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Cocom v. ABM Aviation, Inc. (9th Cir. 25-3246 6/23/26) Arbitration | Substantive Unconscionability
In a putative wage and hour class action brought by Robert Cocom against his former employer ABM Aviation, Inc. (“ABM”), the panel reversed the district court’s judgment that ABM could not enforce the Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“MAA”) the parties signed when Cocom was first employed by ABM, and remanded for further proceedings.
The district court concluded that the MAA was procedurally and substantively unconscionable based on the analysis in Cook v. University of Southern California, 321 Cal. Rptr. 3d 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2024).
The panel held that because the challenged provisions of the MAA were distinguishable in important ways from the provisions held unconscionable in Cook, the district court erred in relying on Cook. The panel first addressed substantive unconscionability. In Cook, the court found the arbitration agreement’s scope, duration, and lack of mutuality to be substantively unconscionable. Here, the MAA was limited to employment-related disputes, making this case distinguishable from Cook and from the California Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in Stoker v. Blue Origin, LLC, 343 Cal. Rptr. 3d 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2026). Second, because the MAA’s more limited scope inherently limited the agreement’s duration, the MAA’s duration was not indefinite and not substantively unconscionable. Third, Cook’s lack-of-mutuality analysis was distinguishable largely because of the MAA’s narrower scope.
Although the district court did not reach the issue, the panel concluded that the MAA’s bar on using arbitration awards for preclusive or precedential effect was not substantively unconscionable.
Finally, the panel held that even if the MAA’s waivers of representative actions under California’s Private Attorneys General Act or of public injunctive relief were substantively unconscionable, those provisions would be severable. Accordingly, the panel concluded that it need not address whether either waiver rose to the level of substantive unconscionability.
Because the panel concluded that most of the MAA’s challenged provisions were not substantively unconscionable, and that any remaining unconscionable provisions could be properly severed, Cocom’s unconscionability defense failed. Because the lack of substantive unconscionability was dispositive, the panel held that it need not address Cocom’s arguments about procedural unconscionability.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/23/25-3246.pdf
City & County of S.F. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (CA1/5 A173302 6/22/26) Meyers-Milias-Brown Act | Arbitration
The Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (Gov. Code, §§ 3500–3511) governs “disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment between public employers and public” unions. (Id., § 3500.) Among other things, the MMBA establishes procedures for resolving those disputes if the public employer and union reach an impasse during negotiations. (Gov. Code, §§ 3505.4 & 3505.5.) Under those impasse resolution procedures, a factfinding panel may “recommend terms of settlement . . . .” (Id., § 3505.5, subd. (a).) But that recommendation is “advisory only.” (Ibid.) Thus, notwithstanding the panel’s recommendation, the public employer “may, after holding a public hearing regarding the impasse, implement its last, best, and final offer.” (Id., § 3505.7.)
The MMBA also provides an alternative for charter cities or counties. Those cities and counties may adopt their own impasse resolution procedures in lieu of the MMBA’s procedures, so long as their procedures include “a process for binding arbitration.” (Gov. Code, § 3505.5, subd. (e).)
Petitioner City and County of San Francisco (City), a charter city and county, has opted for this alternative. Under the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco (Charter), certain labor disputes are eligible for interest arbitration if the City and its employee union reach an impasse. If the dispute is eligible for and submitted to arbitration, then the arbitrators must choose between the “last offer[s] of settlement on each of the remaining issues in dispute” between the City and its union. (Charter, § A8.409-4.) Once the arbitrators make that choice, their decision is “final and binding,” and the City has no other recourse. (Ibid.)
Real party in interest Municipal Attorneys Association of San Francisco (MAA) represents City employees who are “exempt from competitive civil service selection, appointment, and removal procedures” under the Charter. (§ 10.104.) As “exempt appointments” (S.F. Civ. Service Com. Rules, rule 114, § 114.25), MAA members are at-will employees who “serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority” and may be terminated without cause (§ 10.104). During its most recent labor negotiations with the City, the MAA made two proposals that would have altered the at-will status of its members. The first would have limited the City’s ability to discharge MAA members by requiring “just cause” for any “discipline,” including “terminations (discharges).” The second would have required the City to lay off MAA members in order of their seniority. After the City refused to submit these proposals to binding interest arbitration, the MAA filed an unfair practice charge with respondent Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB found that the MAA’s proposals were eligible for arbitration under the impasse resolution provisions of the Charter and held that the City engaged in bad faith bargaining by refusing to submit those proposals to arbitration. We, however, find that the MAA’s proposals are not eligible for arbitration under the Charter. We therefore vacate PERB’s decision to the contrary.