Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Baker v. San Mateo County Employees Retirement Assn. (CA1/1 A171350 9/5/25) County Employees Retirement Law | Disability Retirement
Petitioner Catherine Baker worked for San Mateo County, went on medical leave in 2009, and then returned to a different position in 2015 and 2016 at the same pay rate before filing for disability retirement. Respondent San Mateo County Employees Retirement Association (SamCERA) determined the effective date of her retirement benefits to be in 2016, on the last day she received “regular compensation” pursuant to Government Code section 31724. 1 Baker petitioned for a writ of mandate, asserting that the pay she received in 2015 and 2016 was not “regular compensation” under the statute because she had not returned to her original job position. The trial court concluded otherwise, and denied the writ.
On appeal, Baker argues that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the term “regular compensation” in section 31724. We disagree and affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171350.PDF
Sterling v. Feek (9th Cir. 24-1296 9/4/25) Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation Benefits
In an interlocutory appeal, the panel reversed the district court’s determination that plaintiff had no constitutionally protected property interest in federal Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) benefits, and remanded.
Damario Sterling filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the current and former commissioner of the Washington State Employment Security Department (ESD), alleging that he was deprived of unemployment benefits without adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard.
The panel first held that Sterling’s claims are justiciable. He has standing to seek damages because he was injured when ESD offset his benefits to account for alleged overpayments, and that injury was caused by ESD’s challenged conduct. He has standing to seek prospective injunctive relief because he has a procedural right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act, and he could reasonably be expected to seek unemployment benefits again in the future. His claims for prospective relief were not mooted by the end of the PEUC program because he challenges the procedures ESD generally uses to administer unemployment benefits, not any procedures specific to PEUC benefits.
The panel held that Sterling has a property interest in the PEUC benefits that ESD withheld as offsets. The CARES Act, which established a supplemental program to extend unemployment benefits during the COVID-19 pandemic, gives rise to a constitutionally-protected property interest. The Act uses mandatory language and establishes definite eligibility criteria that greatly narrow the discretion of participating states and create legitimate expectations of aid receipt.
The panel declined to reach defendants’ due process argument, which was not certified for interlocutory review.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/04/24-1296.pdf
Asuncion v. Hegseth (9th Cir. 23-4044 9/4/25) Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of the Secretary of Defense in an action alleging employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
The district court concluded that plaintiff’s claims were time-barred because they were not filed within 90 days of receipt of the Defense Logistics Agency’s Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity’s final agency decision (FAD), and equitable tolling was not warranted.
Claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act are governed by the same remedies, procedures, and rights applicable to Title VII employment discrimination claims brought by federal employees against federal defendants. Under Title VII, a federal employee’s civil action must be brought within 90 days of receipt of notice of the final agency action. The 90-day period functions as a statute of limitations. The panel held that for notices transmitted via traditional mail services, the case law on Title VII statutes of limitations is clear, but electronically transmitted notices present new complications.
The panel held that the 90-day limitation period did not begin until plaintiff’s attorney could realistically be held responsible for having access to the FAD and learning what the agency had decided. Here, the agency made numerous errors when transmitting the passphrase necessary to decrypt the FAD. The panel held that under the circumstances, plaintiff’s attorney did not have effective notice of the agency’s decision until December 5, the day he received by email a decrypted copy of the FAD. Because plaintiff’s attorney filed suit in the district court within 90 days of receiving the accessible FAD, the complaint was timely.
Alternatively, the panel held that plaintiff was entitled to equitable tolling because plaintiff’s attorney was diligent in trying to gain access to the agency’s decision and extraordinary circumstances prevented him from succeeding. Applying equitable tolling, the panel held that plaintiff’s statute of limitations period did not begin to run until he received the decrypted copy of the FAD on December 5. Because he filed his complaint 88 days later, the complaint was timely filed.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/04/23-4044.pdf
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Peterson v. SRFR (9th Cir. 24-1044 9/2/25) Title VII | Covid-19 Vaccine Exemption for Religion
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (SRFR) in an action brought by eight firefighters alleging that, in violation of Title VII and Washington state law, SRFR failed to accommodate their religious beliefs when it denied their requests for exemptions from the governor of Washington’s August 2021 proclamation requiring all healthcare providers to be vaccinated against COVID-19.
SRFR ultimately denied the firefighters’ requests because it was unable to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow the firefighters to remain in their roles without imposing an undue hardship on SRFR.
The panel held that to establish a failure-to-accommodate claim for religious discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first set forth a prima facie case that he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; he informed his employer of the belief and conflict; and the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected him to an adverse employment action because of his inability to fulfill the job requirement. The burden then shifts to the employer to show that it initiated good faith efforts to reasonably accommodate the employee’s religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.
Declining to scrutinize the firefighters’ religious beliefs, the panel assumed that they set forth a prima facie case. The panel held that the district court did not err in concluding that SRFR could not reasonably accommodate the firefighters’ vaccine exemption requests without undue hardship. Following Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023), the panel held that undue hardship is shown when, taking into account all relevant factors in the case at hand, a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business. SRFR showed that it faced several substantial costs of accommodating the firefighters’ requested vaccine exemption, including the health and safety of its own firefighters and the public, the large number of firefighters seeking accommodations, the risk to its operations and the costs of widespread absences, the potential loss of a lucrative contract, and the risk of additional liability. In addition, SRFR provided unrebutted medical evidence that showed the inadequacy of the firefighters’ proposed accommodation. The panel concluded that SRFR thus showed that it could not reasonably have accommodated the firefighters without undue hardship in October 2021.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/09/02/24-1044.pdf
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Cash v. County of Los Angeles, 111 Cal. App. 5th 741 (2025), review granted, 2025 WL 2414150 (Mem) (Aug. 20, 2025); S291827/B336980 FEHA | Attorneys’ Fees
Review granted after affirmance of post-judgment orders. (1) Did the trial court’s across-the-board reduction of the fees requested by plaintiff’s counsel trigger heightened scrutiny of its fee order on appeal? (2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in reducing the fee request on an across-the-board basis? Review granted/brief due.
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Flaxman v. Ferguson (9th Cir. 24-919 8/22/25) First Amendment | Ripeness
The panel reversed the district court’s judgment dismissing as unripe a lawsuit brought by two University of Washington professors challenging the investigatory policies of the Washington State Executive Ethics Board after the Board investigated the professors for misusing their state email addresses.
The Board investigated the professors after they forwarded to a faculty listserv several emails that allegedly contained political discussion and fundraising requests. In conducting the investigations, the Board reviewed several months’ worth of the professors’ emails. The Board ultimately did not discipline one professor, but it fined the other professor. In their lawsuit, the professors, on behalf of themselves and a putative class of listserv subscribers, alleged that the Board’s policies and practices chilled the exercise of their First Amendment rights.
The panel held that the district court erred in dismissing the professors’ lawsuit as unripe under Article III. The professors’ allegations that the Board’s policies will chill their speech are ripe under a pre-enforcement challenge framework because the professors remain affiliated with the University, they are the moderators of the listserv, the Board’s policies are alleged to remain in place, and the Board’s history of enforcement demonstrates a plausible and reasonable fear of prosecution. To the extent the professors also advanced a retaliation theory based on past events, their claim is ripe because the professors have already been injured under a regime that has penalized them for their speech to the listserv.
The panel further held that the district court erred by concluding that the professors’ claims were prudentially unripe. The professors’ claims are fit for judicial decision because the issues are primarily legal, involving the Board’s investigatory policies that have already been applied to the professors. Moreover, withholding review would impose a substantial hardship on the professors.
Because the professors’ claims are ripe, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of their complaint and remanded for further proceedings.
Judge Bennett dissented because in his view the professors’ complaint failed to plead an injury in fact that confers standing under either a pre- or post-enforcement framework. However, because facts on the ground material to the prudential ripeness analysis changed during the pendency of this appeal, he would remand to allow the professors to amend their complaint.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/08/22/24-919.pdf
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Iloff v. LaPaille (SC S275848 per curiam 8/21/25) Minimum Wage and Paid Sick Leave | Good Faith Defense to Liquidated Damages
This case addresses two issues concerning the rights of California workers whose employers fail to pay them the minimum wage or provide them paid sick leave benefits. The first issue relates to the good faith defense to the default rule that employees who prove minimum wage violations are entitled to liquidated damages. (Labor Code, § 1194.2.) We hold that to establish the good faith defense, an employer must show that it made a reasonable attempt to determine the requirements of the law governing minimum wages; proof that the employer was ignorant of the law is insufficient. The second issue relates to the process for raising claims under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (§ 245 et seq.; the “Paid Sick Leave law”). Specifically, we must determine whether a court may consider a Paid Sick Leave law claim that an employee raises in the context of their employer’s appeal to the superior court of a Labor Commissioner ruling. (§ 98.2, subd. (a).) We hold that a court may do so. The Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion on both issues, so we reverse.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S275848.PDF
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Youth 71Five Ministries v. Williams (9th Cir. 24-4101 8/18/25) First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion | Grantee’s Hiring
In a suit brought by Youth 71Five Ministries alleging that the Oregon Department of Education, through its Youth Development Division, violated 71Five’s First Amendment rights when the Division withdrew its conditional award of a grant to 71Five, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of 71Five’s request for a preliminary injunction and its dismissal of 71Five’s claims based on qualified immunity.
The Division added a new grant eligibility Rule that prohibits grantees from discriminating based on religion, and withdrew 71Five’s conditional grant award after discovering that 71Five imposes religious requirements on all employees and volunteers.
The panel affirmed the district court’s decision not to enjoin the Division’s enforcement of the Rule as to 71Five’s grant-funded initiatives. 71Five was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the Rule violates the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion because the Rule is neutral and generally applicable, and likely satisfies rational-basis review. Nor was 71Five likely to succeed on the merits of its novel religious autonomy claims that conditioning grant funding on compliance with the Rule impermissibly interferes with its choice of ministers and faith-based hiring of non-ministers.
Addressing 71Five’s claim that the Rule abridges its expressive association by requiring it to accept employees and volunteers who disagree with its message, the panel held that the Rule was likely permissible as a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral regulation as to Division-funded initiatives. But to the extent that Rule restricts 71Five’s selection of speakers to spread its Christian message through initiatives that receive no Division funding, the Rule likely imposes an unconstitutional condition. Accordingly, the panel directed the district court to enter an order enjoining enforcement of the Rule as to initiatives that do not receive grant funding from the Division.
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 71Five’s claims for damages because 71Five did not allege any violation of a clearly established right, and therefore defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of 71Five’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, against which qualified immunity does not protect.
Judge Rawlinson concurred in the judgment only because of this court’s truncated review of a district court’s decision granting or denying injunctive relief, and obligatory deference to a district court’s discretionary decision to decline consideration of the arguments and evidence presented in a Reply Brief. Otherwise, she would conclude that the State of Oregon’s application of the rules governing its grant program violated 71Five’s right to the free exercise of religion.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/08/18/24-4101.pdf
Spatz v. Regents of the Univ. of California (9th Cir. 24-2997 8/18/25) Age Discrimination
Affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Regents of the University of California on Jordan Spatz’s claims under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, the panel held that the Age Act did not apply to the University of California San Francisco’s refusal to admit Spatz to its neurological surgery residency program.
Spatz alleged that he was denied admission to the medical residency program due to age-based discrimination and retaliation. By its terms, the Age Act exempts from its coverage “any employment practice of any employer.” Giving the terms “employer” and “employment practice” their ordinary common-law meaning, the panel concluded that ranking medical residents is an employment practice to which the Age Act does not apply. To the extent that Spatz’s Age Act claim is not barred, Spatz failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/08/18/24-2997.pdf
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Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. 23-3379, 23-4335 8/14/25) Section 301 Labor Management Relations Act | Removal and Remand
The panel affirmed the district court’s orders remanding two removed actions to state court after concluding that Annamarie Renteria-Hinojosa’s remaining state law claims against her employer, Sunsweet Growers, Inc., were not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act.
The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand orders because, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the bar on appellate review of remand orders set forth in § 1447(d) applies only to remands based on a defect in removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The parties correctly agreed that the district court’s remand was not based on a defect in removal procedure. The panel concluded that the remand also was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, after dismissing federal § 301 untimely-wage claims for failure to exhaust grievance procedures under a collective bargaining agreement, the district court, in its discretion, declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The panel held that the exhaustion requirement for § 301 claims is not jurisdictional. In addition, where the district court exercised its discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction, its remand order was not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The panel therefore had jurisdiction to review the remand orders in their entirety, including the district court’s conclusions that Renteria-Hinojosa’s remaining state law claims were not federal § 301 claims.
The panel affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the remaining claims were not preempted by § 301, which preempts a plaintiff’s state law claim where the claim (1) arises entirely from a collective bargaining agreement or (2) requires interpretation of the agreement. At step one, Renteria-Hinojosa’s claims did not arise exclusively from the parties’ collective bargaining agreements, but rather from California statutes and regulations prohibiting unfair business practices and retaliation and requiring employers to provide minimum wages, overtime pay, paid sick days, accurate itemized wage statements, reimbursement for necessary expenditures, meal and rest periods, and adequate seating. At step two, Renteria-Hinojosa’s claims for overtime pay, sick leave pay, and meal and rest breaks were not preempted because they did not require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements. Sunsweet’s argument that all of Renteria-Hinojosa’s claims were preempted because of the dispute resolution provisions in the collective bargaining agreements was precluded by Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987), which holds that a defendant cannot create removal jurisdiction under § 301 by invoking a collective bargaining agreement as a defense. The panel concluded that Renteria-Hinojosa’s claims under California’s Private Attorneys General Act were not preempted.
The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to remand the remaining state law claims to state court, instead of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/08/14/23-3379.pdf