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Dept. of Human Resources v. Cal. Correctional Peace Officers etc. (CA3 C100353 5/15/26) Public Employee Discipline | First Amendment and MOU
Tracylyn Lopez (Lopez), a correctional officer and union representative at Salinas Valley State Prison (the prison), received a notice of adverse action for directing profanity at two other officers. She later posted materials from the disciplinary action on a union bulletin board near the main entrance to the prison. The posted materials revealed the nature of the discipline against Lopez, and the unique surnames of the other officers.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Department of Human Resources (collectively, CDCR) suspended Lopez for 60 workdays for the posting. Lopez appealed the discipline to the State Personnel Board (SPB), arguing the posting served as commentary on CDCR’s disciplinary practices, and was thus protected by the First Amendment. She also filed a contractual grievance alleging the discipline violated the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between respondent California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) and the State of California, which incorporates the Ralph C. Dills Act (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.; Dills Act) and prohibits retaliation for engaging in protected activities. CCPOA, which represents correctional officers, sought arbitration of the grievance on Lopez’s behalf. This appeal arises at the intersection between these proceedings.
The SPB ruled for CDCR in October 2020. The SPB acknowledged Lopez’s right to express opinions about disciplinary matters, but found the posting fostered a “code of silence,” and thus constituted an inexcusable neglect of duty and failure of good behavior (§ 19572, subds. (d) & (t)), which justified the 60-workday suspension. Whether the discipline constituted retaliation for engaging in protected activity under the MOU and Dills Act was not an issue before the SPB. That issue was reserved for the arbitration proceedings, which took place some 18 months later.
An arbitrator entered an award in favor of Lopez and CCPOA in June 2022. The arbitrator sustained the grievance, finding CDCR violated the MOU by discriminating and interfering with protected speech and representational activity. She rejected CDCR’s argument that Lopez lost any potential protection by promoting an unlawful objective (i.e., fostering the code of silence). She also found CDCR punished Lopez for the protected activity, and failed to show it would have imposed the same penalty regardless of that protected activity. Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered CDCR to rescind the notice of adverse action for the posting, make Lopez whole by issuing backpay and restoring any other benefits and rights lost as a result of the 60-workday suspension, and post a notice at the prison stating CDCR discriminated and interfered with Lopez’s and CCPOA’s protected union activities under the MOU. In so doing, the arbitrator effectively offset the 60-workday suspension reviewed and approved by the SPB.
CDCR filed a petition to vacate or correct the arbitration award. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1285, 1286.2, & 1286.6.) CCPOA responded with a counter petition to confirm the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) The trial court denied CDCR’s petition to vacate the arbitration award and CCPOA’s counter petition to confirm the award. However, the trial court granted CDCR’s petition to correct the award and struck the portion ordering CDCR to rescind the notice of adverse action for the posting and make Lopez whole by issuing backpay and restoring any other benefits and rights lost as a result of the suspension.
CCPOA appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting CDCR’s alternative petition to correct the award. Specifically, CCPOA argues the trial court erred in concluding the arbitrator exceeded her powers in entering the award, and thus lacked statutory authority to correct it. We agree. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment denying the petition to confirm the arbitrator’s award and granting the petition to correct the award, and remand with instructions to enter a new judgment confirming the award as issued by the arbitrator.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C100353.PDF
Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties (US 25-83 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 5/14/26) Arbitration
This case presents the question whether a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims, even when the motion to confirm under §9 or the motion to vacate under §10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face.
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in New York, alleging that respondents unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agreement Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents moved to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration under §3 of the FAA. The District Court held that the arbitration agreement covered Jules’s claims and stayed proceedings. Jules then commenced arbitration against respondents. The arbitrator issued a final award, ruling against Jules on all claims and awarding approximately $34,500 in sanctions to respondents. Back in the same District Court that had previously stayed Jules’s claims pending arbitration, respondents moved to confirm the award under §9. Jules opposed confirmation while cross-moving to vacate the arbitral award under §10 on various grounds. Jules argued that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award because the §9 and §10 motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfied the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and confirmed the arbitral award. The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Badgerow involved a freestanding action commenced for the sole purpose of vacating an arbitral award, but that the present action was distinct because it started as a federal-question suit before it was stayed pending arbitration. The Second Circuit held that a court with the power to stay an action under §3 has the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award, regardless of whether there is an independent jurisdictional basis for the §9 and §10 proceedings.
Held: A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court. Pp. 7–16.
(a) Unlike with the freestanding applications at issue in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, and Badgerow, assessing jurisdiction over a §9 or §10 motion in a case originally filed in federal court does not require “ ‘looking through’ ” the filed action “to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy” outside of court. Vaden, 556 U. S., at 62. Instead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is already before it. As Badgerow explained, “[j]urisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and usually “there is no need to ‘look through’ the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.” 596 U.S., at 15.
The District Court had original jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. §1331, over Jules’s federal claims, and it was that very jurisdiction which authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of Jules’s claims under the parties’ contract before staying litigation pending arbitration pursuant to §3. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated. When the parties returned to court after arbitration with §9 and §10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start. Badgerow , 596 U. S., at 15.
This case therefore is not, as petitioner asserts, “ all over again.” In , the first and only thing that had occurred in federal court was the confirm-or-vacate dispute under §9 and §10. In that circumstance, there were only two places a court could look to find federal jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions or the underlying dispute that “was not before” the court. ., at 9. Here, however, there is an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original claims themselves, which were sufficient to establish the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331.
The fact that the arbitral award may have resolved Jules’s original claims only underscores why the District Court’s original jurisdiction extended to the parties’ §9 and §10 motions. Those motions required the District Court to assess whether there were grounds to vacate the award. The motions were thus integral to determining whether the award would continue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the court confirmed the award.
Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an affirmative defense, a §9 motion goes further and asks a court to convert an arbitral award into a judgment of the court. That is correct, but federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court when resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements, as recognized in , 511 U.S. 375, as well as in the context of consent judgments and class-action settlements.
The FAA’s structure further confirms jurisdiction here. In , 601 U. S. 472, the Court held that §3 requires a stay rather than dismissal, which “comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” including “assist[ing] parties in arbitration . . . and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award.” ., at 478. Under the rule the Court adopts today, this scheme continues to work well: The FAA requires a stay so that a court that has granted a §3 stay can superintend the arbitration to the end, including through confirmation or vacatur under §9 or §10. Pp. 7–11.
(b) Jules’s remaining counterarguments are without merit. First, Jules overreads Badgerow, which did not convert the nonjurisdictional FAA into a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme that requires an independent jurisdictional basis for all §9 and §10 motions. The problem for the losing party in Badgerow was that, without the look-through approach authorized by §4, there was no federal jurisdiction to be found in the case. See 596 U.S., at 9, 12. Because §9 and §10, unlike §4, did not provide a textual basis for applying the look-through approach, the Court held that it was not available. Id., at 14. Respondents here, to the contrary, are not asking for any “highly unusual” look through rule, id., at 12, but merely ask the District Court to use the tools provided by the FAA to finally resolve the federal claims Jules filed in federal court under 28 U. S. C. §1331.
Second, Jules argues that §9 and §10 applications should be treated as entirely “new federal actions” for purposes of assessing jurisdiction, even when filed in pre-existing suits, because §9 and §12 of the FAA require service and notice of such applications. That argument fails. The Court has explained that §3’s mandatory stay is aimed at “avoid[ing] [the] costs and complications” of “bring[ing] a new suit.” 601 U. S., at 478. Jules concedes, moreover, that service of §9 and §10 motions is not required in all cases. The service provisions in §9 and §12 do not impose the strict jurisdictional rule he favors.
Third, Jules’s reliance on §8 of the FAA, which governs certain maritime arbitrations, is unavailing. Section 8 merely instructs that in one class of admiralty cases involving in rem jurisdiction over a vessel, the court holding the vessel must retain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate such award. It does not shed light on how jurisdiction should function in other FAA disputes.
Finally, Jules’s policy concerns lack force. His concerns about encouraging parties to engage in useless federal litigation to create a jurisdictional anchor are conjectural, and there is no evidence suggesting that his concerns about manufactured federal jurisdiction will come to pass. Moreover, it is not anomalous for federal jurisdiction to turn on how litigation proceeded, as “actual litigation” generally “define[s] the parties’ controversy.” , 556 U. S., at 68. In any event, countervailing policy concerns favor the Court’s rule. Jules’s rule would significantly diminish “the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” , 601 U.S., at 478, and would undermine the efficiency interests at the heart of the FAA by forcing parties to launch a fresh state-court proceeding to secure confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral award. Jules’s approach could also lead to unnecessarily complex dual-track litigation where confirm-or-vacate proceedings commence in state court just as arbitrability appeals begin in federal court. Pp. 11–16.
Affirmed.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-83_3e04.pdf
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC (US 24-1238 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 5/14/26) Transportation Broker Liability for Negligent Hiring
Petitioner Shawn Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries after his tractor trailer was struck by a truck driven by respondent Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois for respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. Respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.—a transportation broker—had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued all respondents in Federal District Court and alleged, among other things, that C.H. Robinson was liable for his injuries because it negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe Transport. Montgomery claimed that C.H. Robinson knew (or should have known) from Caribe Transport’s safety rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others. The District Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)—which preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of the trucking industry, 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(1)—expressly preempted Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson. The District Court further held that the claim did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers like C.H. Robinson that coordinate shipments in the transportation industry.
Held: A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the Act. Pp. 4–8.
(a) Even if the FAAAA otherwise preempts Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson, the safety exception saves it. The relevant text provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A). All agree that common-law duties and standards of care form part of a State’s authority to regulate safety. Negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in employing a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical harm. The preemption question thus boils down to whether negligent-hiring claims of the type Montgomery presses are “with respect to motor vehicles.” Because the FAAAA supplies no definition of “with respect to,” the Court gives the phrase its ordinary meaning. Following dictionary definitions, the Court has construed the same phrase in the FAAAA’s preemption provision to mean “concern[s].” 569 U. S. 251, 261. The FAAAA defines “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.” §13102(16). Putting the pieces together, a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if it “concerns” the vehicles used in transportation. Here, requiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim thus falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption. Pp. 4–6.
(b) C.H. Robinson’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. Construing the safety exception as Montgomery requests does not mean that it saves everything preempted by the FAAAA’s express preemption provision. The safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety. State laws related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted.
C.H. Robinson argues that Montgomery’s interpretation of the safety exception creates surplusage. But surplusage exists however the disputed phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is defined, because any overlap comes from the reference to a State’s regulatory authority over “safety.”
Finally, C.H. Robinson asserts that interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection (b) of the FAAAA, which preempts state regulation of “intrastate” rates, routes, or services “of any freight forwarder or broker.” §14501(b)(1). Unlike subsection (c), subsection (b) does not contain a safety exception. C.H. Robinson invokes this textual difference as a reason that subsection (c)’s safety exception should be read to exclude brokers. While it is not obvious why Congress included a safety exception in (c) but not in (b), it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort—the negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury—is not an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” under §14501(c)(2)(A). The text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls. Pp. 6–7.
124 F. 4th 1053, reversed and remanded.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1238_1b7d.pdf
Reges v. Cauce (9th Cir. 24-3518 5/14/26) First Amendment Retaliation
The panel filed (1) an order amending the opinion and dissent filed on December 19, 2025, and reported at 162 F.4th 979 (9th Cir. 2025), and denying a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion and dissent. In the amended opinion, the panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of University of Washington officials (UW) and remanded for further proceedings in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by UW teaching professor Stuart Reges, alleging First Amendment violations when UW investigated, reprimanded, and threatened to discipline him for contentious statements he made in a class syllabus mocking the University’s recommended indigenous land acknowledgment statement.
Recognizing that debate and disagreement are hallmarks of higher education, the panel held that UW violated the First Amendment in taking adverse action against Reges based on his view on a matter of public concern.
Specifically, the panel first held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to UW on Reges’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Reges established a prima facie retaliation claim in that he experienced adverse employment actions, including a lengthy disciplinary investigation and reprimand, because of his protected speech. The speech was protected speech, not government speech, because Reges spoke in his own capacity as a professor, and not on behalf of his employer, and he unquestionably spoke on a matter of public concern. The panel held that UW did not meet its burden under the balancing test of demonstrating that its legitimate interests outweighed Reges’s interest in speaking on a matter of public concern in the university setting. Even assuming that more tangible evidence of disruption beyond student unrest receives further weight in the analysis in this context, the disruption alleged on this record suffered from problems of proof. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for defendants and directed that summary judgment be entered for Reges on his First Amendment retaliation claim.
Because Reges’s viewpoint discrimination claim was also subject to the same analysis, summary judgment for Reges was warranted on this claim as well. The record is clear that the University took action against Reges as a result of the views he expressed in his mock land acknowledgment statement. On remand, the district court should determine the appropriate relief on the retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims.
The panel held that the district court erred by dismissing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Reges’s overbreadth and vagueness facial challenge to UW’s Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy, which targets “any conduct that is deemed unacceptable or inappropriate, regardless of whether the conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.” Because the district court’s limiting construction of the policy conflicts with the policy’s plain text, it was improper. The panel remanded for the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the policy was unconstitutional, taking into account how the policy has been enforced and applied in practice.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge S.R. Thomas agreed with the majority that the balancing test applies to Reges’s First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. However, he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Reges’s speech interests outweighed the University of Washington’s interests. Universities have a responsibility to protect their students. This University, like other universities in the American West, has a particular obligation to its Native students. The disruption Reges’s speech caused to Native students’ learning outweighed his own First Amendment interests. Judge Thomas also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the University’s Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy was not readily susceptible to the district court’s limiting construction.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/05/14/24-3518.pdf