Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Stallion Springs Medical Services v. Super. Ct. (CA5 F090834 9/2/26) Medical Staffing Procedure
Kuljit S. Hundal is a licensed emergency room physician who was a member of the medical staff of the Adventist Health Medical Center Tehachapi (medical staff), which serves Adventist Health Tehachapi Valley (hospital). Stallion Springs Medical Services (Stallion Springs), a medical corporation that was responsible for staffing and scheduling emergency providers at the hospital’s emergency department, contracted with Hundal to provide his services to the hospital as an independent contractor. After a patient complained about Hundal’s conduct in the hospital’s emergency department, the hospital instructed Stallion Springs to remove Hundal from the emergency department schedule. Stallion Springs did so and after its own investigation, terminated its contract with Hundal.
Hundal sued the hospital, medical staff, and Stallion Springs, alleging they failed to comply with statutory and common law procedural requirements in connection with his removal from the emergency department schedule. After the hospital and medical staff were dismissed from the action following a settlement, Stallion Springs moved for summary judgment or alternatively summary adjudication on the two claims asserted against it for violation of the common law right of fair procedure and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, granted the alternative motion for summary adjudication as to the emotional distress claim, and denied the alternative motion for summary adjudication as to the claim for violation of the common law right of fair procedure.
Stallion Springs petitions for a writ of mandate challenging the denial of summary adjudication as to the common law right of fair procedure claim. Stallion Springs contends Hundal cannot maintain that claim against it because the common law doctrine of fair procedure with respect to physician discipline has been superseded by the statutes that address the due process requirements for hospital peer review (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 805–809.9) (the peer review statute), which does not apply to Stallion Springs. Stallion Springs alternatively contends the common law right of fair procedure does not extend to a staffing company. We agree with Stallion Springs that the right of fair procedure does not apply to Stallion Springs as a matter of law, therefore, the trial court erred in denying the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of mandate.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F090834.PDF
Liu v. Kaiser Permanente Emp. Pension Plan (9th Cir. 24-4303 8/31/26) ERISA
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim of Sherry Yali Liu’s action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against the Kaiser Permanente Employees Pension Plan for the Permanente Medical Group, Inc., and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., challenging the denial of Liu’s claim for pension benefits due to her deceased sister.
Liu contended that before her sister died, she elected to receive her earned pension benefits as a lump sum and designated Liu as her beneficiary. Kaiser denied Liu’s claim, reasoning that the sister initiated, but did not finalize, an election and beneficiary designation, and that substantial compliance with the Plan’s requirements is not a basis for benefits under ERISA.
The panel held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, as it is for beneficiary designation changes under Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The panel clarified that Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not nullify the doctrine of substantial compliance, consistent with this court’s application of the doctrine in Becker.
The panel concluded that under California law, Liu’s complaint plausibly alleged that her sister substantially complied with the Plan’s requirements. The panel therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
The panel addressed additional claims in a concurrently-filed memorandum disposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/31/24-4303.pdf
City of L.A. v. American Federation of State, County etc. (CA2/1 B336981, filed 7/30/26, mod, & cert. pub. 8/28/26) Los Angeles Employees Relations Board | Reciprocal Retirement Benefits
Beginning in 1980 the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP) and the City of Los Angeles (City) maintained a reciprocal retirement benefits arrangement (Reciprocity or the Reciprocal Arrangement). This arrangement allowed employees transferring between DWP and the City to carry their pension service credits between the two retirement systems. In 2010, DWP decided to withdraw from Reciprocity. In 2013 the City then adopted Ordinance No. 182824 (the 2013 Ordinance), which suspended the Reciprocal Arrangement.
City employees and their unions (collectively the Coalition) filed an unfair labor relations practice claim before the Los Angeles Employees Relations Board (ERB). The Coalition alleged the City failed to bargain or meet and confer with the Coalition over the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB agreed the City violated its duty to engage in “effects bargaining” regarding possible ways to mitigate the effects of the suspension of the Reciprocal Arrangement. The ERB ordered the City to bargain with the Coalition and to make whole Coalition-represented employees who sustained losses, including reduced pension or other benefits, resulting from the City’s unilateral implementation of the suspension, until the City had satisfied its obligation to bargain. The trial court then denied the City’s petition for writ of mandate challenging the ERB’s order and granted the Coalition’s petition seeking to enforce it.
The City does not dispute that it had a duty to bargain over the effects of ending Reciprocity. Instead, it challenges only the remedy ordered by the ERB. It argues the ERB lacked authority to order make-whole relief and, even if it possessed that authority, fashioned an improper remedy that failed to restore the parties to the status quo existing when the City’s bargaining obligation arose. The City further contends the ERB’s order is vague and overbroad, and violates separation-of-powers principles. Finally, it challenges the trial court’s postjudgment award of attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. We affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B336981.PDF
Bills Signed by Governor (8/27/26)
AB 1928 by Assemblymember Mike Fong (D–Alhambra) — Sex equity: sexual harassment complaints
AB 1950 by Assemblymember John Harabedian (D-Pasadena) —Civil actions: mediation
SB 1038 by Senator John Laird (D-Santa Cruz) — The Public Employees’ Retirement System
SB 1316 by Senator Lola Smallwood-Cuevas (D-Los Angeles) — Employment
SB 1444 by Committee on Labor, Public Employment and Retirement — Employment
Bill Signed by Governor (8/22/26)
AB 2624 by Assemblymember Mia Bonta (D-Alameda) – Privacy for immigration support services providers
Cherry v. WA Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife (9th Cir. 25-4763 8/21/26) Title VII | COVID-19
The panel affirmed in part and reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants and remanded for further proceedings in a reasonable accommodation action under Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination.
The Washington Department of Fish & Wildlife granted five employees religious exemptions from a COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The Department informed the employees that it could not accommodate them in their current roles but offered them a reassignment process.
The panel held that Title VII requires an employer to reasonably accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of its employees, short of incurring an undue hardship. Once an employee has made a prima facie showing of religious discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it made good faith efforts to accommodate the employee’s religious belief in a manner that would reasonably preserve that employee’s employment status. If the accommodation proposed by the employer does not eliminate the conflict, then the employer must implement an alternate accommodation proposed by the employee, unless that would cause undue hardship to the employer. If the accommodation proposed by the employer does reasonably
preserve an employee’s status, then the employer has met its burden.
The panel held that the district court misapplied these rules when it concluded, as a matter of law, that the Department met its burden under Title VII. The panel concluded that offering the reassignment process was not, as a matter of law, an offer of a reasonable accommodation, meaning an alternate position or arrangement that eliminated the asserted conflict between the employees’ religious beliefs and the employees’ current jobs, because the reassignment process offered only a limited possibility of an accommodation. Thus, the panel could not say that, as a matter of law, the Department made a good faith effort to reasonably accommodate the employees’ religion.
The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment against most of the employees with respect to their Title VII claims and against all of the employees with respect to their claims under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. For two of the employees who failed to meet the procedural requirements for bringing a Title VII claim, the panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants with respect to those employees’ Title VII claims.
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment to defendants as to the employees’ federal and state constitutional claims. The employees forfeited their argument that their claims against Department officers in their official capacities were not barred by sovereign immunity. The district court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction over the state-law claims and did not err in rejecting those claims.
Finally, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding three of the employees’ proffered experts, nor in issuing a protective order that prohibited their taking of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/21/25-4763.pdf
Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB (9th Cir. 23-632, 23-780 8/20/26) NLRA Work Preservation Defense
The en banc court denied petitions for review by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) and granted a cross-petition for enforcement by the National Labor Relations Board of the Board’s order awarding the right to perform maintenance and repair work for SSA Terminals, LLC to the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM).
Two labor unions, ILWU and IAM, claimed the right to perform the same maintenance and repair work for SSA Terminals pursuant to their respective collective bargaining agreements in what is known as a “jurisdictional dispute”—a conflict arising from overlapping scopes of work within each union’s contract. Recognizing that an employer caught in the middle of a jurisdictional dispute is ill-equipped to resolve it, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to empower the Board to decide which of the competing unions shall be awarded the work and deemed the failure of the non-prevailing union to respect the Board’s decision an unfair labor practice.
SSA Terminals invoked § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA and asked the Board to decide which union should be awarded the maintenance and repair work. The Board awarded the work to IAM. ILWU then filed a grievance, alleging that SSA Terminals violated its collective bargaining agreement by failing to defend its right to do the work during the Board’s proceedings, and an arbitrator ruled in ILWU’s favor. The following month, IAM and SSA filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that ILWU violated § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA by pursuing a grievance intended to coerce SSA Terminals to reassign the work to ILWU in contravention of the Board’s decision. The Board determined that ILWU violated § 8(b)(4)(D) by failing to comply with the Board’s decision, and rejected ILWU’s work-preservation defense, in which ILWU argued that the arbitration was a permissible work-preservation activity because it sought to pressure SSA Terminals to comply with its contractual obligation to assign the maintenance and repair work to ILWU.
The sole issue the en banc court resolved was whether a union charged with violating § 8(b)(4)(D) may invoke the work-preservation defense described in National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA), 447 U.S. 490, 504 (1980). The en banc court held that (1) the ILA work-preservation defense is not a defense to an unfair labor practice charge under § 8(b)(4)(D) of the NLRA for failure to abide by the Board’s resolution of a jurisdictional dispute, and (2) overruled the passage in International Longshore & Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board (Kinder Morgan), 978 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2020), that stated otherwise.
In ILA, the Supreme Court explained that by enacting § 8(b)(4)(B), Congress intended to prohibit unions from engaging in secondary activity (activity directed at a third-party with the goal of coercing that party to take some action against the employer with whom the union has a dispute) while allowing unions to engage in primary activity (activity a union undertakes directly against its contracting employer for the purpose of preserving work traditionally performed by union members). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the work-preservation defense can defeat an accusation of secondary activity in violation of § 8(b)(4)(B).
The en banc court held that, although ILA work-preservation can be a defense to a § 8(b)(4)(B) unfair labor practice charge, it does not necessarily follow that the defense applies to a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge because the theoretical bases for each charge are different. Section 8(b)(4)(B) seeks to preserve the right of labor organizations to bring pressure on offending employers in primary labor disputes without involving a third-party, and the inquiry is whether the union’s conduct is primary. In contrast, § 8(b)(4)(D) presupposes primary activity because each union in a jurisdictional dispute seeks to secure work from its own employer. Accordingly, the ILA work-preservation defense is inapplicable to a § 8(b)(4)(D) charge.
The en banc court therefore denied ILWU’s and PMA’s petitions and granted the Board’s cross-petition for enforcement.
In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the en banc court addressed whether substantial evidence supported the Board’s work-assignment decision and IAM’s petition challenging the adequacy of the remedy imposed by the Board.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/20/23-632.pdf
Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-1532 8/19/26) Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021
The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying Structure Therapeutics USA, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration in an action brought by a former Structure employee, Dr. Ding Ding, under the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”), which empowers victims of workplace sexual harassment and sexual assault to invalidate predispute arbitration agreements and elect to pursue their claims in federal court.
After Dr. Ding was terminated from her position as Chief Financial Officer with Structure, she filed a demand for arbitration, asserting claims of discrimination and harassment based on national origin and her status as a domestic violence victim. During discovery, Dr. Ding uncovered evidence that her workplace mistreatment was motivated because of her sex. She then withdrew from arbitration and elected to pursue claims in civil court under the EFAA.
The panel held that Dr. Ding could assert her rights under the EFAA. Both the text of the statute and its underlying purpose make clear that Congress intended to afford victims of workplace sexual assault and sexual harassment a genuine choice whether to pursue their claims in a court of law, notwithstanding a preexisting agreement to arbitrate. Where a plaintiff discovers a basis to pursue claims covered by the EFAA during arbitration, she may elect to end arbitration and proceed in court. As the district court found, Dr. Ding did not become aware that her workplace mistreatment was motivated because of her sex until she obtained discoveryonce arbitration proceedings had commenced.
Consequently, she could not have triggered an “election” under the EFAA by filing an arbitration demand with non-sexual harassment claims. Dr. Ding made an election only one time—when she chose to pursue the newly discovered sexual harassment claim by filing her claims in federal Court.
The panel rejected Defendants’ argument that Dr. Ding waived her right to proceed in court by filing an arbitration demand even though she was aware of the facts underlying her sexual harassment claim. This argument was foreclosed by the district court’s finding that there was no record evidence that Dr. Ding knew she had a plausible sexual harassment claim but intentionally chose not to bring the claim when she initiated arbitration.
The panel further held that Dr. Ding plausibly pled a sex-based hostile work environment claim under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act and therefore under the EFAA, which defines “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4).
Judge Rawlinson dissented from the majority’s holding that an employee may proceed with an action under EFAA after first electing to proceed with arbitration and engaging in significant litigation in the arbitration forum. She wrote that the majority’s reading of the statute conflicted with the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, the commonly accepted legal definition of the term “election,” and the court’s precedent addressing waiver in the arbitration context.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/08/19/25-1532.pdf