Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
​
See prior archived alerts by clicking on "Blog" under menu. For alerts older than one year, please request under Contact tab.​​​​
​
Allison v. Dignity Health (CA1/4 A169225, filed 6/2/25, pub. 6/24/25) Class Decertification | Meal & Rest Breaks
Plaintiffs Joanne Allison and Regina Blissett-Grohman, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, appeal an order decertifying their purported class claims [re meal and rest breaks]. We affirm.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169225.PDF
​
Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida (US 23–997 6/20/25) ADA | Retiree
Karyn Stanley worked as a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida, starting in 1999. When Ms. Stanley was hired, the City offered health insurance until age 65 for two categories of retirees: those with 25 years of service and those who retired earlier due to disability. In 2003, the City changed its policy to provide health insurance up to age 65 only for retirees with 25 years of service, while those who retired earlier due to disability would receive just 24 months of coverage. Ms. Stanley later developed a disability that forced her to retire in 2018, entitling her to only 24 months of health insurance under the revised policy. Ms. Stanley sued, claiming the City violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by providing different health-insurance benefits to those who retire with 25 years of service and those who retire due to disability. The district court dismissed her ADA claim, reasoning that the alleged discrimination occurred after she retired, when she was not a “qualified individual” under Title I of the ADA, 42 U. S. C. §12112(a), because she no longer held or sought a job with the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Held: The judgment is affirmed. 83 F. 4th 1333, affirmed.
JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding that, to prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based discrimination. Pp. 4–11.
(a) Section 12112(a) makes it unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation. The parties agree that retirement benefits qualify as “compensation” and assume the City’s policy revision constituted disability-based discrimination. The disagreement centers on whether §12112(a) addresses discrimination against retirees.
(b) A “qualified individual” is someone “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that [she] holds or desires.” §12111(8). Congress’s use of present-tense verbs (“holds,” “desires,” “can perform”) signals that §12112(a) protects individuals able to do the job they hold or seek at the time they suffer discrimination, not retirees who neither hold nor desire a job. The statute’s definition of “reasonable accommodation”—“job restructuring,” modifying “existing facilities used by employees,” and altering “training materials or policies,” §12111(9)—makes sense for current employees or applicants but not for retirees. Section 12112(b)’s examples of discrimination, such as “qualification standards” and “employment tests,” similarly aim to protect job holders and seekers, not retirees. Comparing Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reinforces this reading. Title VII protects “employee[s],” §2000e(f), without temporal qualification, sometimes covering former employees. But where Title VII links “employee” to present-tense verbs, it refers to current employees. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341, n. 2, 343. Similarly the ADA’s “qualified individual” yoked to present-tense verbs suggests current job holders or seekers. Court precedent supports this interpretation. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, the Court noted that a plaintiff’s assertion she is “ ‘unable to work’ will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case,” anticipating that someone may fall outside §12112(a)’s protections if she can “no longer do the job.” 526 U. S. 795, 799, 806. Pp. 4–7. (b) Ms. Stanley argues that §12112(a)’s “qualified individual” requirement is a conditional mandate—applicable only if a plaintiff holds or seeks a job. If neither, she contends, there are no “essential functions” to perform, making every retiree automatically “qualified.” The Court rejects this conceivable-but-convoluted interpretation in favor of the ordinary one.
Ms. Stanley’s surplusage argument—that the Court’s reading renders §12112(b)(5)(A)’s reference to “applicant or employee” meaningless—also fails. That phrase may still serve a narrowing function, and “[t]he canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule.” Marx v. General Revenue Corp.,.568 U. S. 371, 385.
Ms. Stanley argues that Title I’s broad language allowing “any person alleging discrimination” to sue makes the “qualified individual” language irrelevant. But the statute protects people, not benefits, from discrimination—specifically, qualified individuals.
Finally, Ms. Stanley invokes the ADA’s purpose of eradicating disability-based discrimination. She argues this goal would be best served by a judicial decision extending Title I’s protections to retirees. But “legislation [does not] pursu[e] its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v. United States , 480 U. S. 522, 525–526, and other laws may protect retirees from discrimination. If Congress wishes to extend Title I to retirees, it can do so. Pp. 7–11.
GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BARRETT, J., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined as to Parts III and IV, except for n. 12.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-997_6579.pdf
​
Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. NLRB, Pacific Maritime Ass’n v. NLRB, NLRB v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union & Aerospace Workers District 160, Local Lodge 289 v. NLRB (9th Cir. 23-632, 23-658, 23-780, 23-793 6/18/25) NLRA
The panel (1) granted petitions for review by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), (2) denied a petition for review by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), (3) denied a cross-petition for enforcement by the National Labor Relations Board, and (4) vacated the Board’s order directing ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing maintenance work for SSA Terminals at Terminal 5 in the Port of Seattle.
This case arose from a jurisdictional dispute between ILWU and IAM, both of which claimed the right under collective bargaining agreements to perform maintenance work for SSA. Pursuant to section 10(k) of the National Labor Relations Act, SSA asked the Board to decide which union should perform the work. The Board assigned the work to IAM, prompting ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA under its collective bargaining agreement, seeking the value of the work assigned to IAM.
After an arbitrator found in ILWU's favor, SSA filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the Act because its pursuit of the grievance was intended to coerce SSA into assigning the work to ILWU. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects “primary” union activity—activity intended to accomplish some goal within the confines of the employer-employee relationship—as opposed to impermissible “secondary” union activity—activity that has the goal of inducing an employer to take action against a third party with which the union has a dispute. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n (ILA), 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
The Board determined that the work-preservation defense is not available in pure jurisdictional disputes, like this one, where multiple unions have valid contractual entitlements to the disputed work directly with the employer. The Board ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.
The panel held that the Board’s position was foreclosed by International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), 978 F.3d 625, 637 (9th Cir. 2020), which held that “[a] valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D), as well as against jurisdictional disputes under section 10(k).” Pursuant to Kinder Morgan, a union charged with an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(D) may raise a work-preservation defense even when the union is not alleged to have engaged in illegal secondary activity. The Board erred by refusing to entertain ILWU’s work-preservation defense under Kinder Morgan. Accordingly, the panel vacated the Board’s order and remanded for the Board to evaluate the merits of the defense in the first instance.
Concurring, Judge Miller wrote separately to express his view that Kinder Morgan was wrongly decided and should be reconsidered en banc. Because the ILA work-preservation defense allows a union to demonstrate that it did not act with an illegal secondary objective, the Board has historically entertained the defense only when a union is alleged to have engaged in secondary activity in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B). Kinder Morgan applied an affirmative defense that the Supreme Court created to cabin the reach of one statutory provision, section 8(b)(4)(B), to cases arising under a separate statutory provision, section 8(b)(4)(D). Grafting the ILA work-preservation defense onto section 8(b)(4)(D), as Kinder Morgan did, undermines the jurisdictional dispute-resolution scheme enacted by Congress. It is not supported by precedent, creates a circuit conflict, and undermines Congress’s decision to empower the Board to resolve jurisdictional disputes.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/18/23-658.pdf
​
Damiano v. Grants Pass Sch. Dist. No. 7 (9th Cir. 23-35288 6/16/25) First Amendment | Equal Protection
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Grants Pass School District and individual defendants, and remanded, in a lawsuit brought by Rachel Sager and Katie Medart alleging that defendants terminated them from their positions with the District in retaliation for their protected speech pertaining to gender identity, parental rights, and education policy, and discriminated against them on the basis of their religion and viewpoint.
The District employed Medart as a middle school science and health teacher and Sager as an assistant middle school principal. Plaintiffs created, using their own devices and on their own time, the “I Resolve” campaign, which included a website and a video, uploaded to YouTube. Sager, among other things, sent emails from her school account to District employees which provided a link to the “I Resolve” website. Following complaints by employees, students, and concerned citizens, and an independent investigator’s determination that plaintiffs violated District policies, the District terminated plaintiffs but subsequently reinstated them and transferred them to other positions.
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment for defendants on plaintiffs’ claim that defendants retaliated against them for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment. The panel determined that there were genuine disputes regarding the circumstances of plaintiffs’ expressive conduct and the extent of the resulting disruption to the District’s operations and educational environment. In affirming the summary judgment, the panel found that the individual District defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim for damages because the record contained undisputed facts showing that plaintiffs’ expressive conduct gave rise to significant actual and predicted disruption to the District’s operations and educational environment and it was not clearly established in 2021 that a school district could not terminate a teacher and assistant principal under such circumstances.
The panel vacated the grant of summary judgment to the District on the First Amendment claim for damages because at this stage, given that factual disputes are to be resolved in favor of plaintiffs, the panel could not conclude that defendants had shown that the actual or reasonably predicted disruption was so substantial that the District’s interests outweighed plaintiffs’ interest as a matter of law under a Pickering balancing test. The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment to all defendants on the First Amendment retaliation claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ as-applied, content and viewpoint-based discrimination claims, which challenged the District’s original and amended speech policies on the grounds that defendants exercised unbridled discretion under the policies to discriminate against plaintiffs and punish them for their views. For the reasons explained above, the panel held that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to the damages claim. The panel vacated the grant of summary judgment to the District on the as-applied, content- and viewpoint-based discrimination claim for damages, and vacated the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim, which alleged that defendants treated district employees differently based on whether they endorsed the concept of shifting gender identity. The panel assumed, without deciding, that there was a genuine factual dispute regarding whether defendants treated similarly situated employees differently based on their views on gender identity. Although there were genuine factual disputes that prevented the panel from concluding that defendants prevailed as a matter of law, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the individual defendants on the equal protection claim for damages and vacated the grant of summary judgment to the District. The panel vacated the grant of summary judgment to all defendants on the related claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
The panel exercised its discretion to vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ First Amendment prior restraint and compelled speech claims, which challenged the District’s original and amended speech policies. The panel held that the basis for the district court’s summary judgment ruling was too unclear for proper review, and plaintiffs raised their merits arguments for the first time on appeal. The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment without commenting on how the district court should proceed on remand.
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on plaintiffs’ state constitutional claim alleging they were disciplined for engaging in speech protected by the Oregon Constitution. Because plaintiffs failed to discuss this claim in any substantive way, the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the ground of forfeiture.
The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against the individual Board members in their personal capacities for terminating plaintiffs’ employment, rejecting the district court’s conclusion that, as a general rule, board members cannot be held personally liable for decisions made by majority vote.
The panel vacated the grant of summary judgment to the District on the claim for Monell liability because the district court granted summary judgment on the basis that there were no underlying constitutional violations, and the panel vacated the grant of summary judgment on the underlying First Amendment retaliation and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims.
Finally, the panel vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on plaintiffs’ Title VII claim, which alleged that the District terminated them for expressing their biblically-based views on gender and sexuality. For protected class membership, plaintiffs were not required to cite Bible passages or scripture to support their religious views. The panel also agreed with plaintiffs that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the credibility of the District’s proffered reasons for the terminations.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/16/23-35288.pdf
​
Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (CA2/5 B337435 6/13/25) Arbitration | Unconscionability
Under California law, an adhesive agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, if it “compels arbitration of the claims more likely to be brought by . . . the weaker party, but exempts from arbitration the types of claims that are more likely to be brought by . . . the stronger party” (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 497 (Ramirez)) and if it obligates the weaker party to consent to the entry of an injunction in the stronger party’s favor as well as to waive the statutory bond requirement for such an injunction (Lange v. Monster Energy Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 436, 451 (Lange); Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 234 (Carbajal)). Can an employer (as the stronger party) sidestep this precedent by requiring its employees (as the weaker party) to simultaneously execute two contracts—one that purports to require arbitration of all claims on equal terms, and a second that supersedes the first contract and has terms favoring the employer—if those two contracts, when read together, render the first contract unconscionable? Alberto v. Cambrian Homecare (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 482, 491 (Alberto) held that the answer is “no.” We agree with Alberto, and publish to reject the further defenses raised by the employer in this case to what we view as an indefensible end-run around precedent. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s order finding the employer’s arbitration agreement unenforceable and denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B337435.PDF
​
Soto v. United States (US 24–320 per curiam 6/12/25) Combat-Related Special Compensation Settlement Procedure
The Barring Act, 31 U. S. C. §3702, establishes default settlement procedures for claims against the Government and subjects most claims to a 6-year limitations period. However, the Act includes an exception: If “another law” confers authority to settle a claim against the Government, that law displaces the Barring Act’s settlement mechanism, including its limitations period. §3702(a). In 2002, Congress enacted a statute providing “combat-related special compensation” (CRSC) to qualifying veterans who have suffered combat-related disabilities. 10 U. S. C. §1413a. Under federal law, retired veterans generally must waive a portion of their military retirement pay to receive Veterans Affairs (VA) disability benefits, but the CRSC statute allows combat-disabled retirees to receive special compensation up to the amount of waived retired pay.
Petitioner Simon Soto served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006, including two tours in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was medically retired in 2006 and later received a 100-percent disability rating for post-traumatic stress disorder from the VA. In 2016, Soto applied for CRSC payments. The Secretary of the Navy approved his application but limited retroactive compensation to six years, citing the Barring Act’s limitations period. Soto filed a class-action lawsuit arguing that the Barring Act’s 6-year limitations period does not apply to CRSC claims because the CRSC statute constitutes “another law” that provides its own settlement mechanism. The District Court granted summary judgment for the class, but the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the CRSC statute does not explicitly grant settlement authority and therefore cannot displace the Barring Act.
Held: The CRSC statute confers authority to settle CRSC claims and thus displaces the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. Pp. 7–15.
(a) The term “settle” in the Government-claims context refers to determining the validity of a claim and the amount of money a claimant is due. See Illinois Surety Co. v. United States ex rel. Peeler, 240 U. S. 214, 219–220. A statute confers settlement authority so long as it vests an entity with these powers. While the most straightforward way to confer settlement authority may be to use the term “settle,” Congress need not “use magic words.” Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U. S. 42, 48–49. To determine whether a statute constitutes “another law” that displaces the Barring Act’s settlement procedures, courts must examine the text, context, and structure of “the entire statutory scheme” to analyze whether the law confers authority to determine both a claim’s validity and the amount due. Winkelman v. Parma City School Dist., 550 U. S. 516, 523; see Illinois Surety, 240 U. S., at 219–220. Pp. 7–8.
(b) The CRSC statute meets these requirements. The law confers upon “[t]he Secretary concerned” the “[a]uthority” to pay each “eligible” claimant a “monthly amount” “determined” under the statute’s terms. 10 U. S. C. §1413a(a). Regarding validity, the statute provides that the Secretary concerned shall “conside[r]” whether a CRSC applicant is an “eligible” “combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree.” §1413a(d). Because the Secretary “shall pay” CRSC payments to “each eligible” veteran, §1413a(a), determining a claimant’s eligibility is tantamount to determining the validity of his claim. The statute also confers authority on the Secretary to determine the amount due by instructing the Secretary to pay a specific monthly amount. §§1413a(b)(1)–(3). Taken as a whole, the statute establishes a unique, self-contained, comprehensive compensation scheme that authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due on them, thus creating a separate settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act’s default procedures. Pp. 8– 10.
(c) The Federal Circuit erred by imposing undue requirements on Congress’s ability to confer settlement authority and by disregarding the CRSC statute’s plain text. The court’s demand for “specific language” and its alternative requirement that a statute provide a specific limitations period to displace the Barring Act are rejected. Congress need not use particular words to confer settlement authority, and, in this unique statutory regime, it is not unreasonable to think that Congress would have provided a settlement mechanism without a specific limitations period. The Government’s arguments for affirmance are similarly unpersuasive, including its insistence on “hallmark formulations” to confer settlement authority and its concern about destabilizing Government programs. The CRSC statute’s separate subsections, in combination, create a comprehensive benefits regime that authorizes the Secretary concerned to determine both the validity of CRSC claims and the amount due on them. Pp. 10–14.
92 F. 4th 1094, reversed and remanded.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-320_m648.pdf
​
Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (CA4/3 G063626 6/6/25) Arbitration | Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability
Monroe Operations, LLC, doing business as Newport Healthcare (Newport Healthcare) is a nationwide behavioral healthcare company which provides therapy for individuals with mental health issues. It has residential treatment facilities across the country including in California, Utah, Minnesota, Connecticut, and Washington. Newport Healthcare hired Karla Velarde (Velarde) as a care coordinator. Newport Healthcare required Velarde to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. Newport Healthcare later terminated Velarde’s employment. Velarde filed a lawsuit alleging, among other things, discrimination, retaliation, and violation of whistleblower protections against Newport Healthcare and its director of residential services, Amanda Seymour (collectively, Appellants).
Appellants filed a motion to compel arbitration which the trial court denied. The trial court ruled Newport Healthcare pressured Velarde to sign the agreement, which she did not want to do, and the agreement unlawfully prohibited Velarde from seeking judicial review of an arbitration award. On appeal, Appellants take issue with the trial court interpreting the agreement in a manner which bars judicial review of an arbitration award.
There was extensive evidence of procedural unconscionability, with an adhesive contract, buried in a stack of 31 documents to be signed as quickly as possible while a human resources (HR) manager waited, before Velarde could start work that same day. Most problematically, in response to Velarde’s statements that she was uncomfortable signing the arbitration agreement as she did not understand it, false representations were made by Newport Healthcare’s HR manager to Velarde about the nature and terms of the agreement. These representations, which specifically and directly contradicted the written terms of the agreement, rendered aspects of the agreement substantively unconscionable. These procedural and substantively unconscionable aspects, taken together, render the agreement unenforceable. We therefore affirm.
We need not reach the issue of whether the agreement unlawfully prohibited judicial review.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063626.PDF
​​​​​
Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Comm’n (US 24–154 per curiam 6/5/25) Unemployment Compensation Taxes | First Amendment
Wisconsin law exempts certain religious organizations from paying unemployment compensation taxes. The relevant statute exempts nonprofit organizations “operated primarily for religious purposes” and “operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches.” Wis. Stat. §108.02(15)(h)(2). Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four of its sub-entities, sought this exemption as organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied the exemption, holding that petitioners were not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engaged in proselytization nor limited their charitable services to Catholics.
Held: The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of §108.02(15)(h)(2) to petitioners violates the First Amendment. Pp. 7–15.
​
(a) The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretation of §108.02(15)(h)(2) imposes a denominational preference by differentiating between religions based on theological lines. Petitioners’ eligibility for the exemption ultimately turns on inherently religious choices (namely, whether to proselytize or serve only co-religionists in the course of charitable work), not “‘secular criteria’” that “happen to have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different religious organizations.” Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 247, n. 33. Because that regime explicitly differentiates between religions based on theological practices, strict scrutiny applies. Pp. 8–11.
(b) The State argues that, when it comes to religious accommodations afforded by the government, courts should ask whether the accommodation’s eligibility criteria are the product of “invidious discrimination” to determine if strict scrutiny applies. In support of that rule, the State draws on Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437. Gillette, however, is inapposite. Unlike the conscientious objector status in Gillette, which was equally available to members of all religions, the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s interpretation of §108.02(15)(h)(2) facially differentiates among religions based on inherently theological choices. The State next disputes the premise that petitioners were denied coverage because they do not proselytize or serve only Catholics in the course of performing charitable work. The State instead claims that petitioners were excluded because they engaged in no “distinctively religious activity,” meaning “activities that express and inculcate religious doctrine.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 81. That understanding of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling, even if assumed correct, cannot save the statute from strict scrutiny because decisions about whether to “express and inculcate religious doctrine” while performing charitable work are fundamentally theological choices driven by religious doctrine. Pp. 11–13.
(c) Section 108.02(15)(h)(2), as applied, cannot survive strict scrutiny because the State has not met its burden to show that the law’s application is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Wisconsin contends that the exemption advances two principal interests. First, it argues that the law serves a compelling state interest in ensuring unemployment coverage for its citizens. The State, however, has failed to demonstrate that the theological lines drawn by the statute are narrowly tailored to advance that interest, particularly as applied to petitioners. Indeed, petitioners operate their own unemployment compensation system, which provides benefits largely equivalent to the state system. The distinctions drawn by Wisconsin’s regime, moreover, are underinclusive, exempting religious entities that provide similar services (i.e., without proselytizing or serving only co-religionists) when the work is done directly by a church. Second, the State asserts an interest in avoiding entanglement with employment decisions based on religious doctrine. Resolving misconduct disputes for employees tasked with inculcating religious faith, the State argues, may require it to decide whether those employees complied with religious doctrine. The lines drawn by the exemption, however, are overinclusive in relation to that interest, for they operate at the organizational level, covering employees that do and do not inculcate religious doctrine in equal measure. This poor fit between the State’s asserted interests and the distinctions drawn cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. Pp. 13–15. 2024 WI 13, 411 Wis. 2d 1, 3 N. W. 3d 666, reversed and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J., and JACKSON, J., filed concurring opinions.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-154_2b82.pdf
Schuman v. Microchip Tech. Inc. (9th Cir. 24-2624, 24-2978 6/5/25) ERISA
The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment against Peter Schuman and William Coplin in a case concerning the enforceability of a release of claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”); remanded to the district court for further proceedings; and dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction a cross-appeal by Microchip Technology Inc., Amtel Corp., and Amtel Corp. U.S. Severance Guarantee Benefit Program (collectively “Defendants”).
In anticipation of a potential merger, Amtel Corp. created a benefits plan (“Plan”), governed by ERISA, for employees to receive severance in the event that an acquiring company fired Amtel staff. Soon after Microchip acquired Amtel, Microchip terminated Schuman and Coplin, without cause, and offered them significantly lower benefits than promised in the Plan in exchange for a release of all potential claims. Schuman and Coplin signed the releases.
Schuman and Coplin later filed a class-action complaint, on behalf of about 200 similarly situated former Amtel employees who had also signed releases, alleging violations of ERISA, including breach of fiduciary duty and denial of benefits, and challenging the enforceability of the releases.
The district court entered final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) in favor of Defendants and against Schuman and Coplin, certifying for this court’s review the question of what legal test should apply in determining the enforceability of the releases signed by Schuman and Coplin and the majority of class members.
The panel held that the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification was not improper.
The panel held that courts must consider alleged improper conduct by the fiduciary in obtaining a release as part of the totality of the circumstances concerning the knowledge or voluntariness of the release or waiver. In evaluating the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the individual entered into the release or waiver knowingly and voluntarily, courts should consider the following non-exhaustive factors: (1) the employee’s education and business experience; (2) the employee’s input in negotiating the terms of the settlement; (3) the clarity of the release language; (4) the amount of time the employee had for deliberation before signing the release; (5) whether the employee actually read the release and considered its terms before signing it; (6) whether the employee knew of his rights under the plan and the relevant facts when he signed the release; (7) whether the employee had an opportunity to consult with an attorney before signing the release; (8) whether the consideration given in exchange for the release exceeded the benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law; and (9) whether the employee’s release was induced by improper conduct on the fiduciary’s part. Where, as here, the district court has found a genuine issue of fact material to the issue of a breach of fiduciary duty in obtaining the release of claims, the final factor warrants serious consideration and may weigh particularly heavily against finding that the release was “knowing” or “voluntary” or both.
The panel remanded to the district court for its application of the factors.
The panel dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Microchip’s cross-appeal challenging the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the non-named plaintiffs. Pendent jurisdiction does not apply because the issue raised in the cross-appeal—whether the judgment against Schuman and Coplin extinguished the non-named plaintiffs’ claims—is not inextricably intertwined with the issue properly before this court on interlocutory appeal.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/05/24-2978.pdf
​
Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services (US 23–1039 per curiam 6/5/25) Title VII Disparate Treatment
Petitioner Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, has worked for the Ohio Department of Youth Services in various roles since 2004. In 2019, the agency interviewed Ames for a new management position but ultimately hired another candidate—a lesbian woman. The agency subsequently demoted Ames from her role as a program administrator and later hired a gay man to fill that role. Ames then filed this lawsuit against the agency under Title VII, alleging that she was denied the management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The courts below analyzed Ames’s claims under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792, which sets forth the traditional framework for evaluating disparate-treatment claims that rest on circumstantial evidence. At the first step of that framework, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that the defendant acted with a discriminatory motive. Like the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that Ames had failed to meet her prima facie burden because she had not shown “ ‘background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.’ ” 87 F. 4th 822, 825. The court reasoned that Ames, as a straight woman, was required to make this showing “in addition to the usual ones for establishing a prima-facie case.” Ibid.
Held: The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule—which requires members of a majority group to satisfy a heightened evidentiary standard to prevail on a Title VII claim—cannot be squared with the text of Title VII or the Court’s precedents. Pp. 4–9.
(a) Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision bars employers from intentionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. §2000e– 2(a)(1). For most plaintiffs, the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework—stating a prima facie case of discrimination—is “not onerous.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248, 253. The Sixth Circuit’s “background circumstances” rule requires plaintiffs who are members of a majority group to bear an additional burden at step one. But the text of Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs. The provision focuses on individuals rather than groups, barring discrimination against “any individual” because of protected characteristics. Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone. This Court’s precedents reinforce that understanding of the statute, and make clear that the standard for proving disparate treatment under Title VII does not vary based on whether or not the plaintiff is a member of a majority group. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 431 (“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed” in Title VII). Moreover, the “background circumstances” rule—which subjects all majority-group plaintiffs to the same, highly specific evidentiary standard in every case—ignores the Court’s instruction to avoid inflexible applications of the prima facie standard. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 358. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Ohio argues that the “background circumstances” rule does not subject majority-group plaintiffs to a heightened evidentiary standard but rather is “just another way of asking whether the circumstances surrounding an employment decision, if otherwise unexplained, suggest that the decision was because of a protected characteristic.” Brief for Respondent 10. Ohio’s recasting is directly at odds with the Sixth Circuit’s description of the “background circumstances” rule and its application of that rule in this case. Ohio’s alternative argument that Ames’s Title VII claims would fail even absent the “background circumstances” rule is for the courts below to consider in the first instance on remand. Pp. 7–9.
87 F. 4th 822, vacated and remanded.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1039_c0n2.pdf
​
Cash v. County of Los Angeles (CA2/5 B336980 part. pub. 5/30/25) Attorney Fee Award
The trial court reduced the attorney fee award for a prevailing plaintiff [in a FEHA action] by an “across-the-board” 30-percent cut based on “unreasonable padding,” “duplicative” work, and unnecessary work by the plaintiff’s attorneys. Are such findings, without more, sufficient to uphold a percentage reduction to a fee award? Historically, yes. Until recently, appellate courts in California uniformly “review[ed] attorney fee awards on an abuse of discretion standard” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 488 (Laffitte)), and would infer findings and defer to a trial court’s “general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case” or otherwise overcharged for fees (Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 744; California Common Cause v. Duffy (1987) 200 Cal.App.3d 730, 754-755 (Duffy)). Recently, however, a handful of California courts have employed “heightened scrutiny”—imported from federal cases interpreting a federal civil rights statute (namely, 42 U.S.C. § 1988)—and on that basis have demanded that a trial court articulate “case-specific reasons for [any] percentage reduction,” including a “clear[]” “expla[nation of] its reasons for choosing the particular negative multiplier [or percentage] that it chose.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 37, 41 (Warren); Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 921 (Snoeck); see Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 88, 101-104 (Kerkeles)) Other courts have declined to employ this importation of federal law (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 37 & fn. 6 (Morris)), and we join them in doing so. Importing the federal standard exceeds the federal courts’ rationale for employing heightened scrutiny of specific fee awards and is inconsistent with our State’s longstanding policy that “[t]he ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in [their] court.’” (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (Serrano).) We accordingly affirm the reduced attorney fee award for the plaintiff in this case and, in the unpublished portion of this opinion, also affirm the trial court’s denial of a motion to tax the plaintiff’s costs.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B336980.PDF
​
Schneider v. Superior Court (CA2/7 B341712 5/29/25) Pitchess Motion | Police Officers' Personnel Files
Robert Schneider, who is charged with murder, filed a discovery motion under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) and Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady), seeking discovery of Brady information in the confidential personnel records of six deputies with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD). The trial court found Schneider established good cause for an in camera review of the records, and after conducting the review, determined the personnel files of four of the six deputies contained Brady material. But the court denied Schneider’s request for disclosure of the Brady material itself, and instead ordered disclosure of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the individuals who had witnessed or complained of the conduct at issue. The court concluded that this limited disclosure was mandated under Pitchess procedures.
Schneider petitioned for a writ of mandate, challenging the court’s order denying his request for the fuller disclosures. We grant the petition, concluding the trial court should have ordered LASD to disclose all Brady material in the four deputies’ personnel files, including documents and any audio-video materials.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B341712.PDF
​​​​​
Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (CA2/6 B338047 5/27/25) PAGA Standing Requirement
Due to the systemic underenforcement of the Labor Code, the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Labor Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) deputizes employees to stand in the shoes of the state to pursue civil penalties on behalf of themselves and other “aggrieved employees.” (Arias v. Superior Court (2009) 46 Cal.4th 969, 980 (Arias).) So long as they were employed by the alleged violator and personally suffered at least one Labor Code violation, aggrieved employees have standing to bring representative PAGA actions. (Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 81-84 (Kim).) No more is required.
The Legislature recently adopted Assembly Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), which amended portions of section 2699. Among other changes, Assembly Bill No. 2288 “requir[es] an aggrieved employee to have personally suffered the alleged violations within [PAGA’s] one-year statute of limitations.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 21, 2024, pp. 15-16.) Because those amendments apply only to lawsuits filed on or after June 19, 2024, however, they are inapplicable here. (See Stats. 2024, ch. 44, § 1.) All references to section 2699 in this opinion are to the version in effect during the proceedings below and define an “ ‘aggrieved employee’ ” as “any person who was employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” (See § 2699, former subd. (c); Stats. 2016, ch. 31, § 189.)
Edgar Osuna sued Spectrum Security Services, Inc., for purported violations of the Labor Code. He asserted five individual and class claims, and a sixth representative PAGA claim. The trial court dismissed Osuna’s class claims, sent his individual claims to arbitration, and sustained Spectrum’s demurrer to his representative PAGA claim without granting leave to amend. It concluded that Osuna lacks standing to bring the PAGA claim because he did not suffer a Labor Code violation during the one-year statute of limitations period for recovering civil penalties.
Osuna challenges that conclusion on appeal, contending he is an aggrieved employee with standing to assert a representative PAGA claim. We agree. In concluding otherwise, the trial court erroneously grafted requirements related to PAGA’s one-year statute of limitations for recovering civil penalties onto the definition of “aggrieved employee.” Given the adoption of Assembly Bill No. 2288 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), we publish this opinion to reinforce the standing requirements under former section 2699. We reverse the portion of the order sustaining Spectrum’s demurrer to Osuna’s representative PAGA claim.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338047.PDF
​
Thomas v. Corbyn Restaurant Development Corp. (CA4/1 D083655 5/27/25) Settlement Proceeds Paid to Imposter [not employment case, but holding is applicable to every settlement]
This case presents an issue of first impression in California: Which party bears the risk of loss when an imposter causes one party to a settlement to wire settlement proceeds to the imposter instead of the other settling party? After plaintiff and defendants settled a personal injury lawsuit for $475,000, an unknown third party purporting to be plaintiff’s counsel sent “spoofed” emails to defendants’ counsel providing fraudulent wire instructions for the settlement proceeds. Defendants’ counsel wired the settlement proceeds to the fraudulent account and the third party absconded with the funds. Once the fraud was discovered, plaintiff asked for the settlement money, but defendants refused to pay. Plaintiff then applied ex parte to enforce the settlement agreement.
Noting the lack of California authority discussing this topic, the trial court applied persuasive federal case law that uniformly shifts the risk of loss to the party in the best position to prevent the fraud. (See, e.g., Beau Townsend Ford Lincoln, Inc. v. Don Hinds Ford, Inc. (6th Cir. 2018) 759 Fed.Appx. 348, 359 (Beau Townsend Ford); Ostrich Int’l Co., LTD v. Michael A. Edwards Grp. Int’l Inc. (C.D. Cal., May 18, 2023, No. 2:21-cv-00639-JVS(ASx)) 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105828, p. *10 (Ostrich).) After “[l]ooking at the totality of the circumstances,” the trial court found “defendants were in the best position to prevent the fraud” and that plaintiff bore no “comparative fault.” The court granted plaintiff’s application to enforce the settlement and entered judgment in his favor for $475,000.
On appeal, defendants maintain the trial court chose the correct law to apply but applied it incorrectly by mischaracterizing the evidence that supported shifting the blame to defendants, and by failing to consider the evidence that supported shifting the blame to plaintiff. Defendants assert that by doing so, the trial court undertook an overly simplistic analysis that presumed “the payor is . . . in the best position to avoid . . . fraud.” We agree that the authority on which the trial court relied is persuasive but we disagree that the court misapplied it. The record shows that the trial court assessed each party’s role in preventing the fraud. Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that several red flags should have alerted defendants to the fraud, and that there were none that should have alerted plaintiff.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D083655.PDF
​
Carranza v. City of Los Angeles (CA2/7 B327196 part. pub. 5/23/25) Sexual Harassment | Hostile Work Environment
Lilian Carranza, a captain in the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD or Department), learned that a photo of a topless woman falsely said to be her was circulating electronically among LAPD personnel. One of her subordinates told her he had seen on-duty officers looking at the photo on a cellphone and making lewd comments about Carranza, and he told her everywhere he went officers were talking about the photo. Carranza asked the Department to notify its employees that the photo was not of her, and to order they stop sharing it. The Department declined to do so. Its own investigation later confirmed that the photo, intended to depict Carranza, was distributed throughout the Department.
Carranza sued the City of Los Angeles, asserting a single cause of action for hostile work environment due to sexual harassment under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). A jury found in Carranza’s favor, determining she experienced severe or pervasive harassment and that the LAPD failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action despite knowing of the conduct. It awarded her $4 million in noneconomic damages.
In the published part of the opinion we address the City’s contention that Carranza did not experience harassment directly and the conduct was not so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her job. We conclude substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that Carranza endured severe or pervasive harassment that altered the conditions of her workplace, based on her secondhand knowledge that the photo was widely circulating around the Department.
In the unpublished portion of the opinion we address the City’s contentions that the trial court abused its discretion (1) in denying the City’s motion for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct during deliberations, and (2) in setting the hourly rates and lodestar multiplier used to calculate Carranza’s attorney fee award. We find no abuse of discretion in either regard, and affirm both the judgment and the attorney fee award.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B327196.PDF
​
Trump v. Wilcox (US 24A966 order 5/23/25) NLRB and MSPB Board Members
The Government has applied for a stay of orders from the District Court for the District of Columbia enjoining the President’s removal of a member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), respectively. The President is prohibited by statute from removing these officers except for cause, and no qualifying cause was given. See 29 U. S. C. §153(a); 5 U. S. C. §1202(d).
The application for stay presented to The Chief Justice and by him referred to the Court is granted. Because the Constitution vests the executive power in the President, see Art. II, §1, cl. 1, he may remove without cause executive officers who exercise that power on his behalf, subject to narrow exceptions recognized by our precedents, see Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U. S. 197, 215−218 (2020). The stay reflects our judgment that the Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power. But we do not ultimately decide in this posture whether the NLRB or MSPB falls within such a recognized exception; that question is better left for resolution after full briefing and argument. The stay also reflects our judgment that the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully removed officer faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty. See Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U. S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam) (“The purpose of . . . interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” (citation omitted)). A stay is appropriate to avoid the disruptive effect of the repeated removal and reinstatement of officers during the pendency of this litigation.
Finally, respondents Gwynne Wilcox and Cathy Harris contend that arguments in this case necessarily implicate the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections for members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or other members of the Federal Open Market Committee. See Response of Wilcox in Opposition to App. for Stay 2−3, 27−28; Response of Harris in Opposition to App. for Stay 3, 5−6, 16−17, 36, 40. We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States. See Seila Law, 591 U. S., at 222, n. 8.
The March 4, 2025, order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 25−cv−412, ECF Doc. 39, and the March 6, 2025, order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 25−cv−334, ECF Doc. 34, are stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a966_1b8e.pdf
​
Anderson v. Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm. (9th Cir. 22-16268 5/22/25) ERISA
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Winston R. Anderson’s putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act alleging that the trustees of Intel Corporation’s proprietary retirement funds breached their fiduciary duty of prudence and duty of loyalty.
Anderson alleged that the trustees breached their duty of prudence by investing some of the funds’ assets in hedge funds and private equity funds. He alleged that they breached their duty of loyalty by steering retirement funds to companies in which Intel’s venture-capital arm, Intel Capital, had already invested.
The panel held that Anderson did not state a claim for breach of ERISA’s duty of prudence. Because prudence is evaluated prospectively, based on the methods the fiduciaries employed, rather than retrospectively, based on the results they achieved, it is not enough for a plaintiff simply to allege that the fiduciaries could have obtained better results. Instead, a plaintiff must provide some further factual enhancement. When a plaintiff relies on a theory that a prudent fiduciary in like circumstances would have selected a different fund, the plaintiff must provide a sound basis for comparison. The panel concluded that Anderson did not plausibly allege that Intel’s funds underperformed other funds with comparable aims. Anderson failed to state a claim for breach of the duty of prudence because he made only general arguments about the riskiness and costliness of hedge funds and private equity funds without providing factual allegations sufficient to support the claim that the investments that were actually made were ill-suited to the Intel funds.
The panel held that Anderson failed to state a claim that Intel’s fiduciaries breached their duty of loyalty because he did not plausibly allege a real conflict of interest, rather than the mere potential for a conflict of interest.
Concurring in full in the majority opinion, Judge Berzon wrote separately to clarify the role of comparisons and circumstantial allegations in duty-of-prudence claims. She wrote that comparison is not a pleading requirement, and ERISA does not require pleading an empirical comparator— in the form of a “meaningful benchmark” alternative investment or otherwise—to state a claim. The ultimate question, absent direct allegations about the fiduciary’s investment methods, is not how other plans were managed or what other investments were available, but whether the facts alleged—comparative or not—lead to the plausible inference that the actual process used by the defendant fiduciary was flawed. With appropriate evidence, Anderson could have stated a claim by pleading a true benchmark comparison, by providing other circumstantial allegations that plausibly suggested imprudence, or by directly showing that the specific investments the Intel fiduciaries selected or the general methodologies they used were imprudent.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/05/22/22-16268.pdf