CALIFORNIA CASE LAW ALERT

Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.

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Uber Technologies, Inc. v. City of Seattle and Maplebear v. City of Seattle (9th Cir. 25-228 10/29/26) Seattle’s App-Based Worker Deactivation Rights Ordinance

The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing its opinion and dissent filed on March 4, 2026, and denying as moot a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) a superseding amended opinion and dissent, affirming the district court’s denial of a motion by Uber Technologies, Inc. and Maplebear Inc. for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City of Seattle from enforcing Seattle’s App-Based Worker Deactivation Rights Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), which applies to network companies that provide a platform for customers to hire temporary workers and prohibits unwarranted deactivations of these app-based workers’ accounts.

Section 8.40.050.A of the Ordinance requires (1) that a network company “inform” any app-based worker “in writing” of the company’s deactivation policy and (2) that the deactivation policy be “reasonably related” to the company’s “safe and efficient operations.” Plaintiffs, two network companies that rely on app-based workers for their businesses, alleged that the Ordinance compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, and that it is unconstitutionally vague.

Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance regulates speech, the panel concluded that speech is commercial speech, and the Ordinance’s regulation of it overcomes the applicable lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. Because the Ordinance regulates deactivation standards and requires companies to communicate those standards to their workers, the panel applied the test articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).

As to the Ordinance’s first requirement that network companies inform app-based workers of their deactivation policies, the panel held that it meets the test drawn from Zauderer, because the provision is reasonably related to Seattle’s goal to keep app-based workers informed and employed while keeping the public safe, does not purport to compel speech on controversial issues, and is not unduly burdensome.

Concerning the Ordinance’s second requirement that the deactivation policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ “safe and efficient operations,” the panel concluded that provision is not an impermissible regulation of speech because it regulates speech related to what Seattle has designated as unlawful activity: the unwarranted deactivations of worker accounts.

The panel further held that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence as to what grounds for deactivation are reasonably related to safety and efficiency. Accordingly, the panel held that because Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the preliminary injunction.

Dissenting in part, Judge Bennett agreed with the majority that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague. However, he disagreed with the majority’s decision to “[a]ssum[e] without deciding[] that the Ordinance regulates speech,” because the Ordinance does compel speech and is thus subject to the First Amendment. As for the majority’s alternative reasoning that the speech at issue is commercial speech and “overcomes the appropriate level of scrutiny,” Judge Bennett is unpersuaded and believe Plaintiffs have at least raised serious questions going to the merits. He would therefore vacate and remand to have the district court redo its analysis on the merits and reexamine the Winter preliminary injunction factors in light of a determination that the Ordinance is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and in light of the current facts.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/29/25-231.pdf

CA Chamber of Commerce v. Bonta (9th Cir. 25-6874 10/29/26) SB 399 | First Amendment | Preliminary Injunction

The panel affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction preventing California from enforcing California Senate Bill (SB) 399, which prohibits an employer from subjecting, or threatening to subject, an employee to adverse action if the employee chooses not to attend an employer-sponsored meeting or receive communications from the employer, the purpose of which is to communicate the employer’s opinion about religious or political matters.

Before SB 399 went into effect, three industry groups—the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Restaurant Association, and the Western Growers Association—sued the California Attorney General, the California Labor Commissioner, and the Division of Labor Standards of the California Department of Industrial Relations (collectively, “California”) to enjoin enforcement. The industry groups contend that SB 399 violates their First Amendment right to free speech and is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act.

The panel first held that the Western Growers Association has established standing at this stage where (1) at least some of its members have held “all-hands” meetings to communicate their opinion on political matters and would continue to do so if SB 399 were not in effect; (2) such meetings arguably violate SB 399; and (3) there is a credible threat of enforcement, either by California or by affected employees. Because the panel concluded that the Western Growers Association has standing, it did not address the standing of the other industry groups.

Turning to the district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction, the panel first rejected California’s contention that SB 399 does not implicate the First Amendment. Because employers are forbidden from taking adverse action only if they communicate certain messages at the underlying meeting, the law inevitably singles out employers based on their expressive activity. Accordingly, the First Amendment applies.

The panel next held that strict scrutiny applied. SB 399 is facially content-based because it applies only when the employer has discussed certain topics: politics and religion. The law is also speaker-based because it is triggered only by speech communicating the employer’s opinion about religious or political matters.

Applying strict scrutiny, the panel rejected California’s assertion that SB 399 is constitutional as a protection of a “captive audience.” The panel explained that both the Supreme Court and this court have referred to “captive audiences” only when the government acts as a proprietor or in the context of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. Neither court has relied on a “captive audience” theory to identify a compelling interest sufficient to uphold content-based restrictions on nongovernmental speech in a nongovernmental setting. Accordingly, the panel concluded that the industry groups are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim.

Because the panel concluded that the industry groups are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim, and California does not challenge the district court’s determination that the remaining preliminary injunction factors are met, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction.

The panel did not reach the industry groups’ preemption claim.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/29/25-6874.pdf

Civil Rights Dept. v. City of Torrance (CA2/1 B352855, filed 9/29/26, pub. 10/27/26) Fair Chance Act

Plaintiff Civil Rights Department (CRD) is investigating whether defendant City of Torrance (Torrance or the City) has violated Government Code section 12952, the Fair Chance Act, which restricts the circumstances in which an employer may decline to hire a prospective employee due to the employee’s criminal record. When responding to CRD about a job applicant’s complaint concerning the City’s adherence to the Fair Chance Act, Torrance provided CRD with a narrative explanation of the City’s purported compliance. When CRD later instituted administrative proceedings against Torrance involving that applicant and others, the City withheld documents responsive to CRD’s discovery requests on the ground that the documents underlying the City’s narrative explanation, which included individualized assessments of prospective employees and forms for creating such assessments, were protected by attorney-client and work product privilege.

CRD sought relief in superior court, and the court granted CRD’s motion to compel on the ground that Torrance waived any claim of privilege by describing its compliance with the law as a defense to CRD’s claims. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B352855.PDF

Villasenor v. Schneiter (CA2/1 B337209 10/26/26) FEHA | Presumption of Corporate Separateness

In this action under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., we conclude FEHA does not alter the common law’s rebuttable presumption that a corporation exists separately from an alleged alter ego. We will refer to that presumption as “the presumption of corporate separateness.” (F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 782, 797.)

Defendant and Respondent Kurt Schneiter is the sole member of nonparty MMart 1, LLC. Through that company, Schneiter owns Defendant and Respondent SR Restaurant Holdings Group, Inc. (SR Holdings), which, in turn, owns Defendant and Respondent SR Long Beach FD, Inc. (SR Long Beach). SR Holdings and SR Long Beach employed Plaintiff and Appellant, Ana Villasenor, as a restaurant hostess from December 2015 to April 2016.

At the first phase of a bifurcated trial, a jury found SR Long Beach and SR Holdings liable to Villasenor for sexual harassment and other FEHA violations. At the second phase, tried to the court, Villasenor alleged that Schneiter was liable as the corporate defendants’ alter ego. Applying the presumption of corporate separateness, the trial court found Villasenor failed to meet her burden to prove that the court should disregard the corporate defendants’ distinct identities. The trial court entered judgment for Schneiter, from which Villasenor appeals.

Villasenor does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that she failed to rebut the presumption of corporate separateness. Instead, she argues the trial court committed legal error by applying the presumption in the first instance. In Villasenor’s view, to effectuate the public policy behind FEHA, FEHA must be read to alter the presumption and establish a contrary presumption favoring alter ego liability in FEHA actions. We review the asserted legal error de novo. (Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 652; Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527 (Reid).

For reasons we will explain, we conclude FEHA does not alter the presumption of corporate separateness. Accordingly, we affirm.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B337209.PDF

Trona Teachers Assn. v. Bd. of Trust. Trona Jt. Uni. Sch. Dist. (CA4/1 D087158 10/26/26) CBA | Retroactive Payments to Teachers

Education Code section 45028, subdivision (a)(1) contains a “[u]niformity [r]equirement” pertaining to the salaries of certificated public-school teachers. (Adair v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1436, 1444 (Adair).) The law mandates that “when teacher salary schedules operate on the basis of education and experience, they must be wholly uniform.” (Ibid.) A school district and an organization representing certificated teachers in a collective bargaining process, however, may “mutually agree to a salary schedule based on criteria other than a uniform allowance for years of training and years of experience.” (§ 45028, subd. (a)(1).)

In this case, plaintiff Trona Teachers Association CTA/NEA (TTA) entered into a collective bargaining agreement, the 2022-2024 Trona Joint Unified Certificated Agreement (“CBA” or “2022-2024 CBA”), with the Trona Joint Unified School District (District). Although the District approved the CBA in August 2023, the CBA expressly provides that it is “to run retroactive from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024.” The CBA also provides it “shall remain in full force and effect from July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024.” Article 20 of the CBA contains several retroactive provisions pertaining to compensation for certificated employees and refers to salary schedules contained in an appendix to the CBA. The appendix contains two salary schedules based on years of experience and educational levels, one “effective 7/1/2022,” and a second “effective 1/1/2023.” Both schedules also state, “Earned Masters: $2,000 stipend.”

After approving the CBA in August 2023, the District refused to make retroactive payments provided for in the CBA to six former District certificated teachers: plaintiffs Michael Lane, Valerie Gennrich, Yesenia Goins, Tyson LoPresti, Cindy Winks, and Joseph Wolfe (Former Teachers). Although the Former Teachers worked for the District the entire period between July 1, 2022 and June 30, 2023, they each resigned before the District’s August 2023 approval of the CBA. If applied to the Former Teachers retroactively, the CBA would have resulted in additional pay for each of the Former Teachers in amounts ranging from about $5,000 to $9,000.

Plaintiffs (i.e. the TTA and the Former Teachers) filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the District to provide the Former Teachers with the retroactive payments. Plaintiffs argued that the District’s decision to provide retroactive payments solely to those teachers who remained employed by the District as of August 2023 violated the uniform salary requirement of section 45028. Plaintiffs further contended that the District and the TTA had not mutually agreed to a salary schedule based on any criteria other than a uniform allowance for training and experience. After briefing and argument, the trial court denied the plaintiffs’ writ petition.

On appeal, plaintiffs reiterate their contention that the District failed to pay the Former Teachers in accordance with the uniformity requirement of section 45028. They maintain that the District’s refusal to pay the Former Teachers according to the salary schedule for the 2022-2023 period in which they worked created unequal pay for equally qualified teachers who performed the same work. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court’s decision improperly created an “unbargained ‘continuing’ employee condition absent from the statute or CBA.” (Some capitalization and boldface omitted.)

We conclude that the CBA does not contain any language restricting the retroactive increases to employees who remained employed with the District at the time the CBA was approved in August 2023 and that the District’s refusal to pay the Former Teachers the retroactive payments violated section 45028, subdivision (a)(1). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to issue a writ of mandate compelling the District to make the retroactive payments to the Former Teachers.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D087158.PDF

San Diego-Tomas v. Aspire Bakeries, LLC (CA1/4 A175977, filed 10/2/26, pub. 10/23/26) FEHA | Awarding Defendant Costs

Plaintiff Cecilia San Diego-Tomas appeals a judgment dismissing her complaint for discrimination and retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) against her former employer defendant Aspire Bakeries, LLC (Aspire). She does not contest the dismissal of her complaint but contends that the trial court erred in awarding Aspire $15,397.96 in costs without making the required finding that her FEHA claims were frivolous. (§ 12965, subd. (c)(6).) We agree and therefore reverse the judgment insofar as it awards costs to Aspire and remand for further proceedings.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A175977.PDF

Castillo v. Belkorp AG, LLP (CA5 F090527 10/23/26) Arbitration | PAGA

This is an employment-related dispute between defendant/appellant Belkorp AG, LLC (Belkorp) and plaintiff/respondent Stephen Castillo. Former employee Castillo brought purely nonindividual claims under Labor Code section 2698 et seq., the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), against Belkorp. Belkorp filed a motion to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. In this appeal, Belkorp contends the court erred by: (1) failing to adjudicate the merits of its motion to compel arbitration; (2) concluding that Castillo could maintain a PAGA action alleging only nonindividual PAGA claims; and (3) failing to order the parties to arbitration. We affirm.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F090527.PDF

Molina v. Triumph Residential Services, Inc. (CA2/4 B350252 10/22/26) Arbitration | Lab. Code § 432.6

Labor Code section 432.6 makes it illegal for an employer to require, as a condition of employment, that an employee agree to arbitrate certain employment law claims.

An agreement to arbitrate is a contract. Normally, courts do not enforce contracts that are illegal to form. However, section 432.6 contains the following provision: “Nothing in this section is intended to invalidate a written arbitration agreement that is otherwise enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) [FAA]).” (§ 432.6, subd. (f).) Thus, for arbitration agreements enforceable under the FAA, section 432.6 creates an unusual rule. An employer may enforce an arbitration agreement that was illegal to form.

As we discuss below, the Legislature included this odd feature of section 432.6 for a specific reason. The Legislature hoped that doing so would keep federal courts from ruling that section 432.6 is preempted by federal law. That did not happen. In cases where the FAA applies, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that section 432.6 is preempted by the FAA. (Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Bonta (9th Cir. 2023) 62 F.4th 473, 478 (Bonta).)

How do these features of section 432.6 work when the FAA is not at issue and federal preemption does not apply? In this case, an employer, Triumph Residential Services, Inc., seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement. A former employee, Tiffany Diane Molina, argues that the arbitration agreement was required as a condition of employment in violation of section 432.6. All parties agree that the FAA does not apply to the arbitration agreement and that there is no federal preemption. In this context, can the arbitration agreement be enforced by Triumph, even if it was illegally formed under section 432.6?

We conclude that the answer is no. We reject Triumph’s arguments to the contrary. In our view, section 432.6 was intended to allow only arbitration agreements “enforceable under the [FAA]” to be enforced despite being formed illegally. Since the arbitration agreement in this case is concededly not “enforceable under the [FAA],” it may not be enforced if it violates section 432.6.

We further conclude that the trial court had enough evidence before it to conclude that the arbitration agreement here violated section 432.6. Since the agreement violated section 432.6 and since the FAA does not apply, Triumph may not enforce it.

We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying Triumph’s motion to compel arbitration.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B350252.PDF

Cruz v. City of Hermosa Beach (CA2/5 B343086 part. pub. 10/15/26) COVID-19 | Religious Exemption

Defendants City of Hermosa Beach (the City) and the Hermosa Beach Police Department terminated plaintiff Jonathan Cruz from his employment after they implemented a COVID-19 vaccination requirement as an employment qualification and denied his request for a religious exemption. Plaintiff sued defendants for violating the procedural provisions of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA; Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.) and for unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5 and the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; § 12900 et seq.).

Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that POBRA did not apply to plaintiff’s termination. Defendants also argued that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact as to the existence of a causal link between plaintiff’s protected activity and the adverse employment action. The trial court granted summary judgment.

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred because POBRA applied to his termination and he raised triable issues of material fact that defendants had a retaliatory motive when they terminated his employment. We affirm. In the published portion of this opinion, we conclude that POBRA does not apply to a vaccination requirement imposed on all employees as an employment qualification.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B343086.PDF

McInerney v. Regents of the Univ. of California (CA2/2 B339467, filed 9/18/26, pub. 10/13/26) FEHA | Fair Chance Act

John “Jack” McInerney (appellant) appeals from a judgment entered against him on his claims against the Regents of the University of California through the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) brought pursuant to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.), including discrimination pursuant to section 12952 (colloquially referred to as the fair chance act or FCA), retaliation pursuant to section 12940, subdivision (h), and failure to prevent retaliation pursuant to section 12940, subdivision (k). The trial court summarily adjudicated appellant’s claims for retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation. As to appellant’s claims under the FCA, the trial court ruled UCLA “properly and lawfully” followed the requirements of the statute in all ways but one: it failed to give appellant five business days to submit evidence of rehabilitation or mitigation regarding his criminal convictions. The question of whether this violation caused appellant harm was decided by jury trial. The jury decided against appellant.

Appellant appeals, arguing the trial court erred in summarily adjudicating appellant’s retaliation and failure to prevent retaliation claims; preventing the jury from considering appellant’s substantive claims under the FCA; and requiring harm beyond the mere denial of the FCA’s statutory five-day response period.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B339467.PDF

Smith v. Burbank Unified School Dist. (CA2/8 B347288 10/7/26) FEHA Religious Discrimination | COVID-19 Vaccination

Douglas Smith is a devout Christian whose faith compelled him to refuse the COVID-19 vaccination that his former employer Burbank Unified School District required of him. In response to Smith’s request for a religious exemption to the vaccine mandate, the District placed Smith on an indefinite unpaid leave of absence. Smith asked for, but the District refused to provide, masking and weekly PCR testing as a reasonable accommodation. Smith was on unpaid leave from the District for about a year before he began working at an unrelated school that had no vaccine mandate.

Smith sued the District, bringing three claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Government Code sections 12900, et seq.: religious discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination, and retaliation.

The District filed a summary judgment motion, which the trial court granted. We affirm. The trial court correctly found the District met its burden of establishing unpaid leave was the only reasonable accommodation the District could offer to unvaccinated teachers that did not pose an undue burden. Undesignated statutory citations refer to the Government Code.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B347288.PDF

Anderson v. Intel Corp. Inv. (US 25-498 Oral Argument 10/6/26) ERISA

Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), a plan fiduciary is subject to a "[p]rudent man standard of care," which requires the fiduciary to "discharge his duties with respect to a plan" with the "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" that a prudent person "acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1)). As this Court has recognized, a court's inquiry into whether a plaintiff has adequately alleged that a fiduciary breached ERISA's duty of prudence "will necessarily be context specific" because the content of that duty "turns on 'the circumstances ... prevailing' at the time the fiduciary acts." Fifth Third Bancorp. v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 425 (2014) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)). As a result, "categorical" pleading rules are "inconsistent with the context-specific inquiry that ERISA requires." Hughes v. Nw. Univ., 595 U.S.170, 173 (2022).

The question presented is: Whether, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an ERISA fiduciary failed to use the requisite "care, skill, prudence, or diligence" under the circumstances and thus breached ERISA's duty of prudence when investing plan assets requires alleging a "meaningful benchmark."

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9th Circuit Decision

Chin v. DoorDash, Inc. (CA2/8 B348844 10/5/26) EFAA | Arbitration

The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA; 9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402) permits a plaintiff to invalidate an arbitration agreement, and to proceed in court, if asserting claims of sexual assault or harassment. However, when a plaintiff, as here, brings suit in court, strategically withholds a known sexual harassment claim arising from the same events pleaded in that suit, and leads the court to compel arbitration without timely asserting that claim or the EFAA by proper opposition or other appropriate mechanism, that plaintiff has relinquished the benefits of the EFAA as to both the pleaded and withheld claims. We accordingly reverse the trial court’s denial of arbitration, which it based on the EFAA, as well as several related orders.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B348844.PDF

Doe v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (CA2/4 B344642 10/5/26) Sexual Harassment | Non-Direct Supervisor and Strict Liability

In this Fair Employment and Housing Act case, we must decide whether the strict liability or negligence standard applies to an employer when a sexual harassment claim is based on the conduct of a supervisor who is not the plaintiff’s supervisor. Plaintiff Jane Doe contends the relationship between the harassment victim and the alleged harasser is not determinative; all that is required for strict liability to apply is that the alleged harasser supervises other employees. Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) contends strict liability applies only if the alleged harasser is the plaintiff’s supervisor. We conclude that where the alleged harasser is not plaintiff’s supervisor and only supervises other employees, strict liability does not apply.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B344642.PDF

Schmidt v. City of Pasadena (9th Cir. 25-488 10/5/26) PREP Act/COVID-19 Vaccination Policy

The panel affirmed (1) the district court’s dismissal of Jonathan Schmidt’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Pasadena and individually named City employees, alleging that the City’s COVID-19 safety policy requiring unvaccinated employees to complete weekly COVID testing and wear masks in shared spaces unlawfully harmed him, and (2) the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.

In August 2021, the City of Pasadena implemented a COVID-19 vaccination policy for its employees that required City employees to either receive the COVID-19 vaccination by September 17, 2021, or request a medical or religious exemption from the vaccination requirement. Schmidt, a forensic specialist in the Pasadena Police Department, requested and received a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement, but was required to test and wear a mask. He contends that the defendants created a hostile work environment by revealing his unvaccinated status through the masking and testing requirements.

The panel held that the defendants have immunity from all of Schmidt’s claims under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (“PREP”) Act, which provides immunity from federal and state law claims relating to the administration of certain medical countermeasures during a declared public health emergency. The panel held the statutory requirements of PREP Act immunity were met where: (1) both the City and individual defendants qualify as “covered person[s]” under the PREP Act because both engaged in the administration of a covered countermeasure; (2) the COVID-19 testing and face masks required by the City’s policy meet the PREP Act’s requirements for being considered a “covered countermeasure”; and (3) Schmidt’s claims were “caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from” the administration of a covered countermeasure.

Clarifying the causation requirement of the PREP Act’s immunity provision, the panel wrote that the district court erred by focusing on the types of legal claims Schmidt pleads rather than the type of injury he alleges. The panel held that Schmidt’s allegations that he suffered physical, emotional, and property damage as a direct result of the City’s COVID-19 safety policies are sufficient to establish causation for PREP Act immunity.

The panel further held that Schmidt failed to allege a valid ground for reconsideration or for finding that the district court abused its discretion in managing his case.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/05/25-488.pdf

MacDonald v. OR Health and Science University (9th Cir. 24-4852 10/2/26) COVID-19 Vaccination Policy / Free Exercise / Title VII

The panel affirmed (1) the district court’s dismissal, on qualified immunity grounds, of Brittany K. MacDonald’s Free Exercise claim; and (2) the district court’s summary judgment for Oregon Health and Science University (“OHSU”) on MacDonald’s Title VII failure to accommodate claim, in her action challenging the denial of her request for a religious exemption from a COVID-19 vaccination policy.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 21-29 issued by Oregon Governor Kate Brown, which required all healthcare workers in Oregon’s healthcare facilities to be vaccinated against COVID-19, OHSU required all OHSU personnel to be vaccinated by October 18, 2021, unless an individual received an approved religious or medical exemption. An email notice sent to employees who had requested an exemption provided examples of beliefs that do not qualify for a religious exemption, including “[a]n objection to the vaccine on the basis of fetal cell concerns, either in the vaccines or in testing and development.” MacDonald, who was a registered nurse at Doernbecher Children’s Hospital of OHSU, requested a religious exemption, asserting, in part, that her “beliefs regarding the sanctity of life conflict directly with any requirement to inject abortion derived cell lines into [her] body.” After her exemption request was denied, and she was terminated for failing to be vaccinated, MacDonald filed suit alleging (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Free Exercise claim against individuals who served on the OHSU Board of Directors and members of OHSU’s Vaccine Exception Review Committee (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”); and (2) a 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) Title VII failure to accommodate her religious beliefs claim against OHSU.

The panel held that the Individual Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on MacDonald’s Free Exercise claim because the right to refuse a state-mandated vaccine by a healthcare worker who works in-person with vulnerable populations due to allegedly religious concerns about fetal cells and bodily integrity or sanctity was not clearly established at the time the Individual Defendants denied MacDonald’s religious exemption.

The panel next affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for OHSU on MacDonald’s Title VII failure to accommodate claim because OHSU demonstrated that it could not have accommodated MacDonald without undue hardship. OHSU’s evidence established that the health and safety risks posed to OHSU’s patients and employees presented a substantial hardship in the context of its business, and accommodating MacDonald would have imposed substantial operational and financial costs on OHSU.

Addressing MacDonald’s pretext arguments, the panel wrote that there is no precedent that imports a “pretext” or “discriminatory motives” analysis into the “undue hardship” failure to accommodate analysis. And even if pretext were a part of the analysis, MacDonald failed to present a triable issue of material fact establishing that OHSU’s demonstrated substantial economic and noneconomic costs in allowing MacDonald to work while unvaccinated were mere pretext.

Dissenting, Judge Tung wrote that the defendants’ conduct here plainly violated established law prohibiting the targeting of a person’s religious beliefs. The policy singled out an employee’s religious objection to abortion and the use of fetal tissue as categorically undeserving of any consideration, which is a classic case of the State targeting religious beliefs and is never permissible. Because MacDonald had a right to be free from the State’s targeting of her religious belief (against the use of aborted fetal cells) by deeming such a belief not “religious” at all and thus not worthy of consideration for an exemption, the Defendants should have been denied qualified immunity.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/02/24-4852.pdf

Washington v. Alta Loma School Dist. (CA4/1 D088028 10/2/26) Misclassification | Job Sharing Teacher Position

Public school districts may not classify a teacher as a temporary employee “unless the position in which he or she is employed is ‘a position the law defines as temporary.’ ” (Stockton Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 446, 457 (Stockton).) Education Code section 44920 permits school districts to hire and classify a teacher as a temporary employee for up to one school year to replace a teacher who “has been granted leave for a semester or a year, or is experiencing long-term illness.” (Italics added.)

Relying on section 44920, the Alta Loma School District (District) defends its classification of Melissa Washington as a temporary employee for the three consecutive years she taught at the District’s elementary school. Specifically, the District claims it hired Washington to fill in for two permanent teachers who were sharing one full-time teaching position under a voluntary job-sharing arrangement. It contends such a job-sharing arrangement constitutes “leave” under section 44920, permitting the District to classify Washington as a temporary employee and ultimately to summarily dismiss her after her third year of teaching. We disagree.

We hold the term “leave” under section 44920 means “leave of absence.” Part-time work such as a teacher’s reduction in workload due to a voluntary job-sharing arrangement does not constitute a leave of absence under section 44920 that permits the hiring and classification of his or her replacement as a temporary employee. In reaching this conclusion, we follow our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 826 (Balen) that temporary classifications for teachers should be strictly construed.

We thus agree with Washington that she was misclassified as a temporary employee during the entire term of her employment. Under the Education Code, Washington defaulted to the classification of a probationary employee for the first two school years, after which she became a permanent employee by operation of law for the third year. As a permanent employee, the District was not permitted to summarily dismiss Washington. The trial court erred by concluding otherwise and denying Washington’s petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). We reverse the judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to issue a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate Washington as a permanent employee with the seniority date of August 2, 2019, and to hold further proceedings to determine her damages for lost compensation. In doing so, we reject the District’s argument that the doctrine of laches bars the relief we grant Washington.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D088028.PDF

2026 California Labor & Employment Bills Signed by Governor (10/1/26)

BY BILL NUMBER

AB 187 by the Committee on Budget — Employment

AB 395 by Assemblymember Jesse Gabriel (D-Encino) — Holidays

AB 540 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Civil actions and attorneys

AB 1198 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — Public works: prevailing wages

AB 1235 by Assemblymember Chris Rogers (D-Santa Rosa) — California State University: skilled and trained workforce requirement

AB 1331 by Assemblymember Sade Elhawary (D-South Los Angeles) — Workplace surveillance

AB 1381 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) — Education-related positions: previous employment disclosures: Commission on Teacher Credentialing: unprofessional conduct

AB 1439 by Assemblymember Robert Garcia (D-Rancho Cucamonga) — Public retirement systems: development projects: labor standards

AB 1534 by Assemblymember Jacqui Irwin (D-Thousand Oaks) — Federal Workforce Pell Grant program: local workforce development boards: participant training requirement

AB 1544 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Court proceedings: media access

AB 1600 by Assemblymember Dr. Joaquin Arambula (D-Fresno) — Disadvantaged communities: farmworker communities

AB 1619 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) — Public employees’ retirement: administration

AB 1656 by Assemblymember Laurie Davies (R-Laguna Niguel) — Human trafficking case continuances

AB 1697 by Assemblymember Ash Kalra (D-San Jose) — Employment contracts: stay-or-pay provisions: contract date

AB 1766 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Health curriculum framework: human trafficking and online safety

AB 1784 by Assemblymember Gail Pellerin (D-Santa Cruz) — Postsecondary education: nondiscrimination: pregnancy or pregnancy-related issues

AB 1803 by Assemblymember Josh Lowenthal (D-Long Beach) — Employment: sexual harassment training and education: anti-hate speech training

AB 1809 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) — Public contracts: school and community college districts

AB 1818 by Assemblymember Liz Ortega (D-San Leandro) — California State University: employer-employee relations: meeting and conferring

AB 1844 by Assemblymember Blanca Pacheco (D-Downey) — Judges’ Retirement System II: beneficiaries

AB 1845 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Student safety: human trafficking

AB 1883 by Assemblymember Isaac Bryan (D-Los Angeles) — Workplace surveillance tools

AB 1890 by Assemblymember Cecilia Aguiar-Curry (D-Winters) — County of Napa: farmworker housing: funding

AB 1904 by Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson) — Teachers: credentialed educator apprenticeship programs

AB 1908 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) — Settlement agreements: victims’ compensation funding

AB 1928 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) — Sex equity: sexual harassment complaints

AB 1950 by Assemblymember John Harabedian (D-Pasadena) — Civil actions: mediation

AB 1980 by Assemblymember Jessica Caloza (D-Los Angeles) — Labor: apprenticeship: Equal Representation in Construction Apprenticeships Grant Program

AB 2006 by Assemblymember Michelle Rodriguez (D-Ontario) — State government: office buildings: daycare centers

AB 2017 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — State holidays: Eid

AB 2039 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — Attorneys

AB 2078 by Assemblymember Chris Rogers (D-Santa Rosa) — Employees: meal periods: stationary engineers

AB 2120 by Assemblymember José Luis Solache (D-Lynwood) — School district employees: merit system

AB 2129 by Assemblymember Heath Flora (R-Ripon) — State employees: compensation: firefighters

AB 2150 by Assemblymember Matt Haney (D-San Francisco) — Emergencies: personnel: training requirements: opioid overdose reversals

AB 2155 by Assemblymember Cecilia Aguiar-Curry (D-Winters) — Arbitration: validity of agreements to arbitrate

AB 2156 by Assembly Speaker Robert Rivas (D-Salinas) and Senate President pro Tempore Monique Limón (D-Santa Barbara) – Holidays: Farmworkers Day

AB 2157 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Workforce development: Displaced Oil and Gas Worker Pilot Program: extension

AB 2179 by Assemblymember Darshana Patel (D-San Diego County) — Workplace violence: restraining orders

AB 2212 by Assemblymember Rebecca Bauer-Kahan (D-Orinda) — Postsecondary education: sexual harassment, harassment, intimidation, and bullying policies: student training

AB 2263 by Assemblymember Ash Kalra (D-San Jose) — Transportation Authority: employee housing: transit-oriented joint development projects

AB 2270 by Assemblymember Dr. Joaquin Arambula (D-Fresno) — Low-income housing tax credit: farmworker housing

AB 2294 by Assemblymember Tri Ta (R-Westminster) — State holidays: Sylvia Mendez Day

AB 2311 by Assemblymember Pilar Schiavo (D-Santa Clarita) — Health care districts: employment

AB 2319 by Assemblymember Nick Schultz (D-Burbank) — Personal Income tax law: corporation tax law: credits: qualified motion picture: post-production

AB 2321 by Assemblymember Liz Ortega (D-San Leandro) — Occupational safety and health: investigations

AB 2392 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) — Public postsecondary education: generative artificial intelligence systems: procurement standards: training

AB 2417 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — State Teachers’ Retirement System: community colleges: part-time faculty

AB 2448 by Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) — Medical information: confidentiality

AB 2466 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) — Strong Workforce Program: work-based learning opportunities: regional consortia

AB 2483 by Assemblymember Sade Elhawary (D-South Los Angeles) — Wildland firefighters: Formerly Incarcerated Firefighter Certification and Employment Program

AB 2490 by Assemblymember Avelino Valencia (D-Anaheim) — Teacher credentialing: emergency career substitute teaching permit: alternative qualifications

AB 2519 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) — State Teachers’ Retirement System: positions subject to membership

AB 2524 by Assemblymember Mike A. Gipson (D-Carson) — Pupils: work permits: issuance

AB 2529 by Assemblymember Natasha Johnson (R-Elsinore) — Civil claims: public entities and employees: declaration

AB 2563 by Assemblymember Blanca Pacheco (D-Downey) — Sex discrimination: scope

AB 2580 by Assemblymember Al Muratsuchi (D-Torrance) — Teacher credentialing: programs of professional preparation: California State University and community college partnerships

AB 2599 by Assemblymember Isaac Bryan (D-Los Angeles) — Slavery: corporate disclosures

AB 2618 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Public Utilities Commission: commissioners: employment

AB 2624 by Assemblymember Mia Bonta (D-Alameda) — Privacy for immigration support services providers

AB 2634 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — Workforce development: High road training partnerships: scoring preference

AB 2646 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Employment: minimum wages: agricultural workers

AB 2682 by Assemblymember Marc Berman (D-Menlo Park) — Transportation network company drivers: labor relations: appeals

AB 2780 by the Committee on Public Employment and Retirement — Public employees’ retirement

SB 186 by Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review - Income taxes: film tax credits

SB 342 by Senator Thomas Umberg (D-Santa Ana) — Contractors: unlicensed work

SB 574 by Senator Thomas Umberg (D-Santa Ana) — Attorneys, arbitrators, judicial officers, and alternative resolution providers

SB 909 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Public works

SB 947 by Senator Jerry McNerney (D-Pleasanton) — Employment: automated decision systems

SB 951 by Senator Eloise Gómez Reyes (D-Colton) — Employment: technological displacement: notice

SB 998 by Senator Lena Gonzalez (D-Long Beach) — Educational equity: discrimination prevention coordinators

SB 1012 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Employment of inmate

SB 1038 by Senator John Laird (D-Santa Cruz) — The Public Employees’ Retirement System

SB 1046 by Senator Catherine Blakespear (D-Encinitas) — Occupational safety: transboundary pollution

SB 1050 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) — False advertising: synthetic performers

SB 1083 by Senator Sasha Renée Pérez (D-Pasadena) — Noncertificated public school employees: private school employees: egregious misconduct: statewide data system: Commission on Teacher Credentialing: adverse actions: contracts and background checks for educational services

SB 1111 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) — Digital replicas

SB 1129 by Senator Anna Caballero (D-Merced) — State Bar of California: community justice worker program

SB 1149 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Employees: bereavement leave

SB 1159 by Senator Christopher Cabaldon (D-Yolo) — Artificial intelligence: transparency and governance

SB 1227 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Department of Industrial Relations: apprenticeship pilot program

SB 1237 by Senator Catherine Blakespear (D-Encinitas) — Civil Rights Department

SB 1316 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Employment

SB 1330 by Senator Jesse Arreguín (D-Berkeley) — Assault and battery: utility workers

SB 1342 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Criminal records: relief

SB 1394 by Senator Lena Gonzalez (D-Long Beach) — State holidays: Cesar Chavez Day: Farmworkers Day

SB 1444 by Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement — Employment

BY SUBJECT MATTER

Apprenticeships

AB 1980 by Assemblymember Jessica Caloza (D-Los Angeles) — Labor: apprenticeship: Equal Representation in Construction Apprenticeships Grant Program

SB 1227 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Department of Industrial Relations: apprenticeship pilot program

Arbitration

AB 2155 by Assemblymember Cecilia Aguiar-Curry (D-Winters) — Arbitration: validity of agreements to arbitrate

Artificial Intelligence

AB 2392 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D-Alhambra) — Public postsecondary education: generative artificial intelligence systems: procurement standards: training

SB 947 by Senator Jerry McNerney (D-Pleasanton) — Employment: automated decision systems

SB 951 by Senator Eloise Gómez Reyes (D-Colton) — Employment: technological displacement: notice

SB 1050 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) — False advertising: synthetic performers

SB 1111 by Senator Angelique Ashby (D-Sacramento) — Digital replicas

SB 1159 by Senator Christopher Cabaldon (D-Yolo) — Artificial intelligence: transparency and governance

Attorneys

AB 540 by Assemblymember Damon Connolly (D-San Rafael) — Civil actions and attorneys

AB 2039 by Assemblymember Rick Chavez Zbur (D-Hollywood) — Attorneys

SB 574 by Senator Thomas Umberg (D-Santa Ana) — Attorneys, arbitrators, judicial officers, and alternative resolution providers

SB 1129 by Senator Anna Caballero (D-Merced) — State Bar of California: community justice worker program

Budget

AB 187 by the Committee on Budget — Employment

Civil Procedure

AB 1544 by Assemblymember Maggy Krell (D-Sacramento) — Court proceedings: media access

AB 1908 by Assemblymember Tina McKinnor (D-Inglewood) — Settlement agreements: victims’ compensation funding

AB 1950 by Assemblymember John Harabedian (D-Pasadena) — Civil actions: mediation

AB 2529 by Assemblymember Natasha Johnson (R-Elsinore) — Civil claims: public entities and employees: declaration

Civil Rights Department

SB 1237 by Senator Catherine Blakespear (D-Encinitas) — Civil Rights Department

Contracts

AB 1697 by Assemblymember Ash Kalra (D-San Jose) — Employment contracts: stay-or-pay provisions: contract date

Contractors

SB 342 by Senator Thomas Umberg (D-Santa Ana) — Contractors: unlicensed work

Criminal Records

SB 1342 by Senator María Elena Durazo (D-Los Angeles) — Criminal records: relief

Day Care

AB 2006 by Assemblymember Michelle Rodriguez (D-Ontario) — State government: office buildings: daycare centers

Discrimination

AB 2563 by Assemblymember Blanca Pacheco (D-Downey) — Sex discrimination: scope

Education