Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Ventura Cty Emp Ret Assn v. Crim J Atty Ret Assn Ventura Cty (SC S283978 7/27/26) Public Employee Pension Calculation
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In the California Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA; Stats. 2012, ch. 296, § 28; Gov. Code, § 7522 et seq.), the Legislature imposed new limits on the types and amounts of employee compensation that county retirement systems may use as a basis to calculate retirement benefits of covered public employees. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1059–1063; Gov. Code, § 31461, subd. (b) (section 31461).) The purpose of these limits was to reduce the practice of “pension spiking” — that is, “the manipulation of an employee’s pattern of work and pay to produce inflated compensation earnable during the final compensation period” which, in turn, results in greater pension obligations for participating counties. (Alameda County, at p. 1061.)
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This case concerns one of these limits: Under PEPRA, the pension calculation for certain public employees now must exclude payments an employee receives for unused vacation or other leave “in an amount that exceeds that which may be earned and payable in each 12-month period during the final average salary period, regardless of when reported or paid.” (§ 31461, subd. (b)(2) (section 31461(b)(2)).) In Alameda County, we described one function of this provision as preventing employees from effectively doubling the amount of cashed out leave time they would ordinarily be able to receive in a single calendar year, under annual limits set by the terms of employment, by designating a final compensation year that straddles two calendar years. (Alameda County, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1062–1063.) This description was not essential to our holding in Alameda County, which primarily concerned PEPRA’s constitutionality. Nonetheless, the retirement system in Ventura County proposed to implement the law as Alameda County described it. Now, facing opposition from county employees, the retirement system seeks confirmation that the opinion’s understanding of section 31461(b)(2) is correct.
Reading the relevant statutory text in light of the purposes it was meant to achieve, we now confirm what we said about section 31461(b)(2) in Alameda County: Under PEPRA, a public employee’s retirement benefit calculation may not include cashed out leave time in excess of the applicable annual limit set by the terms of employment, even though the employee has designated a final compensation period that straddles two or more calendar years.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S283978.PDF
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Krzesni v. Wellpoint School District, et al. (9th Cir. 25-3308 7/27/26) Whistleblower Retaliation | NDAA
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The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants Wellpinit School District (“WSD”) and John Adkins in a whistleblower retaliation action brought by David Krzesni under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“NDAA”), 41 U.S.C. § 4712, and Washington state law.
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Krzesni alleged that he was unlawfully terminated from his job in retaliation for making protected disclosures regarding WSD’s purported misuse of federal grant money. He alleged that defendants retaliated by refusing to renew his contract after he disclosed information revealing that WSD had used grant money to fund a trip to Hawaii without the requisite authorization from the federal government. He also brought a wrongful discharge claim under Washington law.
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The panel held that to establish a prima facie whistleblower claim under the NDAA, a plaintiff must show that (1) an employee covered by the statute (2) communicated to a qualified person or body (3) a protected disclosure and (4) suffered an adverse employment action as a reprisal for making that disclosure. Once a prima facie claim is established, the employer may rebut it with clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action against the employee even if the protected disclosure had not occurred.
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The panel concluded that Krzesni’s act of reporting the Hawaii trip in an annual performance report was not a protected disclosure, and neither was his rhetorical question to a supervisor about the funding of the trip. The panel concluded that even if Krzesni made a protected disclosure in a call with the federal grant contact, this disclosure could not have been the basis for the adverse employment action because WSD had already decided not to renew Krzesni’s contract before then.
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The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Krzesni’s state law wrongful discharge claim because the nonrenewal of his contract was not a discharge.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/27/25-3308.pdf
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Weiss v. The Permanent Medical Group, Inc. (9th Cir. 24-6609 7/24/26) Religious Discrimination | COVID-19 Vaccine
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The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of an employment discrimination action brought by Mimi Weiss under Title VII and California law against The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (“TPMG”), and remanded.
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TPMG initially granted Weiss a religious exemption from its COVID-19 vaccine mandate for its employees. It later required Weiss to provide additional information so it could evaluate whether her beliefs were sincere. When she did not fully respond to the supplemental inquiry, TPMG revoked Weiss’s exemption and terminated her because she failed to get vaccinated.
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To state a prima facie case of failure to accommodate her religion under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, the plaintiff must show that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer threatened her with or subjected her to discriminatory treatment, including discharge, because of her inability to fulfill the job requirements.
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The district court granted TPMG’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Weiss failed to satisfy the second element of the prima facie case—she did not adequately allege that she gave TPMG sufficient notice of the conflict between her beliefs and its vaccine mandate.
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Addressing the notice requirement, the panel held that the employee must provide only enough information about her religious needs to permit the employer to understand the existence of an actual conflict between those needs and the employer’s expectations. Applying this standard, the panel concluded that Weiss satisfied the second element of a prima facie case for purposes of the pleading stage because she plausibly alleged that she informed TPMG of her belief and its conflict with the vaccine mandate.
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The panel addressed a privacy claim in an accompanying memorandum disposition and dissent.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/24/24-6609.pdf
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Theis v. IMESD (9th Cir. 25-5641, 25-8039 7/21/26) First Amendment
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The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying plaintiff Roderick E. Theis II’s motion for a preliminary injunction in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against InterMountain Education Service District (“IMESD”), its Board of Directors, and other officials, alleging that defendants violated his First Amendment rights under the Free Speech Clause by directing him to remove certain books from his offices and by reprimanding him for displaying those books.
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Theis, a licensed clinical social worker who served as an Education Specialist within the IMESD, displayed two books—He Is He and She Is She—in his office at La Grande Middle School. These books share the themes that gender is binary and cannot be changed. In his Elgin School District office, Theis displayed on his desk a different children’s book—Johnny the Walrus—which allegorically comments on transgender issues. Following a complaint, Theis acknowledged displaying all three books in his offices while meeting with students on the job, but said that he had never intended to harm anyone and that the books were not hostile. IMESD concluded that Theis’s display of the books constituted a bias incident, directed Theis to stop displaying the books in his school offices, and warned that noncompliance could result in discipline, including termination.
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The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction given the robust body of precedent holding that educators speak as government employees when they convey messages to students within the four walls of a school. As a government employee, Theis was assigned to work in school offices, meet with students, and carry out his duties in that setting. His speech occurred in the course of those responsibilities and cannot be meaningfully separated from them. As such, Theis’s speech falls outside the First Amendment’s ambit.
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Because the panel determined Theis’s speech was beyond First Amendment coverage, it did not conduct the Pickering balancing test.
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The panel distinguished this case from Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, 597 U.S. 507, 509 (2022), because Theis was not engaged in a moment of private expression detached from his role, but rather, he was engaged in his core professional responsibilities.
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The panel addressed Theis’s additional claims in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.
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Dissenting, Judge VanDyke wrote that, like the personal views that Theis’s colleagues were permitted to express in their offices, Theis’s placement of three children’s books as decorations in his office was his own personal expression, not the government’s. The Supreme Court in Kennedy established that some employee expression remains personal even though it is observed by students on school grounds, and the majority’s approach cannot be reconciled with Kennedy. Judge VanDyke further wrote that because Theis’s office decorations related to a matter of public concern and because the record contains no evidence of any disruption to IMESD’s interests that could outweigh Theis’s speech interest, Theis’s expression is protected by the First Amendment under Pickering.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/21/25-5641.pdf
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Seagraves v. WA DCYF (9th Cir. 25-3282 7/21/26) COVID Vaccination Policy
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The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by former employees (the “Employees”) of the Washington Department of Children, Youth, and Families (“DCYF” or “the agency”), arising from the implementation of a COVID19 vaccination requirement mandated by then-Governor of Washington, Jay Inslee.
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The Employees allege that DCYF and three individuals who held positions within the agency (the “Officials”) violated their constitutional rights and various provisions of Washington state law through the implementation of the COVID-19 vaccination requirement when their requests for religious accommodations from the vaccine requirement were denied and they were separated from the agency.
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The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Employees’ claims against the Officials in their personal capacities because the first amended complaint did not plausibly allege personal involvement by any of the Officials in constitutional violations of the Employees’ free exercise, equal protection, or procedural due process rights.
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The panel further held that the Employees’ claims for prospective injunctive relief against the Officials in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the Employees identified no ongoing violation of federal law where Governor Inslee’s COVID-19 vaccination requirement was rescinded months before they filed their original complaint.
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Lastly, the panel held that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the Employees leave to amend, based on its reasonable conclusion that amendment would have been futile.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/21/25-3282.pdf
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Bills Signed by Governor (7/13/26)
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SB 135 by the Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review — Higher education budget trailer bill
Note that SB 135, among other things, would add new Education Code section 84750.8 to require community colleges districts to provide both certificated and classified employees with up to 14 weeks of paid pregnancy disability leave benefits.
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SB 163 by the Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review — Developmental services
Note that SB 163, among other things, would amend section 4622(m) and 4894(a)(7) of the Welfare and Institutions Code to require adoption of an anti-retaliation policy and procedures to protect board members and regional center employees.
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SB 171 by the Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review — Labor
Note that SB 171, among other things, would amend section 62.5(f)(1) of the Labor Code to require payment of the annual employer assessment by electronic funds transfer (EFT) and provides the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations with the discretionary authority to reduce or waive penalties.
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Combs v. Neflix, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-3164 7/8/26) Arbitration | EFAA
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The panel affirmed the district court’s order granting Netflix, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in Jessica Combs’s diversity action alleging employment-related claims.
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Combs alleged that between 2017 and 2021 she repeatedly complained to supervisors and management about Netflix’s sexually charged environment and specific instances of harassment, that Netflix ignored her complaints, and that she was fired in retaliation for submitting complaints.
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) limits the Federal Arbitration Act’s reach as to claims involving sexual harassment or sexual assault, allowing plaintiffs making such allegations to proceed in court notwithstanding any predispute agreement to arbitrate. Included in the EFAA is a timing provision in a statutory note, which reads: “This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after the date of enactment of this Act,” i.e., March 3, 2022. 9 U.S.C. § 401 note.
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The panel held that Combs’s complaint alleged conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment. Her claims therefore presumptively fell within the EFAA, and she could elect to proceed in court rather than through arbitration, if she met the EFAA’s timing provision.
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Interpreting the EFAA’s timing provision as a matter of first impression, the panel held that the EFAA would apply either to “claims that accrue” or “disputes that arise” on or after March 3, 2022. The panel determined that a claim accrues under the EFAA when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action and that a dispute arises for purposes of the EFAA when an employee registers disagreement—through either an internal complaint, external complaint, or otherwise—with his or her employer, and the employer expressly or constructively opposes that position.
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The panel held that by the allegations of Combs’s complaint, the dispute arose and claims accrued before the EFAA’s effective date of March 3, 2022. Because the EFAA does not apply, Combs’s claims must proceed to arbitration.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/07/08/25-3164.pdf
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Damak v. Super. Ct. (CA4/3 G065583 7/8/26) Civil Discovery Monetary Sanctions | Pro Per Employment Plaintiff
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After failing to receive any response from Satraj Hospitality LLC, Sangita Khanna, and Sanjeev Khanna (defendants) to a variety of propounded discovery, or any communication from their counsel concerning it, self-represented Aziz Damak filed motions to compel [on an employment matter]. In addition to other relief, each of the motions requested the trial court issue monetary sanctions of at least $1,000 pursuant to method-specific sanction provisions of the Civil Discovery Act (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016.010 et seq.; Discovery Act.). Although the court granted all the motions to compel and the nonmonetary relief requested, it denied the requests for monetary sanctions because Damak did not show he incurred any actual expenses as a result of defendants’ failure to respond to the discovery.
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Through this mandate proceeding, Damak challenges the denial of monetary sanctions, asserting the denial is contrary to the applicable statutes which make monetary sanctions mandatory. In addition, he contends it runs counter to the deterrent purpose of the statutory provisions and will serve to encourage discovery abuse of self-represented parties by those who are represented by counsel. He requests we either direct the trial court to impose monetary sanctions in an amount to be determined or impose the sanctions ourselves.
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As part of a legislatively established comprehensive system of discovery procedures, the applicable statutes control the types of sanctions available and the circumstances under which they may be granted. Longstanding statutory language and relevant case law lead us to conclude it was proper for the trial court to focus, in part, on whether Damak incurred expenses due to defendants’ lack of response. However, the record is devoid of any consideration afforded to a more recently enacted Discovery Act sanctions provision that is an integral component of the statutory scheme and applies notwithstanding any other law. Specifically, section 2023.050, which relates to document production requests, makes a $1,000 sanction against a party and/or attorney mandatory under certain circumstances irrespective of any resulting expenses incurred by the other side. Because the trial court failed to consider whether the requisite factual findings triggering such sanctions could properly be made, the court erred in denying outright the requests for monetary sanctions. Accordingly, we grant Damak’s petition for writ of mandate, in part, and direct the court to reconsider the monetary sanctions requests in accordance with section 2023.050 and this opinion, including our discussion of civility in the legal profession.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G065583.PDF
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Decloedt v. Radnet Management (CA2/1 B343963, filed 6/26/26, ord. pub. 7/7/26) Arbitration | EFAA | FEHA | Sexual Orientation Harassment
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This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to compel plaintiff and respondent Trevor Joseph Decloedt to submit his claims to arbitration.
Decloedt sued defendants and appellants Radnet Management, Inc.; RadNet, Inc.; Radnet Managed Imaging Services, Inc.; Joe Zambrano; and Susana Ceballos (collectively, appellants), alleging 11 state-law causes of action, including a cause of action for sexual harassment under our state’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.). The trial court denied appellants’ motion to compel Decloedt to submit these claims to arbitration. The court based its decision on the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402), which statute creates an exemption to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA; 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). The EFAA applies to “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (See 9 U.S.C. § 401(4) & § 402(a).)
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Appellants contend the EFAA does not apply to Decloedt’s lawsuit. We disagree. We hold that harassment on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sexual harassment under FEHA, and appellants fail to show the trial court erred in finding Decloedt sufficiently pleaded a FEHA sexual harassment claim. As to the latter point, we find Decloedt sufficiently alleged Ceballos subjected him to severe or pervasive harassment because of his homosexuality. In sum, we affirm the denial of appellants’ motion to compel arbitration.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B343963.PDF
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Adelanto Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Krause (CA4/1 D086337 7/6/26) Workplace Violence Restraining Order
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Michael Krause, a former superintendent of the Adelanto Elementary School District (District), appeals from an order granting the District’s request for a workplace violence restraining order (WVRO) against him on behalf of three of its employees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.8.) Krause, who is now an elected member of the District’s Board of Trustees (Board), contends that the District waived its right to seek a WVRO as part of an employment separation agreement releasing any existing claims against him. We conclude that, even assuming the release would apply to a WVRO proceeding, an employer’s right to prosecute a WVRO on behalf of its employees is unwaivable under Civil Code section 3513. We also find sufficient evidence of a future threat of harassment to support the WVRO, and we reject Krause’s contention that the WVRO violates his parental rights. We conclude, however, that one portion of the WVRO is overbroad and violates Krause’s First Amendment rights as an elected Board member by prohibiting him from making any comment on the WVRO or the WVRO proceedings at regular Board meetings. Accordingly, we will modify the WVRO to vacate this provision. We also modify the WVRO by limiting its duration to the statutory maximum of three years, rather than four years as ordered by the trial court, subject to early termination under the terms of the original order. (See § 527.8, subd. (l)(1).) We affirm the order as so modified.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D086337.PDF
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Phan v. Knight Sacramento SU Inc. (CA3 C103401, filed 6/5/26, pub. 7/2/26) Arbitration
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Defendants and appellants, Knight Sacramento SU Inc., et al. (Knight), are California corporations operating car dealerships throughout the state. Plaintiff and respondent, Michelle Phan (Phan), was intermittently employed by Elk Grove Subaru (Subaru) and Elk Grove Volkswagen (Volkswagen) between 2022 and 2024. In 2024, Phan filed wage and hour claims against Knight in both her individual capacity and on behalf of a class of current and former employees of Knight. Phan demanded a jury trial.
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Relying on the arbitration agreements signed by Phan during her employment, Knight moved to compel arbitration of Phan’s claims, or alternatively, to sever any invalid terms and enforce the remainder of the agreements. Relying on Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 (Cook), the trial court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration agreements were both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The court also declined to sever the unconscionable terms.
Knight appeals and argues that the trial court incorrectly applied Cook, and in any event, Cook is distinguishable. Knight also asks this Court to decline to follow the Cook decision.
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We affirm the trial court’s order.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C103401.PDF
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Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics (CA4/3 G064718M mod. 7/1/26) Labor Code Violations | Attorney’s Fees Negative Multiplier
It is hereby ordered that the opinion filed herein on May 26, 2026, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
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On page 8, second full paragraph, first sentence, replace, “On May 30, 2017” with, “On May 3, 2024.”
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On page 9, first full paragraph, replace: “Taduran contingency risk for ‘a case that has lasted seven years, involving over 1,500 attorney hours and nearly $100,000 in actual out-of-pocket litigations costs.’” with “Taduran contended the 1.5 multiplier was appropriate based on the contingency risk for ‘a case that has lasted seven years, involving over 1,500 attorney hours and nearly $100,000 in actual put-of-pocket litigations costs.’”
This modification does not change the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064718M.PDF
Bill Signed by Governor 6/30/26
AB 2155 by Assemblymember Cecilia Aguiar-Curry (D-Winters) — Arbitration: validity of agreements to arbitrate
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Trump v. Slaughter (US 25-3326 6/29/26) Termination of FTC Commissioners | Separation of Powers
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is a regulatory agency that has accumulated vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory powers. The FTC’s powers belong not to the President or his appointees alone, but instead to five Commissioners, each of whom serves for seven years and may be removed by the President only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 15 U. S. C. §41.
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Soon after President Trump began his second term in January 2025, he fired the FTC’s two Democratic appointees, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. He did not identify a cause under the statute. He instead told them their “continued service on the FTC [was] inconsistent with [his] Administration's priorities” and that they were removed “pursuant to [his] authority under Article II of the Constitution.” App. 28. Slaughter filed suit against the President and other executive officials, seeking relief to restore her to office. She argued that her removal was ultra vires, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and violated the Constitution. The District Court granted Slaughter’s motion for summary judgment. It acknowledged that Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, generally permits the President to remove executive officers at will, but explained that Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, carved out an exception for the FTC. The court declared the President’s “purported removal” ultra vires and issued a permanent injunction barring interference “with Ms. Slaughter’s right to perform her lawful duties.” App. 90–91. A divided Court of Appeals denied the Government’s motion for a stay pending appeal, and this Court stayed the District Court’s order and granted certiorari before judgment.
Held: The FTC’s for-cause removal provision is contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. Pp. 2–36.
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https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-332_qn12.pdf
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Trump v. Cook (US 25A312 application for stay 6/29/26) Termination of Federal Reserve Governor
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In August 2025, President Trump purported to fire Lisa Cook, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Cook was the first Governor to be fired in the central bank’s 111-year history. She promptly filed suit. She alleged that the attempted removal was not “for cause,” as required by statute, and that the President had in any event failed to comply with the statute’s (and the Constitution’s) requirement that she receive pretermination process. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent her removal. This Court must decide whether the District Court’s order should remain in effect pending the conclusion of litigation over the attempted removal.
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The United States has a long tradition of independent central banking. The Nation’s first de facto central bank, the Bank of North America, predates even our Constitution. The structure of the Bank of North America was unusual; it was owned in part by the Government and in part by the public, run by directors accountable only to private stockholders, and yet tasked with public purposes—specifically, the maintenance of a sound national currency.
Although the Bank of North America was short lived, two more national banks soon followed in its footsteps. Both had similar goals to the Bank of North America—and a similar degree of independence from the Federal Government. The first came in 1791, when the First Congress chartered a bank that came to be known as the First Bank of the United States. After the charter for the First Bank was allowed to expire in 1811, Chief Justice Marshall remarked that “a short experience of the embarrassments to which the refusal to revive [the First Bank] exposed the government”—severe financial instability following the War of 1812—“convinced those who were most prejudiced against [a central bank] of the measure of its necessity.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 402. That necessity led to the Second Bank of the United States, chartered in 1816. In 1832, however, President Jackson, unconvinced of the wisdom of an independent national bank, vetoed a bill passed by Congress to extend the Second Bank’s charter.
Eighty years later, after an era of ruinous financial panics, a bipartisan congressional commission recommended the creation of another central bank to assume “the serious duty of protecting public and private interests at times when they are imperiled.” Report of the National Monetary Commission, S. Doc. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 36. What emerged is today’s central bank—called the Federal Reserve System—first created in 1913, and then restructured in 1933 and 1935. The Federal Reserve consists of 12 “independent but affiliated banks,” one for each region. C. Glass, An Adventure in Constructive Finance 173. These regional banks, called Federal Reserve Banks, are privately owned (and operated) by the commercial banks of the area. See 38 Stat. 254, 12 U. S. C. §341. Above those banks sits the Board of Governors, which supervises the system with an eye to the economy’s “long run growth.” §225a. The Board consists of seven members, each appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. §241. Like the directors of its three predecessors, the Federal Reserve’s Governors do not serve at the President’s pleasure—they instead serve staggered 14-year terms, and may be removed only “for cause.” §242.
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Cook’s term on the Board of Governors was set to expire in 2038. On August 20, 2025, the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Director posted to social media a letter in which he accused Cook of mortgage fraud. President Trump posted to social media that “Cook must resign, now!!!” and he later told reporters that he would “fire her if she doesn’t resign.” Complaint in No. 1:25-cv-02903 (D DC), ECF Doc. 1, p. 14. Three days later, the President purported to fire Cook for cause. In a letter to Cook, he stated that he had “reason to believe” that she “may have made false statements on one or more mortgage agreements.” ECF Doc. 1–4, p. 2. He told her that he lacked “confidence in [her] integrity” and that he had determined that “faithfully executing the law requires [her] immediate removal from office.” Id., at 3. After Cook filed suit, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent her removal. The Court of Appeals declined to stay the injunction, and the Government filed an application for stay in this Court.
Held: The Government’s application is denied. Pp. 8–27.
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https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a312_5468.pdf
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Betanco v. Living Spaces Furniture, LLC (CA1/1 A169754 6/25/26) PAGA | Arbitration
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After respondent Luis Betanco filed a class action lawsuit and a separate action under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) against appellants Living Spaces Furniture, LLC (Living Spaces) and Of Service Transportation, LLC (Of Service), appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion. Appellants first contend that the court erred in concluding that Betanco was a “transportation worker” under section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and thus exempt from the Act. We reject the contention because Betanco was actively engaged in the interstate transportation of goods even though he made retail (as opposed to wholesale) deliveries. We also reject appellants’ second contention that the trial court was required to dismiss Betanco’s non-individual PAGA claims.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169754.PDF
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Jung v. Acosta (CA2/5 B340726 6/25/26) Appeal of Union Judicial Panel Proceeding | Anti-SLAPP
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Following a union judicial panel proceeding, plaintiffs were found guilty of violating the union’s prohibitions against anti-LGBTQ bigotry, racism, and sexist behavior and removed from their positions as an officer and an employee. Plaintiffs then sued defendants asserting various causes of action based on defendants’ alleged disclosure of text messages and a confidential mediation brief that defendants used to draft the charges in the judicial panel proceeding. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), and the trial court granted the motion, in part.
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On appeal, plaintiffs contend the stricken claims did not arise from protected activity and, alternatively, those claims had the “‘requisite minimal merit’” to defeat the anti-SLAPP motion. (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 385.) We conclude the alleged judicial panel proceedings were “official proceeding[s] authorized by law” within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) and plaintiffs did not demonstrate their challenged claims had the requisite minimal merit. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B340726.PDF
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Brown v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 24-3789 6/24/26) Title VII Religious Discrimination
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The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants Alaska Airlines, Inc., and Association of Flight Attendants-CWA AFL-CIO (“AFA”) and remanded for further proceedings in an employment discrimination action brought by former flight attendants Marli Brown and Lacey Smith.
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Brown and Smith claimed that Alaska fired them because of their religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state anti-discrimination laws, and that their union, AFA, discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs during Alaska’s internal investigation. The district court granted summary judgment for Alaska and AFA on plaintiffs’ federal claims and further concluded that the Railway Labor Act preempted their state anti-discrimination claims against the union.
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Plaintiffs were fired after they posted comments on Alaska’s World, an internal intranet communications network, in response to the company’s post announcing its support for the Equality Act, proposed federal legislation that would extend certain federal nondiscrimination requirements to cover discrimination involving sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity in various contexts. The panel held that, whether viewed through the lens of direct and circumstantial evidence or through the burden-shifting McDonnell-Douglas framework for Title VII cases, plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact whether Alaska terminated them because of their religious beliefs, and the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment on their Title VII and state law claims. Plaintiffs also demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact whether AFA attempted to cause or acquiesced in their firing because of their religious beliefs.
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Brown posted a facially religious statement that the Equality Act would endanger the Christian church, encourage suppression of religious freedom, and eliminate conscience protections, and Alaska and the union understood the religious basis for the post. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether she was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire her because of her religious beliefs.
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Smith’s comment on Alaska’s World, that “As a company, do you think it’s possible to regulate morality?” was not explicitly grounded in religious belief, but Alaska considered Smith’s situation in connection with Brown’s, working them up together. The panel concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the company’s stated neutral reasons for firing Smith were pretextual and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether AFA attempted to cause Smith’s termination based on her religious beliefs or acquiesced in it.
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Agreeing with the Second and Eighth Circuits, the panel held that the Railway Labor Act’s duty of fair representation did not impliedly preempt plaintiffs’ Oregon and Washington state law anti-discrimination claims against AFA.
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Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Christen concurred in the majority’s conclusion that both plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that should have prevented entry of summary judgment regarding: (1) whether plaintiffs’ union, the AFA, attempted to cause or acquiesced in the termination of their employment on the basis of their religious beliefs; and (2) whether Alaska Airlines terminated Brown on the basis of her religious beliefs. Judge Christen also agreed that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. Judge Christen dissented from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Smith’s claims against Alaska because she did not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/24/24-3789.pdf
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Cocom v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-3246 6/23/26) Arbitration | Substantive Unconscionability
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In a putative wage and hour class action brought by Robert Cocom against his former employer ABM Aviation, Inc. (“ABM”), the panel reversed the district court’s judgment that ABM could not enforce the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“MAA”) the parties signed when Cocom was first employed by ABM, and remanded for further proceedings.
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The district court concluded that the MAA was procedurally and substantively unconscionable based on the analysis in Cook v. University of Southern California, 321 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024).
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The panel held that because the challenged provisions of the MAA were distinguishable in important ways from the provisions held unconscionable in Cook, the district court erred in relying on Cook. The panel first addressed substantive unconscionability. In Cook, the court found the arbitration agreement’s scope, duration, and lack of mutuality to be substantively unconscionable. Here, the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, making this case distinguishable from Cook and from the California Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC, 343 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2026). Second, because the MAA’s more limited scope inherently limited the agreement’s duration, the MAA’s duration was not indefinite and not substantively unconscionable. Third, Cook’s lack-of-mutuality analysis was distinguishable largely because of the MAA’s narrower scope.
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Although the district court did not reach the issue, the panel concluded that the MAA’s bar on using arbitration awards for preclusive or precedential effect was not substantively unconscionable.
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Finally, the panel held that even if the MAA’s waivers of representative actions under California’s Private Attorneys General Act or of public injunctive relief were substantively unconscionable, those provisions would be severable. Accordingly, the panel concluded that it need not address whether either waiver rose to the level of substantive unconscionability.
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Because the panel concluded that most of the MAA’s challenged provisions were not substantively unconscionable, and that any remaining unconscionable provisions could be properly severed, Cocom’s unconscionability defense failed. Because the lack of substantive unconscionability was dispositive, the panel held that it need not address Cocom’s arguments about procedural unconscionability.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/23/25-3246.pdf
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City & County of S.F. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (CA1/5 A173302 6/22/26) Meyers-Milias-Brown Act | Arbitration
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The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, §§ 3500–3511) governs “disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment between public employers and public” unions. (Id., § 3500.) Among other things, the MMBA establishes procedures for resolving those disputes if the public employer and union reach an impasse during negotiations. (Gov. Code, §§ 3505.4 & 3505.5.) Under those impasse resolution procedures, a factfinding panel may “recommend terms of settlement . . . .” (Id., § 3505.5, subd. (a).) But that recommendation is “advisory only.” (Ibid.) Thus, notwithstanding the panel’s recommendation, the public employer “may, after holding a public hearing regarding the impasse, implement its last, best, and final offer.” (Id., § 3505.7.)
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The MMBA also provides an alternative for charter cities or counties. Those cities and counties may adopt their own impasse resolution procedures in lieu of the MMBA’s procedures, so long as their procedures include “a process for binding arbitration.” (Gov. Code, § 3505.5, subd. (e).)
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Petitioner City and County of San Francisco (City), a charter city and county, has opted for this alternative. Under the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco (Charter), certain labor disputes are eligible for interest arbitration if the City and its employee union reach an impasse. If the dispute is eligible for and submitted to arbitration, then the arbitrators must choose between the “last offer[s] of settlement on each of the remaining issues in dispute” between the City and its union. (Charter, § A8.409-4.) Once the arbitrators make that choice, their decision is “final and binding,” and the City has no other recourse. (Ibid.)
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Real party in interest Municipal Attorneys Association of San Francisco (MAA) represents City employees who are “exempt from competitive civil service selection, appointment, and removal procedures” under the Charter. (§ 10.104.) As “exempt appointments” (S.F. Civ. Service Com. Rules, rule 114, § 114.25), MAA members are at-will employees who “serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority” and may be terminated without cause (§ 10.104). During its most recent labor negotiations with the City, the MAA made two proposals that would have altered the at-will status of its members. The first would have limited the City’s ability to discharge MAA members by requiring “just cause” for any “discipline,” including “terminations (discharges).” The second would have required the City to lay off MAA members in order of their seniority. After the City refused to submit these proposals to binding interest arbitration, the MAA filed an unfair practice charge with respondent Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the MAA’s proposals were eligible for arbitration under the impasse resolution provisions of the Charter and held that the City engaged in bad faith bargaining by refusing to submit those proposals to arbitration. We, however, find that the MAA’s proposals are not eligible for arbitration under the Charter. We therefore vacate PERB’s decision to the contrary.
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