (CA2/3 B344945 4/24/26) EFAA | Arbitration
Plaintiff Craig Stoker was employed by defendant Blue Origin, LLC from 2020 to 2022. After he was terminated, Stoker sued Blue Origin and others (collectively, Blue Origin) for a variety of employment claims, including sexual harassment in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). Blue Origin moved to compel arbitration of Stoker’s claims under a contractual arbitration agreement, and Stoker opposed the motion, urging that the complaint alleged a “sexual harassment dispute” within the meaning of the federal Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. § 402, subd. (a)), and the arbitration provision was substantively and procedurally unconscionable. The trial court concluded that the EFAA applied, and thus Stoker could not be compelled to arbitrate his claims. Blue Origin appealed.
We affirm. As we discuss, the arbitration agreement is substantively and procedurally unconscionable, and severance is not appropriate in this case. We therefore affirm the order denying the motion to compel arbitration without considering the applicability of the EFAA to Stoker’s claims.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B344945.PDF
Amezcua v. Super. Ct. (CA4/1 D087216 4/24/26) Attorneys’ Fees
Unless “specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Although there are statutes in our code that permit a trial court to award attorney fees as sanctions for pretrial motion practice under many circumstances, section 473 is not one of them.
For this reason, we grant Karla Amezcua’s petition for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate an order that grants her leave to amend the operative complaint, but only if she pays $25,000 to Massage Envy Franchising, LLC (Massage Envy). Neither the court nor Massage Envy invoked the authority of statutes that do allow attorney fees as sanctions (see §§ 128.5, 128.7). Sua sponte, the court awarded attorney fees to penalize delay and inefficiencies in seeking to amend a[n employment] complaint on the basis of section 473. As we explain, this was not authorized. We grant the requested relief and direct the court to strike the payment condition from its order to the extent it includes attorney fees.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D087216.PDF
Santana v. Studebaker Health Care Center (CA2/7 B343640, filed 4/7/26, pub. 4/22/26) Arbitration
When Studebaker Health Care Center, Inc. hired J. Asencion Santana, Studebaker required him to sign a series of documents. In three of the documents Studebaker and Santana agreed to arbitrate most disputes arising out of their employment relationship, except for non-individual claims brought as a private attorney general under the Labor Code Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). After his employment ended Santana filed a wage-and-hour class action against Studebaker, which included a cause of action under PAGA. Studebaker filed a motion to compel arbitration, and the trial court denied it.
Studebaker appeals from the order denying its motion to compel arbitration, arguing the trial court erred in ruling that, because of various “conflicts” among the three arbitration-related documents, there was no valid agreement to arbitrate. Studebaker also argues the trial court erred in ruling in the alternative the agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable and unenforceable.
We agree with Studebaker on both counts. Though the agreement to arbitrate contains a few ambiguities, those ambiguities do not undermine the parties’ clear agreement to arbitrate employment-related disputes. And though the agreement to arbitrate reflects some procedural unconscionability—as contracts of adhesion generally do—the agreement does not contain any substantively unconscionable terms and is not unenforceable. Therefore, we reverse.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B343640.PDF
Martinez v. Sierra Lifestar (CA5 F089576 4/21/26) Wage and Hour Class Certification
Plaintiff Adam Martinez appeals the denial of his motion for class certification of wage and hour claims against his former employer. Martinez alleges Sierra Lifestar, Inc. (Lifestar) miscalculated the “regular rate of pay” (Lab. Code, § 510, subd. (a)) of approximately 135 workers by excluding nondiscretionary bonuses, which caused Lifestar to underpay overtime, double time, and premiums for meal and rest periods.
Lifestar opposed class certification, arguing common questions of law or fact did not predominate and, furthermore, Martinez’s claim was not typical of the proposed classes. Lifestar supported this argument by asserting it paid 10 types of bonuses, each type of bonus had its own criteria, Martinez was paid only one type of bonus, and he received that “EMS Bonus” only once. “EMS Bonus” is Lifestar’s pay code for a bonus given to its employees in connection with National Emergency Medical Services Week.
The trial court denied the motion for class certification on the sole ground that Martinez did not establish his claim was typical of the other claims arising from his theory that Lifestar improperly excluded bonuses when calculating an employee’s regular rate of pay. We conclude the trial court committed legal error in its analysis of whether a unique defense defeated the typicality of Martinez’s claim. Lifestar’s arguments that Martinez’s EMS Bonus was properly excluded from his regular rate of pay because it was in the nature of a gift, was discretionary, or both, are not unique to Martinez. Those arguments apply to all EMS Bonuses paid to Lifestar’s other employees for National Emergency Medical Services Week and, therefore, are not unique to Martinez.
We therefore reverse the order denying class certification and remand for further consideration of the class certification motion.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F089576.PDF
Gessele v. Jack in the Box Inc. (9th Cir. 23-2522, 23-2527, amended opn. 4/20/26) Wage and Hour Oregon Law
The panel filed (1) an order replacing the opinion filed on November 25, 2025, with an amended opinion, and denying Appellees’ petition for panel rehearing as moot; and (2) an amended opinion reversing in part and affirming in part the district court’s judgment in a wage-and-hour case brought by plaintiffs against their former employer, Jack in the Box (JITB), on behalf of themselves and a class of other former employees.
Plaintiffs challenged three JITB policies: JITB over-deducted its employees’ wages for the Workers’ Benefit Fund (WBF), JITB did not pay workers for interrupted meal periods more than 20 minutes long, and JITB deducted employees’ pay for non-slip shoes.
Plaintiffs prevailed on the WBF claims, and JITB defeated the unpaid break and shoe claims. JITB appealed, and plaintiffs cross-appealed. The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the WBF, the shoe claims, and the unpaid break claims, and remanded.
Addressing JITB’s appeal concerning the WBF over-deductions, the panel held that the district court erred in finding, at summary judgment, that JITB’s over-deductions were willful such that JITB owed penalty wages, and remanded for a trial on willfulness. To help the district court and the parties retry the case, the panel also provided guidance on a penalty wage theory the parties call “Late Final Pay 1”—a claim for penalty wages for WBF over-deductions but not minimum wage or overtime violations—and the constitutional limits on penalty wages.
Next, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exclude the class members whose mailed notices were undeliverable, nor did the district court err in refusing to reduce the prejudgment interest for plaintiffs’ alleged delays. However, on remand, the district court will have to recalculate the prejudgment interest in light of the holding on willfulness.
Addressing plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, the panel held that it had jurisdiction. Because the district court granted JITB’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) motion, the 30-day deadline of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) ran from the amended judgment, and the cross-appeal was timely.
The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to certify the unpaid break class. The parties disputed whether an employer was always liable when it cut meal breaks short, and if liable whether the remedy was wages for the length of the shortened break. In Maza v. Waterford Operations, LLC, 300 Or. App. 471 (2019), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that Oregon employers had to pay for shortened meal breaks. The panel held that the district court attempted to duck Maza, but its reasoning was not persuasive. The district court found that Maza applied only prospectively, but Maza governs meal breaks that occurred before Maza was decided. Maza’s holding that Oregon employers must enforce meal breaks applied before June 2010. Consistent with Maza, employers must pay for shortened meal breaks even before June 2010 pursuant to the reasoning in Athena v. Pelican Brewing Co., 345 Or. App. 172 (2025). The panel concluded that JITB was required to pay for the full 30 minutes of shortened meal periods pursuant to OAR § 839-020-0050 before June 2010. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s denial of class certification and remanded.
The district court erred in granting JITB’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the named Plaintiffs’ individual unpaid break claims for the same reason that it erred in denying class certification for the pre-June 2010 class claims.
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment on the shoe claims. The panel held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to JITB on its affirmative defense that the shoe deductions were for its employees’ benefit, and reversed and remanded so a jury can decide whether the shoe requirement was for the employees’ benefit. The panel also remanded so the district court can reconsider whether to certify the shoe class in light of the panel’s decision.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/20/23-2522.pdf
Paknad v. Super. Ct. (CA6 H052652, filed 3/24/26, pub. 4/17/26) Workplace Investigation Report | Attorney Work Product Privilege
This is the second mandate proceeding occasioned by two reports and investigative materials prepared by an attorney commissioned by defendants and real parties in interest, Intuitive Surgical, Inc. and Intuitive Surgical Operations, Inc., to investigate plaintiff and petitioner Michelle Paknad’s claims of sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and unlawful retaliation as an Intuitive employee.
In the first proceeding, we concluded that despite a “relationship . . . giving rise to the attorney‑client privilege and work product protections,” Intuitive waived the privilege “by placing the scope and adequacy of the investigations at issue, . . . such that . . . disclosure of the material is ‘ “essential for a fair adjudication of the action.” ’ ” (Paknad v. Superior Court (May 20, 2024, H050711) [nonpub. opn.] (Paknad I), quoting Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 128 (Wellpoint).) While we stopped short of holding that Intuitive had necessarily waived protection as to all the investigator’s materials or core work product under Code of Civil Procedure 2018.030, subdivision (a), we issued a peremptory writ directing the respondent court to “grant[] the motion [to compel production of the] . . . reports and related investigative materials,” subject to an in camera review “to determine ‘if some protection is warranted notwithstanding the waiver’ . . . .” (Paknad I, supra, H050711, quoting Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 740 (Costco Wholesale Corp.) and citing People v. Superior Court (Jones) (2021) 12 Cal.5th 348, 366 (Jones).)
Before the respondent court, the parties disputed whether Intuitive’s waiver of attorney work product protection extended to core work product. The court ultimately ordered disclosure of the reports and investigative materials subject to Intuitive’s proposed redactions. Because the redactions excised all the investigator’s factual findings, Paknad petitioned again for mandamus relief.
Having reviewed the proposed redactions of the records lodged with the respondent court, we will grant Paknad’s second petition for writ of mandate.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H052652.PDF
Cleare et al. v. Super. Ct. (CA1/2 A173289N, filed 3/25/26, mod. 3/26/26, further mod. 4/17/26) [formerly captioned as West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct.] Teacher Vacancy or Misassignment
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 25, 2026, be modified as follows:
On page 13, in the third independent paragraph, delete the sentence that begins with the word “As” and ends with the word “requirement”, and replace it with a sentence that reads as follows:
“While there is evidence that the District applied for and apparently obtained some waivers from the Commission on Teachers Credentialing, we do not understand it to demonstrate that the District did all it could in this regard before that body or that the State Board of Education was ever approached.”
With this modification, the paragraph now reads as follows:
As plaintiffs confirmed at the motion for new trial, they argued that “[the District] could have gotten—they should have, they were required legally to get a waiver, if they really have exhausted every other thing. To establish impossibility, it has to be . . . a real impossibility. [¶] They’re required, if they’ve exhausted all efforts, to go to the commissioner of teacher credentials . . . [¶] . . . . [¶] . . . . [T]hey can go to the state agency and get a waiver or make their impossibility case there.” While there is evidence that the District applied for and apparently obtained some waivers from the Commission on Teachers Credentialing, we do not understand it to demonstrate that the District did all it could in this regard before that body or that the State Board of Education was ever approached. Until this appears―indeed, until all other options are exhausted―the District cannot make a claim of impossibility, that is to say, the District cannot show that it has done everything possible and is still unable to assign credentialed instructors to classrooms.
This modification does not effect a change in the Judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(2).)
The petition for rehearing is denied.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173289N.PDF
Gonzales v. Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC (9th Cir. 25-1037 4/16/26) ADA Disability Discrimination | Fitness-for-Duty Certification | Justiciability
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment after a jury trial in favor of Roman Gonzales in his action under the Americans with Disabilities Act against Batelle Energy Alliance, LLC.
Batelle contracts with the United States Department of Energy to manage the Idaho National Laboratory, where the government stores spent nuclear fuel. Batelle revoked Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification and terminated his employment as a Security Police Officer because of his use of prescription pain medication. The jury found in favor of Gonzales on his retaliation and “regarded as” discrimination claims, and the district court denied Batelle’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
Aligning with the Sixth Circuit, the panel rejected Batelle’s argument that its revocation of Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification, a requirement for security personnel under 10 C.F.R. § 1046, was not justiciable because it was a nonreviewable security clearance decision vested with the Department of Energy. Under Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), when agencies make security clearance determinations and other similarly predictive national security judgments that Congress vested in those agencies, the resulting decisions are nonjusticiable. The revocation of Gonzales’s fitness-for-duty certification, however, was justiciable because the medical and physical standards set forth in § 1046 are not tied to predictive security determinations.
The panel affirmed Batelle’s other grounds for appeal in a simultaneously filed memorandum disposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/16/25-1037.pdf
Walton v. Victor Valley Community College District (CA4/3 G064887, filed 3/18/26, mod. & pub. 4/15/26) FEHA | Standing | Unpaid Intern
Plaintiff Jessie Walton appeals from summary judgment on her sexual harassment-related claims against defendant Victor Valley Community College District. We agree with Walton that the trial court wrongly excluded her attorney’s declaration for a correctible omission. The court also erred in finding: (a) Walton lacks standing to pursue Fair Employment and Housing Act claims, (b) she failed to comply with the Government Claims Act, and (c) the District cannot be liable under Education Code section 66270 because it was not deliberately indifferent to Walton’s complaints.
But Walton does not dispute the trial court’s ruling on her claim for Civil Code violations. We thus reverse for the court to summarily adjudicate that one cause of action but otherwise deny the motion.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064668.PDF
Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center (9th Cir. 23-3710 4/15/26) COVID-19 Vaccine | Failure to Accommodate Religious Belief
The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel majority affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a Title VII action alleging discrimination on the basis of religion by plaintiff’s employer in connection with a COVID-19 vaccine requirement.
In its opinion, the panel majority held that the plaintiff failed sufficiently to plead a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with her employer’s policy requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19, absent an approved exception, and she therefore failed to state a failure-to-accommodate claim.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Forrest, joined by Judges R. Nelson, Bress, Bumatay, VanDyke, and Tung, wrote that, in an effort to prevent religion from being used as an insincere excuse for avoiding general public-health measures implemented to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the court held that plaintiffs claiming religious discrimination must show a clear nexus between their religious convictions and their choice not to comply with those measures that does not involve “secular” knowledge. The court also held that in establishing such nexus, plaintiffs may not rely on the invocation of prayer, without more. But this standard necessarily requires judging The panel denied a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc in a case in which the panel majority affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a Title VII action alleging discrimination on the basis of religion by plaintiff’s employer in connection with a COVID-19 vaccine requirement.
In its opinion, the panel majority held that the plaintiff failed sufficiently to plead a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with her employer’s policy requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated against COVID-19, absent an approved exception, and she therefore failed to state a failure-to-accommodate claim.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Forrest, joined by Judges R. Nelson, Bress, Bumatay, VanDyke, and Tung, wrote that, in an effort to prevent religion from being used as an insincere excuse for avoiding general public-health measures implemented to address the COVID-19 pandemic, the court held that plaintiffs claiming religious discrimination must show a clear nexus between their religious convictions and their choice not to comply with those measures that does not involve “secular” knowledge. The court also held that in establishing such nexus, plaintiffs may not rely on the invocation of prayer, without more. But this standard necessarily requires judging religious belief, and it is a significant misstep that risks reducing the freedom of belief to the freedom of accepted belief.
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Tung, joined by Judges R. Nelson, Collins, Lee, Bress, Bumatay, and VanDyke, wrote that the panel majority legally erred by recharacterizing the plaintiff’s clearly religious objection to a company policy as “purely secular” merely because the objection turned in part on a secular consideration.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/15/23-3710.pdf
L.A. County Professional Peace Officers Assn. v. County of L.A. (CA2/7 B338182, filed 3/13/26, pub. 4/10/26) MOU | Meet and Confer
The Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association (PPOA) appeals the denial of its petition for writ of mandate against the County of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors for the County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission, and County Executive Officer Fesia Davenport (together, the County). PPOA and the County are parties to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) governing the terms and conditions of employment for PPOA members. PPOA asserts it has the right to meet and confer regarding the County’s decision to outsource certain work performed by PPOA members to a private security contractor. The County responds that PPOA waived any such right in the MOU because the MOU recognizes the County may contract with a private firm and contains a management rights clause. We reverse because the County fails to demonstrate that PPOA clearly and unmistakably waived its right to meet and confer regarding the County’s outsourcing decision.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338182.PDF
Cordero v. Ghilotti Construction Co., Inc. (CA1/1 A173024, filed 3/18/26, pub. 4/10/26) Privette Doctrine
Plaintiff Leonardo Cordero, who worked for Camblin Steel Service, Inc. (Camblin), was injured while working on a pedestrian bridge project in Menlo Park. Ghilotti Construction Company, Inc. (Ghilotti) was the “ ‘turnkey’ ” contractor on the job. Cordero sued Ghilotti for damages for his industrial injuries, and Ghilotti eventually moved for, and the trial court granted, summary judgment on the basis of the Privette doctrine, which creates a “strong presumption under California law that a hirer of an independent contractor delegates to the contractor all responsibility for workplace safety[,] . . . [which] means that a hirer is typically not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor or its workers while on the job.” (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 37–38 (Gonzalez).)
Cordero maintains the Privette presumption does not apply in this case and advances two arguments in this regard: First, as a matter of law, a Cal-OSHA (Lab. Code, § 6300 et seq.) regulation imposed a “nondelegable” duty on Ghilotti to address the site conditions that assertedly caused him to fall. Second, as a factual matter, Ghilotti did not delegate workplace safety to Camblin. He further maintains that even if the Privette presumption does apply, there are triable issues as to whether the “retained control” exception to the Privette doctrine set forth in Hooker v. Department of Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198 (Hooker) applies. We affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173024.PDF
Barbosa v. Sierra Pacific Orthopaedic Center Medical Group, Inc., 2025 WL3628510 (nonpub. Dec. 15, 2025), review granted (Mar. 25, 2026); S294710/F088971
Petition for review after affirmance of order denying motion to compel arbitration. If an arbitration agreement provides that disputes will be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; the FAA), do the FAA’s substantive provisions apply and preempt inconsistent state laws regardless of whether interstate commerce is involved? Review granted/brief due.
Blunt v. Town of Gilbert (9th Cir. 24-3538 4/3/26) Retroactivity | AZ POBOR
This case raises the issue of whether Arizona’s presumption against retroactivity prohibits application of a 2022 amendment to the Arizona Peace Officers Bill of Rights (POBOR) to an at-will employment contract signed in 2021 between a police officer and his employer. Because the disposition of this appeal turns on an important and unsettled question of Arizona law, we submit this request to the Arizona Supreme Court to exercise its discretion and accept the following certified questions in accordance with Supreme Court of Arizona Rule 27 and Section 12-1861 of the Arizona Revised Statutes:
-
Does the presumption against retroactivity prohibit application of the 2022 amendment to Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-1102 to at-will employment agreements that were signed before the 2022 amendment?
-
If the presumption against retroactivity does not apply, does the 2022 amendment void the at-will employment contract between Blunt and the Town of Gilbert because the facts giving rise to Blunt’s termination occurred after enactment of the amendment, such that any discipline imposed against him by the Town must be supported by just cause?
-
If the 2022 amendment voids the at-will employment contract between Blunt and the Town of Gilbert, would that result in impairment of a vested contractual right in violation of the Contract Clause of the Arizona State Constitution?
Our phrasing of the questions should not restrict the Court’s consideration of the issues involved. The Court is not limited to the particular questions outlined above, and it may modify or expand upon the questions as it deems appropriate. If the Court decides not to accept certification, we will decide the question as we believe the Arizona Supreme Court would. See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/03/24-3538.pdf
The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court (CA4/2 E085766N, filed 1/14/26, further mod. 4/2/26) Wage and Hour Class Action | Revocation of Individual Settlement Agreements
On the court’s own motion, the majority opinion filed in this matter on January 14, 2026, is modified as follows:
To the “Disposition,” we add the following sentence: “Each side is to bear their own costs on appeal.”
Except for this modification, the majority opinion remains unchanged. The modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085766N.PDF
O’Dell v. Aya Healthcare Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-1528 4/1/26) Arbitration | Non-Mutual Offensive Collateral Estoppel
Reversing the district court’s judgment in a putative class action brought by former employees of a travel-nursing agency against the agency for purported wage-related violations, the panel held that the application of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements was not compatible with the Federal Arbitration Act.
The agency entered into arbitration agreements with each of its employees, and the agreements contained a clause requiring an arbitrator (not a court) to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement. The district court sent four cases to separate arbitrations. Two arbitrators found the agreements valid, and the other two arbitrators found the agreements invalid. Applying the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, the district court picked the two arbitral awards invalidating the agreements to preclude the arbitration of disputes with respect to 255 other employees who had separate arbitration agreements with the agency.
The panel held that the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel cannot be invoked to avoid enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Nowhere in the FAA did Congress contemplate that a non-mutual preclusion doctrine could be deployed to frustrate an arbitration that the parties had agreed to undertake in resolving their disputes. The application of non-mutual offensive issue preclusion would also violate the principle of consent that the FAA incorporates. In addition, the application of the doctrine to deny enforcement of an arbitration agreement is incorrect because the district court’s ruling effectively transformed individualized arbitral proceedings into something akin to a bellwether class action to which the parties never agreed.
Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/04/01/25-1528.pdf
Cleare et al. v. Super. Ct. (CA1/2 A173289M, filed 3/25/26, mod.3/26/26) [formerly captioned as West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct.] Teacher Vacancy or Misassignment
THE COURT: It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 25, 2026, be modified as follows:
1. We modify the caption of the opinion, demonstrated above, correcting the parties and titles pertaining thereto.
2. On page 14, the first sentence under “Disposition” shall read as follows: “Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the Superior Court of Contra Costa County to vacate the minute order denying the petition of mandate and to enter a new order granting the petition.”
This modification does effect a change in the Judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(c)(2).)
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173289M.PDF
Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock (US 24-935 Oral Argument 3/25/26) Last-Mile Delivery Drivers | Arbitration
Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce-but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders-"transportation workers" "engaged in foreign or interstate commerce" for purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act's § 1 exemption?
Transcript
Audio
10th Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
West Contra Costa Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct. (CA1/2 A173289 3/25/26) Teacher Vacancy or Misassignment
This is a proceeding for mandate brought by four teachers seeking to compel the West Contra Costa Unified School District (District) to alter its practices for putting teachers in specified schools in the District, and to direct the District to comply with the statutory scheme governing the subject. At trial, the issue quickly became reframed as whether the District had established that compliance with the relevant statutes made it impossible to put enough qualified teachers in classrooms, thus excusing the District’s non-compliance. The trial court answered this question in the District’s favor.
We conclude the ruling must be set aside because the District failed to establish that it had unsuccessfully tried to comply with all of the governing statutory procedures for filling teacher vacancies. Unless and until the District carries that burden, it is premature to consider whether the doctrine of impossibility will excuse the District’s non-compliance with those procedures.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A173289.PDF
Guardian Storage Centers v. Simpson (CA4/3 G064847 3/24/26) Attorney-Client Privileged Material Inadvertently Transmitted
One of the key facets of the legal profession is the robust and ever-growing set of ethical obligations to which attorneys must adhere. Among those obligations, with which every attorney should be very familiar, is one concerning what an attorney should do if they come into possession of seemingly attorney-client privileged material belonging to another that appears to have been inadvertently transmitted.
These employment related cases require us to determine an attorney’s obligations in slightly different circumstances: an attorney receives from their client a seemingly attorney-client privileged email belonging to an opposing party; the email was originally and intentionally sent to the client when the client was an executive employed by the opposing party employer; however, unbeknownst to the employer, the email was subsequently forwarded by the executive employee to their personal email address and, following their termination, provided to their attorney for use in a lawsuit against their former employer.
Appellants Guardian Storage Centers, LLC (Guardian) and John Minar appeal from orders denying disqualification of the law firm representing respondents, Aarons Ward (Aarons), under such circumstances. They contend the trial court abused its discretion by making unsupported factual findings and applying incorrect legal standards in parts of its analysis. From their perspective, the proper analysis compels the conclusion that Aarons should be disqualified because it impermissibly conducted a detailed review of the attorney-client privileged emails, failed to notify Guardian it possessed them, refused to return them upon Guardian’s demand, and has indicated its intent to use them against Guardian and related parties in the instant litigation.
We conclude the denial of disqualification was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. The trial court’s finding that the disputed emails are attorney-client privileged, with Guardian being the privilege holder, is supported by substantial evidence, and respondents failed to demonstrate waiver of the privilege. Although the respondents who received the emails were intended recipients at the time they were sent, the court erred in finding this factor favored denying disqualification and, thereby, implicitly rejecting application of the analytical framework set forth in State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644 (State Fund). We find what has come to be known as the State Fund rule, which originated from a situation involving inadvertent disclosure by a party’s attorney, equally applicable to a situation in which it is reasonably apparent the privileged material was impermissibly taken from the privilege holder without authorization. Because the trial court did not analyze the circumstances through that proper legal lens, employed too limited a test for determining whether the content of the privileged emails could likely be used to Guardian’s disadvantage in the instant litigation, and made an unsupported finding related thereto, we reverse the challenged orders and remand the matter so the court may reconsider Guardian’s disqualification motions in accordance with this opinion.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064847.PDF
Pechkis v. Trustees of the Cal. State University (CA3 C103742 3/24/26) Retaliation | Anti-SLAPP
A motion to strike a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP), under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, must “ ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim’ ” and “identify what acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) Plaintiff professors Hyewon Pechkis and Joseph Pechkis sued defendant the Trustees of the California State University based on retaliation from reporting discrimination and harassment by a department chair at California State University, Chico (Chico State). Defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion against two retaliation causes of action; the trial court denied the motion and defendant appeals.
On appeal defendant argues the challenged causes of action must be stricken because they are based “in part” on communications between Chico State employees and employees at another campus relating to an investigation into Hyewon, and these communications are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirm, concluding defendant failed to carry its burden because whether the challenged causes of action are based in part on protected activity does not necessarily establish the causes of action arise from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C103742.PDF
The Merchant of Tennis, Inc. v. Superior Court (CA4/2 E085766M, filed 1/14/26, mod. 3/23/26) Wage and Hour Class Action | Revocation of Individual Settlement Agreements
On the court’s own motion, the majority opinion filed in this matter on January 14, 2026, is modified as follows:
To the “Disposition,” we add the following sentence: “Each side is to bear their own costs on appeal.”
Except for this modification, the majority opinion remains unchanged. The modification does not effect a change in the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085766M.PDF
Sandler v. Modernizing Medicine, Inc. (9th Cir. 24-6623 3/19/26) Arbitration
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment denying a motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable, and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration.
The employment contract between the parties specified that any employment-related disputes be subject to arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act in conformity with the procedures of the California Arbitration Act. The district court acknowledged that the arbitration agreement delegated the question of the agreement’s validity to an arbitrator to decide. The district court ruled, however, that where the contract contained a severability clause permitting a court to excise an unconscionable provision, the delegation clause did not constitute a clear and unmistakable delegation and thus could not be enforced.
The panel held that the district court misapplied federal law and erroneously relied on state-court decisions pointing to the existence of a severability clause to refuse to compel arbitration. The parties clearly and unmistakably agreed to have the arbitrator resolve any challenge to the validity of the arbitration agreement. The clear and unmistakable nature of the delegation was not negated by the presence of a severability clause. The panel rejected the district court’s attempt to adopt a state rule that disfavored arbitration here.
The panel also vacated the district court’s judgment that the parties’ arbitration agreement was unconscionable. The district court should not have addressed the issue in the first place, but instead should have enforced the delegation clause requiring an arbitrator’s resolution.
The panel remanded to the district court with instructions to grant the motion to compel arbitration and to stay the case pending the completion of arbitration proceedings.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/03/19/24-6623.pdf
Ayala-Ventura v. Superior Court (CA5 F089695, filed 2/19/26, pub. 3/17/26) Arbitration
Jazmin Ayala-Ventura filed a putative class action complaint against her former employer, CCS Facility Services-Fresno Inc. (CCS), alleging various state law violations for unpaid wages, meal and rest break violations, failure to reimburse business expenses, and unlawful business practices. CCS moved to compel arbitration of Ayala-Ventura’s claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement she executed when she was hired. The trial court granted CCS’s motion, ordered arbitration of Ayala-Ventura’s individual claims, and dismissed the class claims.
On appeal, Ayala-Ventura contends: (1) the arbitration agreement is unconscionable because it is overbroad, lacks mutuality, and indefinite in duration; and (2) the trial court is bound by stare decisis to follow Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook), and erred by finding Cook factually distinguishable, not persuasive, and not binding.
Given the uncertainty of the trial court order’s appealability, we deem the appeal a petition for writ of mandate. We deny the petition on the merits.