Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/27/26)
Signed:
AB 1198 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — Public works: prevailing wages
AB 1534 by Assemblymember Jacqui Irwin (D-Thousand Oaks) — Federal Workforce Pell Grant program: local workforce development boards: participant training requirement
AB 1544 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Court proceedings: media access
AB 1600 by Assemblymember Dr. Joaquin Arambula (D-Fresno) — Disadvantaged communities: farmworker communities
AB 1601 by Assemblymember Chris Rogers (D-Santa Rosa) — County employees’ retirement: cost-of-living adjustments
AB 1619 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) — Public employees’ retirement: administration
AB 1803 by Assemblymember Josh Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) — Employment: sexual harassment training and education: anti-hate speech training.
AB 1809 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D–Alhambra) — Public contracts: school and community college districts
AB 1838 by Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) — Public contracts: local agencies: responsive bidders
AB 1844 by Assemblymember Blanca Pacheco (D-Downey) — Judges’ Retirement System II: beneficiaries
AB 1980 by Assemblymember Jessica Caloza (D-Los Angeles) — Labor: apprenticeship: Equal Representation in Construction Apprenticeships Grant Program
AB 2006 by Assemblymember Michelle Rodriguez (D-Ontario) — State government: office buildings: daycare centers
AB 2017 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — State holidays: Eid
AB 2039 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — Attorneys
AB 2129 by Assemblymember Heath Flora (R-Ripon) — State employees: compensation: firefighters
AB 2294 by Assemblymember Tri Ta (R-Westminster) — State holidays: Sylvia Mendez Day
AB 2417 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — State Teachers’ Retirement System: community colleges: part-time faculty
AB 2448 by Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) — Medical information: confidentiality
AB 2483 by Assemblymember Sade Elhawary (D-South Los Angeles) — Wildland firefighters: Formerly Incarcerated Firefighter Certification and Employment Program
AB 2490 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) — Teacher credentialing: emergency career substitute teaching permit: alternative qualifications
AB 2529 by Assemblymember Natasha Johnson (R-Elsinore) — Civil claims: public entities and employees: declaration
AB 2580 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) — Teacher credentialing: programs of professional preparation: California State University and community college partnerships
AB 2618 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Public Utilities Commission: commissioners: employment
AB 2634 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — Workforce development: High road training partnerships: scoring preference
AB 2682 by Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) — Transportation network company drivers: labor relations: appeals
SB 909 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Public works
SB 998 by Senator Lena Gonzalez (D-Long Beach) — Educational equity: discrimination prevention coordinators
SB 1046 by Senator Catherine Blakespear (D-Encinitas) — Occupational safety: transboundary pollution
SB 1083 by Senator Sasha Renée Pérez (D-Pasadena) — Noncertificated public school employees: private school employees: egregious misconduct: statewide data system: Commission on Teacher Credentialing: adverse actions: contracts and background checks for educational services
SB 1129 by Senator Anna Caballero (D-Merced) — State Bar of California: community justice worker program
SB 1149 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Employees: bereavement leave
SB 1330 by Senator Jesse Arreguín (D-Berkeley) — Assault and battery: utility workers
SB 1342 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Criminal records: relief
SB 1394 by Senator Lena Gonzalez (D-Long Beach) — State holidays: Cesar Chavez Day: Farmworkers Day
Vetoed:
AB 1054 by Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson) — Public employees’ retirement: deferred retirement option program: public employee health benefits.
Ridings v. PeaceHealth (9th Cir. 24-7282 9/24/26) Title VII Religious Discrimination | Failure to Accommodate
The panel reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of Karly Ridings’s employment discrimination action against PeaceHealth, alleging a failure to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII and Oregon state law, and remanded for further proceedings.
Ridings, a registered nurse, sent a letter to PeaceHealth requesting a religious exemption from a mandatory vaccination policy on two religious grounds.
In response, PeaceHealth placed her on indefinite leave without benefits or pay. In her complaint, Ridings briefly explained her rationale for declining the vaccine, but she did not attach the letter. PeaceHealth moved to dismiss for failure to plead the first element of a failure-to-accommodate religious discrimination claim, that PeaceHealth’s vaccination policy conflicted with Ridings’s bona fide religious beliefs. In her opposition to the motion to dismiss, Ridings requested leave to amend the complaint if the court found the pleading to be insufficient. She also attached a copy of the religious exemption letter that she had tendered to PeaceHealth.
The panel held that under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, the district court should have considered the contents of Ridings’s letter because it was central to her claim. The panel held that, considering the letter, Ridings easily satisfied the plausibility threshold for a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim, which requires a plaintiff to show that an employment duty conflicted with her sincere religious beliefs or practice and also that she informed her employer of the belief and conflict.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/24/24-7282.pdf
A.S. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (CA2/8 B335692 9/22/26) Nondisclosure Statute | Employer Inquiry about Job Applicants’ Criminal Convictions
An employer may want to know if job applicants have criminal records. A competing interest favors rehabilitation by ensuring small past mistakes do not doom good workers to a lifetime of impoverished employment opportunities. The California Legislature has been active in adjusting the boundary between these clashing concerns. A key statute, repeatedly amended, is section 432.7 of the Labor Code, which we call the Nondisclosure Statute.
In simple terms, the Nondisclosure Statute prohibits employers from asking applicants about certain kinds of criminal convictions. The statute also makes exceptions to the general prohibition. We construe this statute and conclude no exception defeats the general prohibition on the facts of this case. This means the defendant and appellant employer in this case — the Los Angeles Unified School District — violated the Nondisclosure Statute when it rejected two applicants based on their expunged misdemeanor convictions.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B335692.PDF
Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/20/26)
Signed
AB 1235 by Assemblymember Chris Rogers (D-Santa Rosa) — California State University: skilled and trained workforce requirement
AB 1381 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) — Education-related positions: previous employment disclosures: Commission on Teacher Credentialing: unprofessional conduct
AB 1439 by Assemblymember Robert Garcia (D-Rancho Cucamonga) — Public retirement systems: development projects: labor standards
AB 2150 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — Emergencies: personnel: training requirements: opioid overdose reversals
AB 2157 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Workforce development: Displaced Oil and Gas Worker Pilot Program: extension
AB 2212 by Assemblymember Rebecca Bauer-Kahan (D-Orinda) — Postsecondary education: sexual harassment, harassment, intimidation, and bullying policies: student training
AB 2466 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D–Alhambra) — Strong Workforce Program: work-based learning opportunities: regional consortia
Vetoed
AB 605 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) — Employment: refineries: task force. A veto message can be found here
AB 713 by Assemblymember José Luis Solache (D-Lynwood) — Public postsecondary education: student employment. A veto message can be found here
AB 1383 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) — Public employees’ retirement benefits. A veto message can be found here
Bills Signed by Governor (9/19/26)
Assembly Bill 2319 by Assemblymember Nick Schultz (D-Burbank), Personal Income tax law: corporation tax law: credits: qualified motion picture: post-production
Senate Bill 186 by Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review - Income taxes: film tax credits.
Bills Signed and Vetoed by Governor (9/18/26)
Signed
AB 187 by the Committee on Budget — Employment
AB 2120 by Assemblymember José Luis Solache (D-Lynwood) — School district employees: merit system
AB 2311 by Assemblymember Pilar Schiavo (D-Santa Clarita) — Health care districts: employment
SB 1227 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Department of Industrial Relations: apprenticeship pilot program
Vetoed
SB 1059 by Senator Bob Archuleta (D-Pico Rivera) — Employment Training Panel. A veto message can be found here
Heimbigner v. Edgewater Services, LLC (9th Cir. 25-2325 9/17/26) Washington State Wrongful Termination Claims
The panel certified to the Washington Supreme Court the following questions:
(1) Does Washington law recognize common-law wrongful termination claims against indirect employers?
(2) Does Washington law recognize common-law wrongful termination claims against individuals such as officers, managers, or supervisors?
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/decisions/opinions/
Bill Signed by Governor (9/16/26)
SB 1050 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) False advertising: synthetic performers
Sujan v. UHS Corona (CA4/2 E084185 9/16/26) Admitting Privileges
Plaintiff Sunil Sujan, a physician who formerly practiced medicine with defendant Corona Regional Medical Center (CRMC), filed this lawsuit alleging CRMC and three individual defendants (Alaa Afifi, M.D., Imdad N. Yusufaly, M.D., and Ahmed El-Bershawi, M.D.) engaged in a concerted scheme to defame him and ruin his professional reputation, and summarily suspended his admitting privileges. Sujan’s wife Nina Patel also sued defendants alleging a single cause of action for loss of consortium.
Sujan appeals from the judgment entered for defendants after the trial court granted their motion for summary judgment. The trial court found, inter alia, that Sujan failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before suing for damages. According to Sujan, he was excused from exhausting his remedies in the available peer review process because he had entered into an agreement with CRMC to lift his suspension and reinstate his admitting privileges, and, because that agreement avoided the requirement that CRMC report the suspension to the California Medical Board, it rendered futile any relief he might have achieved through an administrative appeal. He also appeals from a postjudgment order granting, in part, defendants’ motion for attorney fees as provided for in CRMC’s bylaws. Sujan contends the fee provision in the bylaws conflicts with Business and Professions Code section 809.9, which provides for attorney fees in lawsuits challenging peer review decisions, and he argues defendants cannot recover fees under that statute because the trial court made no finding that the lawsuit was frivolous or that Sujan had acted in bad faith during the litigation. Finally, even if the fee provision under the bylaws is not preempted by statute, Sujan argues it is unconscionable and unenforceable.
In a cross-appeal from the attorney fees order, defendants argue the trial court erred by (1) finding Patel could not be held liable for attorney fees because she was not a signatory to the bylaws, (2) finding the attorney declaration filed with the fee motion was insufficient to introduce billing invoices in support of their claim for attorney fees incurred for work performed by the prior attorneys, and (3) reducing the hourly rates for work performed by two of their current attorneys.
On Sujan’s appeal, we conclude (1) he has not met his burden of establishing with evidence a triable issue of material fact on defendants’ defense by establishing he was excused from exhausting his administrative remedies and (2) the trial court correctly found defendants were entitled to recover attorney fees from Sujan as provided in the bylaws.
On defendants’ cross-appeal, we conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion for attorney fees in part.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E084185.PDF
Bill Signed by Governor (9/14/26)
AB 2780 by the Committee on Public Employment and Retirement — Public employees’ retirement
Taduran v. Glidewell James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, 121 Cal.App.5th 197 (2026), review granted 2026 WL 2603782 (mem.) (Sept. 2, 2026); S297762/G064718
Review granted after affirmance of judgment. Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of related issues in Cash v. County of Los Angeles, S291827 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.520, is deferred pending further order of the court. Review granted/holding for lead case.
Szewczyk v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (CA4/3 G065386, filed 8/14/26, pub. 9/14/26) County Employees Retirement Law
Pursuant to the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq.) (CERL), a County of Orange (County) employee receives a pension amount based in part on the employee’s “‘[c]ompensation earnable’” (§ 31461, subd. (a).). “‘Compensation earnable’” is defined as “the average compensation . . . for the period under consideration upon the basis of the average number of days ordinarily worked by persons in the same grade or class of positions during the period, and at the same rate of pay.” (Ibid.)
Following a reorganization of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department in 2008, those classified in the position of deputy sheriff II were assigned to work patrol while those classified as a deputy sheriff I worked in jail operations. Deputy sheriff II’s Robert Szewczyk and Rodney Morikawa, along with other deputy sheriff II’s who had been working in jail operations at the time of the reorganization, accepted the option to remain working in jail operations. All deputy sheriffs working in jail operations, exclusively, were required to work a so-called “platoon schedule” by which they worked a regular, mandatory schedule of 80.5 hours every two weeks; a half-hour of overtime coded as “6FE” overtime was built into this regular work schedule.
After they retired in 2018, Szewczyk and Morikawa petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus and a writ of traditional mandamus compelling the Orange County Employees Retirement System (OCERS) and the OCERS Board of Retirement (the Board) (collectively, the OCERS parties) to include 6FE overtime pay as “‘compensation earnable’” in determining their final compensation and pension benefit. The court granted the petitions and the OCERS parties appealed.
We affirm. For the reasons we explain, 6FE overtime pay constituted compensation earned by persons in Szewczyk and Morikawa’s same grade or class of positions during the relevant time period, and at the same rate of pay, and therefore must be included in their compensation earnable calculation under section 31461, subdivision (a).
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G065386.PDF
Cedar Park Assembly of God v. Kuderer (9th Cir. 23-35560 23-35585 9/14/26) First Amendment | Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Washington state defendants, in an action brought by Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington (“Cedar Park”), alleging that Washington’s Reproductive Parity Act of 2018 (the “Parity Act”) and Washington’s thirty-year-old conscience statute violate the Free Exercise Clause and Cedar Park’s right to religious autonomy.
The Parity Act requires insurance carriers to include, in the health plans that they offer, coverage for all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is covered, for abortions. The Parity Act’s 2019 implementing regulations do not diminish or affect any rights provided under Washington’s conscience statute, which shields an employer that buys health insurance from any requirement to purchase coverage for a health care service to which the employer objects on either religious or moral grounds. Thus, notwithstanding the Parity Act, the conscience statute enables health carriers to accommodate religious or moral objections to abortion by offering tailored health plans that exclude coverage for abortion services.
Cedar Park is a church that objects, on religious grounds, to abortion and to some forms of contraception. As an employer, Cedar Park purchases for its employees group health insurance that covers comprehensive maternity care. Cedar Park challenges the validity of the Parity Act and the conscience statute, alleging the laws violate the Free Exercise Clause and the Church Autonomy Doctrine to the extent that they require Cedar Park to provide coverage for, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion and certain contraceptives, either directly or indirectly.
In a prior opinion, the panel held that Cedar Park failed to prove standing on the summary judgment record, vacated the district court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the action for lack of standing. However, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100 (2025), the panel vacatedits opinion and reheard oral argument.
The panel first held that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond, Cedar Park’s contention that the Parity Act caused it to facilitate abortion indirectly suffices to establish Article III standing.
Turning to the free exercise claim, the panel assumed, without deciding, that Cedar Park established that the challenged laws burden its religious exercise because Cedar Park presently cannot acquire an abortion-excluding plan that it believes would insulate it from the possibility of facilitating access to abortion.
The panel next held that the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable. As to neutrality, the panel considered the stated objects, text, surrounding circumstances at the time of enactment, and real-world operation, and held that Cedar Park failed to show that the challenged laws target religious conduct or are otherwise the product of hostility toward religion. The panel next analyzed the challenged laws for underinclusiveness and individualized exemptions and concluded that the laws are generally applicable.
Because the challenged laws are neutral and generally applicable, rational basis review applies and Cedar Park concedes that the laws satisfy that standard. Accordingly,the panel held that Cedar Park’s free exercise claim fails.
Finally, the panel held that the challenged laws do not violate the church autonomy doctrine because the statutes in question do not deal with employment at the church itself or with matters of internal church governance.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Callahan agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Cedar Park has standing to sue Washington, but stated the majority erred in holding that Washington’s law is consistent with the Constitution. In her view, Washington’s law burdens Cedar Park’s religious exercise, is neither neutral nor generally applicable, and cannot satisfy the high bar of strict scrutiny. The law thus runs afoul of the First Amendment.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/14/23-35585.pdf
Lewis-Williams v. SF Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (9th Cir. 25-618, 25-619, 25-740 9/11/26) Religious Discrimination | COVID Vaccine Mandate
The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment after a jury trial against San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in an employment discrimination action brought under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act by six former employees who alleged failure to accommodate their sincere religious objections to a COVID-
19 vaccine mandate.
The panel held that BART was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. It was undisputed that the former employees carried their burden of showing a prima facie case that BART failed to accommodate their religious objections to the vaccination requirement. The panel concluded that BART did not carry its burden of showing that the employees’ religious objections could not be accommodated without undue hardship. To prevail on its “undue hardship” defense, BART had to show that the alternatives to vaccination would be not only less safe, but less safe by a substantial, excessive, or unjustifiable margin. Thus, even if BART established that the vaccine was the most effective way of preventing COVID-19 transmission in the workplace, that did not mean that less effective preventive measures were per se unreasonable. BART’s reliance on guidance from public health authorities was not dispositive for purposes of showing undue hardship. In addition, BART did not show that in the context of its transportation business, in-person alternatives to vaccination would have caused undue hardship. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying BART’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because the panel could not conclude that the trial evidence only supported BART.
The panel held that BART was not entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the evidence. In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel’s violation of an order in limine excluding certain evidence of requests for religious exemptions did not require a new trial.
The panel further held that it was not plain error for the district court to order front pay for one plaintiff.
The panel found moot, and did not address, a cross-appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment for BART on the employees’ free exercise claims.
Concurring, Judge R. Nelson wrote that the district court’s analysis of the free exercise claims, which the majority did not reach, was troubling. The district court concluded that BART’s review process did not violate general applicability because it did not allow unfettered discretion in the treatment of religion. This court, however, has rejected the “unfettered discretion” test.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/09/11/25-740.pdf
Civil Rights Dept. v. Space Exploration Technologies (CA2/3 B346853, filed 8/11/26, part. pub. 9/9/26) CRD and FEHA’s Territorial Reach
Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX) appeals an order compelling it to comply with the California Civil Rights Department’s (CRD) investigatory subpoena. CRD issued the subpoena after receiving an administrative complaint from a former SpaceX employee alleging violations of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12900 et. seq.). SpaceX argues the federal constitution, the presumption against extraterritorial application of laws, and FEHA precluded CRD from investigating the complaint because it alleges conduct outside FEHA’s territorial reach. We conclude SpaceX has not met its burden to show error on any of these grounds. Accordingly, we affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B346853.PDF
Stallion Springs Medical Services v. Super. Ct. (CA5 F090834 9/2/26) Medical Staffing Procedure
Kuljit S. Hundal is a licensed emergency room physician who was a member of the medical staff of the Adventist Health Medical Center Tehachapi (medical staff), which serves Adventist Health Tehachapi Valley (hospital). Stallion Springs Medical Services (Stallion Springs), a medical corporation that was responsible for staffing and scheduling emergency providers at the hospital’s emergency department, contracted with Hundal to provide his services to the hospital as an independent contractor. After a patient complained about Hundal’s conduct in the hospital’s emergency department, the hospital instructed Stallion Springs to remove Hundal from the emergency department schedule. Stallion Springs did so and after its own investigation, terminated its contract with Hundal.
Hundal sued the hospital, medical staff, and Stallion Springs, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with his removal from the emergency department schedule. After the hospital and medical staff were dismissed from the action following a settlement, Stallion Springs moved for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication on the two claims asserted against it for violation of the common law right of fair procedure and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, granted the alternative motion for summary adjudication as to the emotional distress claim, and denied the alternative motion for summary adjudication as to the claim for violation of the common law right of fair procedure.
Stallion Springs petitions for a writ of mandate challenging the denial of summary adjudication as to the common law right of fair procedure claim. Stallion Springs contends Hundal cannot maintain that claim against it because the common law doctrine of fair procedure with respect to physician discipline has been superseded by the statutes that address the due process requirements for hospital peer review (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 805–809.9) (the peer review statute), which does not apply to Stallion Springs. Stallion Springs alternatively contends the common law right of fair procedure does not extend to a staffing company. We agree with Stallion Springs that the right of fair procedure does not apply to Stallion Springs as a matter of law, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandate.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F090834.PDF
Liu v. Kaiser Permanente Emp. Pension Plan (9th Cir. 24-4303 8/31/26) ERISA
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of Sherry Yali Liu’s action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against the Kaiser Permanente Employees Pension Plan for the Permanente Medical Group, Inc., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., challenging the denial of Liu’s claim for pension benefits due to her deceased sister.
Liu contended that before her sister died, she elected to receive her earned pension benefits as a lump sum and designated Liu as her beneficiary. Kaiser denied Liu’s claim, reasoning that the sister initiated, but did not finalize, an election and beneficiary designation, and that substantial compliance with the Plan’s requirements is not a basis for benefits under ERISA.
The panel held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, as it is for beneficiary designation changes under Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The panel clarified that Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not nullify the doctrine of substantial compliance, consistent with this court’s application of the doctrine in Becker.
The panel concluded that under California law, Liu’s complaint plausibly alleged that her sister substantially complied with the Plan’s requirements. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
The panel addressed additional claims in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/31/24-4303.pdf
City of L.A. v. American Federation of State, County etc. (CA2/1 B336981, filed 7/30/26, mod, & cert. pub. 8/28/26) Los Angeles Employees Relations Board | Reciprocal Retirement Benefits
Beginning in 1980 the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) and the City of Los Angeles (City) maintained a reciprocal retirement benefits arrangement (Reciprocity or the Reciprocal Arrangement). This arrangement allowed employees transferring between DWP and the City to carry their pension service credits between the two retirement systems. In 2010, DWP decided to withdraw from Reciprocity. In 2013 the City then adopted Ordinance No. 182824 (the 2013 Ordinance), which suspended the Reciprocal Arrangement.
City employees and their unions (collectively the Coalition) filed an unfair labor relations practice claim before the Los Angeles Employees Relations Board (ERB). The Coalition alleged the City failed to bargain or meet and confer with the Coalition over the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB agreed the City violated its duty to engage in “effects bargaining” regarding possible ways to mitigate the effects of the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB ordered the City to bargain with the Coalition and to make whole Coalition-represented employees who sustained losses, including reduced pension or other benefits, resulting from the City’s unilateral implementation of the suspension, until the City had satisfied its obligation to bargain. The trial court then denied the City’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the ERB’s order and granted the Coalition’s petition seeking to enforce it.
The City does not dispute that it had a duty to bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead, it challenges only the remedy ordered by the ERB. It argues the ERB lacked authority to order make-whole relief and, even if it possessed that authority, fashioned an improper remedy that failed to restore the parties to the status quo existing when the City’s bargaining obligation arose. The City further contends the ERB’s order is vague and overbroad, and violates separation-of-powers principles. Finally, it challenges the trial court’s postjudgment award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. We affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B336981.PDF
Bills Signed by Governor (8/27/26)
AB 1928 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D–Alhambra) — Sex equity: sexual harassment complaints
AB 1950 by Assemblymember John Harabedian (D-Pasadena) —Civil actions: mediation
SB 1038 by Senator John Laird (D-Santa Cruz) — The Public Employees’ Retirement System
SB 1316 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Employment
SB 1444 by Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement — Employment
Bill Signed by Governor (8/22/26)
AB 2624 by Assemblymember Mia Bonta (D-Alameda) – Privacy for immigration support services providers
Cherry v. WA Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife (9th Cir. 25-4763 8/21/26) Title VII | COVID-19
The panel affirmed in part and reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded for further proceedings in a reasonable accommodation action under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
The Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife granted five employees religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The Department informed the employees that it could not accommodate them in their current roles but offered them a reassignment process.
The panel held that Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship. Once an employee has made a prima facie showing of religious discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it made good faith efforts to accommodate the employee’s religious belief in a manner that would reasonably preserve that employee’s employment status. If the accommodation proposed by the employer does not eliminate the conflict, then the employer must implement an alternate accommodation proposed by the employee, unless that would cause undue hardship to the employer. If the accommodation proposed by the employer does reasonably
preserve an employee’s status, then the employer has met its burden.
The panel held that the district court misapplied these rules when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the Department met its burden under Title VII. The panel concluded that offering the reassignment process was not, as a matter of law, an offer of a reasonable accommodation, meaning an alternate position or arrangement that eliminated the asserted conflict between the employees’ religious beliefs and the employees’ current jobs, because the reassignment process offered only a limited possibility of an accommodation. Thus, the panel could not say that, as a matter of law, the Department made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate the employees’ religion.
The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against most of the employees with respect to their Title VII claims and against all of the employees with respect to their claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. For two of the employees who failed to meet the procedural requirements for bringing a Title VII claim, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants with respect to those employees’ Title VII claims.
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants as to the employees’ federal and state constitutional claims. The employees forfeited their argument that their claims against Department officers in their official capacities were not barred by sovereign immunity. The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over the state-law claims and did not err in rejecting those claims.
Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding three of the employees’ proffered experts, nor in issuing a protective order that prohibited their taking of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/21/25-4763.pdf
Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB (9th Cir. 23-632, 23-780 8/20/26) NLRA Work Preservation Defense
The en banc court denied petitions for review by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and granted a cross-petition for enforcement by the National Labor Relations Board of the Board’s order awarding the right to perform maintenance and repair work for SSA Terminals, LLC to the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM).
Two labor unions, ILWU and IAM, claimed the right to perform the same maintenance and repair work for SSA Terminals pursuant to their respective collective bargaining agreements in what is known as a “jurisdictional dispute”—a conflict arising from overlapping scopes of work within each union’s contract. Recognizing that an employer caught in the middle of a jurisdictional dispute is ill-equipped to resolve it, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to empower the Board to decide which of the competing unions shall be awarded the work and deemed the failure of the non-prevailing union to respect the Board’s decision an unfair labor practice.
SSA Terminals invoked § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA and asked the Board to decide which union should be awarded the maintenance and repair work. The Board awarded the work to IAM. ILWU then filed a grievance, alleging that SSA Terminals violated its collective bargaining agreement by failing to defend its right to do the work during the Board’s proceedings, and an arbitrator ruled in ILWU’s favor. The following month, IAM and SSA filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that ILWU violated § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA by pursuing a grievance intended to coerce SSA Terminals to reassign the work to ILWU in contravention of the Board’s decision. The Board determined that ILWU violated § 8(b)(4)(D) by failing to comply with the Board’s decision, and rejected ILWU’s work-preservation defense, in which ILWU argued that the arbitration was a permissible work-preservation activity because it sought to pressure SSA Terminals to comply with its contractual obligation to assign the maintenance and repair work to ILWU.
The sole issue the en banc court resolved was whether a union charged with violating § 8(b)(4)(D) may invoke the work-preservation defense described in National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980). The en banc court held that (1) the ILA work-preservation defense is not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA for failure to abide by the Board’s resolution of a jurisdictional dispute, and (2) overruled the passage in International Longshore & Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board (Kinder Morgan), 978 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2020), that stated otherwise.
In ILA, the Supreme Court explained that by enacting § 8(b)(4)(B), Congress intended to prohibit unions from engaging in secondary activity (activity directed at a third-party with the goal of coercing that party to take some action against the employer with whom the union has a dispute) while allowing unions to engage in primary activity (activity a union undertakes directly against its contracting employer for the purpose of preserving work traditionally performed by union members). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the work-preservation defense can defeat an accusation of secondary activity in violation of § 8(b)(4)(B).
The en banc court held that, although ILA work-preservation can be a defense to a § 8(b)(4)(B) unfair labor practice charge, it does not necessarily follow that the defense applies to a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge because the theoretical bases for each charge are different. Section 8(b)(4)(B) seeks to preserve the right of labor organizations to bring pressure on offending employers in primary labor disputes without involving a third-party, and the inquiry is whether the union’s conduct is primary. In contrast, § 8(b)(4)(D) presupposes primary activity because each union in a jurisdictional dispute seeks to secure work from its own employer. Accordingly, the ILA work-preservation defense is inapplicable to a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge.
The en banc court therefore denied ILWU’s and PMA’s petitions and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement.
In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the en banc court addressed whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s work-assignment decision and IAM’s petition challenging the adequacy of the remedy imposed by the Board.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/20/23-632.pdf
Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-1532 8/19/26) Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying Structure Therapeutics USA, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in an action brought by a former Structure employee, Dr. Ding Ding, under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”), which empowers victims of workplace sexual harassment and sexual assault to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements and elect to pursue their claims in federal court.
After Dr. Ding was terminated from her position as Chief Financial Officer with Structure, she filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims of discrimination and harassment based on national origin and her status as a domestic violence victim. During discovery, Dr. Ding uncovered evidence that her workplace mistreatment was motivated because of her sex. She then withdrew from arbitration and elected to pursue claims in civil court under the EFAA.
The panel held that Dr. Ding could assert her rights under the EFAA. Both the text of the statute and its underlying purpose make clear that Congress intended to afford victims of workplace sexual assault and sexual harassment a genuine choice whether to pursue their claims in a court of law, notwithstanding a preexisting agreement to arbitrate. Where a plaintiff discovers a basis to pursue claims covered by the EFAA during arbitration, she may elect to end arbitration and proceed in court. As the district court found, Dr. Ding did not become aware that her workplace mistreatment was motivated because of her sex until she obtained discoveryonce arbitration proceedings had commenced.
Consequently, she could not have triggered an “election” under the EFAA by filing an arbitration demand with non-sexual harassment claims. Dr. Ding made an election only one time—when she chose to pursue the newly discovered sexual harassment claim by filing her claims in federal Court.
The panel rejected Defendants’ argument that Dr. Ding waived her right to proceed in court by filing an arbitration demand even though she was aware of the facts underlying her sexual harassment claim. This argument was foreclosed by the district court’s finding that there was no record evidence that Dr. Ding knew she had a plausible sexual harassment claim but intentionally chose not to bring the claim when she initiated arbitration.
The panel further held that Dr. Ding plausibly pled a sex-based hostile work environment claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act and therefore under the EFAA, which defines “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4).
Judge Rawlinson dissented from the majority’s holding that an employee may proceed with an action under EFAA after first electing to proceed with arbitration and engaging in significant litigation in the arbitration forum. She wrote that the majority’s reading of the statute conflicted with the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, the commonly accepted legal definition of the term “election,” and the court’s precedent addressing waiver in the arbitration context.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/19/25-1532.pdf