Reverse chronological e-mail alerts prepared pro bono for the California Lawyers Association (formerly State Bar of California) Labor & Employment Law Section, unofficially since 2003 and officially since 2007, covering California, 9th Circuit and US Supreme Court decisions, and new laws signed by Governor. To subscribe, contact LaborLaw@CLA.Legal.
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Div. of Occupational Saf. & Health v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (CA2/8 B340734 6/18/26) Cal/OSHA Administrative Subpoena
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In June 2023, the Division of Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA), a state agency within the California Department of Industrial Relations, was notified by the Los Angeles County Medical Examiner (Coroner’s Office) of the death of a man who made deliveries as a driver with Uber Technologies, Inc.’s (Uber) app-based delivery platform. After efforts to arrange a meeting with Uber about the driver fatality were unsuccessful, OSHA served an administrative subpoena on Uber under Government Code section 11181, subdivision (e), and Labor Code section 6314, subdivision (c), seeking records related to the driver’s employment status and the circumstances surrounding his death. Uber responded with objections and did not produce any documents. OSHA, under Government Code section 11187, then filed this action below seeking to enforce its subpoena. The superior court granted OSHA’s petition and ordered Uber to produce all of the requested documents.
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Uber appeals, arguing the trial court’s order enforcing OSHA’s administrative subpoena is invalid on numerous grounds. We affirm the order compelling production, but reverse the order to the extent it orders production of all documents without limitation, and remand to the superior court to reconsider the scope of OSHA’s requests.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B340734.PDF
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Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics (CA4/3 G064718, filed 5/26/26, pub. 6/17/26) Labor Code Violations | Attorney’s Fees Negative Multiplier
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Abraham Taduran sued his former employer James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc. (Glidewell) for various Labor Code violations. The trial court awarded a total of $516,965 in civil penalties for four Labor Code violations, reducing the maximum penalty for several violations on a per employee basis. Taduran contends the trial court was required to reduce penalties for Labor Code violations on a per pay period basis. As discussed below, we conclude the Labor Code does not mandate any particular method for reducing a maximum civil penalty. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a lesser amount of civil penalties here.
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Taduran also sought $1,570,500 in attorney fees as the prevailing party, based on a lodestar of $1.047 million and a multiplier of 1.5. The trial court accepted the lodestar figure, but applied a modifier of 0.70, resulting in an award of $733,440 in attorney fees. Taduran contends the court’s reasoning for applying a negative multiplier cannot withstand “heightened scrutiny.” We disagree and find no abuse of discretion. As discussed below, the trial court considered the proper factors and reasonably applied a negative multiplier. Accordingly, we affirm.
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064718.PDF
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Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Trump (9th Cir. 25-4014 6/17/26) FSLMRS | Preliminary Injunction
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The panel filed (1) an order amending the opinion filed February 26, 2026, and stating that the order shall constitute the mandate of the court; and (2) an amended opinion vacating the district court’s preliminary injunction enjoining President Trump’s Executive Order 14,251, which excludes certain federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS) based on national security concerns.
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The FSLMRS protects the rights of federal employees to join labor unions, but exempts several federal agencies from coverage and authorizes the President to exclude other agencies and subdivisions from coverage based on national security considerations. Invoking 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1), the President determined that certain agencies “have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work,” and that the FSLMRS “cannot be applied to these agencies and agency subdivisions in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.”
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Under Executive Order 14,251, the agencies designated for exclusion include, inter alia, the Departments of State, Justice, and Veterans Affairs, the EPA, nearly all of the Departments of Energy, Defense, and Treasury, and various subdivisions of the Departments of Agriculture, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services.
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Plaintiffs, six unions representing roughly 800,000 federal civilian employees, sued the President and various other federal defendants, alleging that Executive Order 14,251 constituted First Amendment retaliation, as well as other claims. The district court preliminarily enjoined Executive Order 14,251 based solely on plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claim, finding a serious question as to whether Executive Order 14,251 served to retaliate against the plaintiff unions for filing lawsuits against and publicly criticizing the current Administration.
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The panel agreed with the district court that it had jurisdiction over this case. Although the government maintained that plaintiffs should have filed these claims before the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the panel explained that it was not “fairly discernible” that Congress meant for unions representing employees excluded from the statutory scheme to nonetheless use that scheme to challenge their exclusion.
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Turning to the merits, the panel concluded that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits of plaintiffs’ retaliation claim. Assuming without deciding that plaintiffs made out a prima facie case of retaliation, the panel held that on this record the government has shown that the President would have taken the same action even in the absence of the protected conduct. Executive Order 14,251 discloses no retaliatory animus on its face and instead expresses that the President’s primary concern with union activity was its interference with national security. Accordingly, because Executive Order 14,251 has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, apart from any retaliatory animus, the government on the existing record has shown that the President would have taken the same actions in the absence of the asserted retaliatory intent.
Because plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits, the panel did not need to consider the remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, and the public interest—but if the panel were to consider those factors, the government has the edge.
Concurring, Judge Owens wrote separately to note that the panel was reviewing a preliminary injunction, which potentially is a distinction with a difference. Because the review of a preliminary injunction is limited to the law applied by the district court and because the fully developed factual record may be materially different from that initially before the district court, the disposition of appeals from most preliminary injunctions may provide little guidance as to the appropriate disposition on the merits.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/17/25-4014.pdf
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Orr v. USDC for the Dist. Of CA, Riverside (9th Cir. 25-2330 6/9/26) Arbitration
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The panel granted a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the district court to vacate its order compelling arbitration of Rebecca Orr’s individual claims against her former employer, the United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”).
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Orr brought several claims against UPS on behalf of three putative classes as well as individual claims. The district court ordered Orr to arbitrate her individual claims consistent with the terms of the binding arbitration agreement, but stayed the litigation of the class claims pending resolution of arbitration. In ruling on UPS’s motion to compel arbitration, the district court refused to determine whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or the California Arbitration Act was applicable to Orr’s agreement.
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The panel weighed the factors in Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977), in determining whether to grant a writ of mandamus.
Regarding the third Bauman factor—whether the district court committed a clear error of law—the panel held that the district court committed clear error by refusing to determine the basis for its authority to compel arbitration and improperly delegating the contractual question as to the FAA’s applicability to the arbitrator. New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira held that the district court, not an arbitrator, must decide whether the contracts of employment exclusion in 9 U.S.C. § 1 applies to an agreement before ordering arbitration. 586 U.S. 105, 111 (2019). By compelling arbitration of Orr’s individual claims without deciding whether the FAA or state law applies, the district court improperly delegated the FAA § 1 exclusion question to the arbitrator.
Regarding the first Bauman factor—whether the party seeking the writ lacks an adequate alternative remedy—the panel held that Orr met this factor because no contemporaneous, ordinary appeal of the district court’s order is available.
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Regarding the second Bauman factor—whether the party seeking the writ will be prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal—the panel held that Orr met this factor for two cumulative reasons: (1) uncorrectable prejudice stemmed from the district court’s refusal to specify the source of its authority for its order compelling arbitration; and (2) because the outcome in arbitration could depend on whether the FAA or state arbitration law applied, Orr faced prejudice uncorrectable on appeal if she proceeded to arbitration without the district court’s determination on that issue.
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Because Orr made a sufficient showing as to the first three Bauman factors, including the critical factor of clear legal error, the panel granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to determine the appropriate statutory basis for its authority to compel arbitration.
Concurring, Judge Miller joined the court’s opinion in full because it correctly applied this Court’s precedents permitting the use of writs of mandamus to review orders compelling arbitration. He wrote separately to express his view that those cases improperly disregarded Congress’s specific limitations on interlocutory review of orders involving arbitration.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/09/25-2330.pdf
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People v. FMCSA (9th Cir. 20-70706 6/4/24) Preemption | FMCSA | California Meal & Rest Breaks
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The panel denied a petition for review brought by the People of the State of California and California officials seeking review of the determination of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) that California’s meal and rest break (“MRB”) rules, as applied to drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles, were preempted.
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The Motor Carrier Safety Act (“MCSA”) requires the Secretary of Transportation to review State laws and regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety, and gives the Secretary express power to preempt State law. In 2020, the FMSCA determined that California’s MRB rules, as applied in this case, were regulations “on commercial motor vehicle safety” that were “additional to or more stringent than” the federal hours-of-service (“HOS”) regulations under 49 U.S.C. 3114. The FMSCA determined that the MRB rules were preempted because they did not provide any reasonable safety benefit beyond the safety benefit already provided by the federal HOS regulations, were incompatible with federal regulations, and imposed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
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The panel held that petitioners’ contention that California’s MRB rules were beyond the scope of the FMSCA’s preemption authority was precluded by the holding in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 2785 v. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 986 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 93 (2021) (“Teamsters”). The panel also rejected petitioners’ argument that the FMSCA may not preempt California’s mid-shift break rules for drivers of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles because the agency itself has not promulgated such regulations. Petitioners read Teamsters too narrowly. Finally, the panel rejected petitioners’ argument that the FMSCA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that California’s MRB rules would cause an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. The record supports the FMSCA’s conclusion that California’s MRB rules impose a significant operational burden upon operators of passenger-carrying commercial motor vehicles. This conclusion was sufficient to justify the agency’s decision to preempt California’s MRB rules.
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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/04/20-70706.pdf
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Cortina et al. v. North American Title Company (CA5 F085389 partial pub. 5/29/25) Wage-and-Hour Class Action | Decertification
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In Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 (Duran), Justice Carol Corrigan used the phrase “exceedingly rare beast” to describe “a wage and hour class action that proceeded through trial to verdict.” (Id. at p. 12.) The plaintiffs in Duran had alleged their employer misclassified them as exempt from the laws requiring premium pay for overtime and mandatory meal breaks and rest periods during the workday. Such lawsuits are notoriously difficult to manage on a large scale, are often deemed unsuitable for class treatment, and usually settle if class certification is granted. The Duran action, which involved a class of 260 people, lasted more than 16 years and ultimately ended in decertification due to the unmanageability of issues arising from the employer’s defenses.
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We dare say the present case is even rarer and more beastly than Duran. The original complaint was filed 19 years ago. There have been numerous interlocutory appeals and writ proceedings, the most recent of which involved review by the California Supreme Court. (North American Title Co. v. Superior Court (2024) 17 Cal.5th 155.) At long last, an appeal of the underlying judgment is presented for review on the merits. Unfortunately, the end is still nowhere in sight.
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The wage and hour claims of approximately 700 plaintiffs, divided into two classes based on whether they had been designated as exempt or nonexempt employees, were litigated in a bifurcated bench trial. Upon conclusion of the first phase, the “Nonexempt” class was ordered decertified. However, the trial court ruled against the defendant employer on certain defenses asserted as to the claims of the “Exempt” class. The court then appointed a referee to conduct the second phase of trial, doing so without the parties’ consent and over defendant’s strenuous objections. The reference proceedings lasted years and included live testimony from over 230 class members, all leading to the entry of a $43 million judgment.
A nonconsensual reference of the scope and magnitude ordered in this case is not merely a rare occurrence. It appears unprecedented in our state jurisprudence. A trial court’s authority to delegate matters to a referee without the parties’ consent is strictly circumscribed by the California Constitution and Code of Civil Procedure. The reference proceedings below were entirely unauthorized. This error alone compels reversal of the judgment.
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Prejudicial errors were also committed in the first phase of trial, which became known as the “liability phase” even though it did not truly resolve all issues of liability. Critical aspects of the trial plan and format contravened the holdings of Duran. The employer’s affirmative defenses were also rejected out of hand, on a classwide basis, due to misinterpretations of the applicable law.
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The employer relied on two different Labor Code exemptions, both of which largely depend on how employees spend their time during the workday. To provide a very simplified primer, certain types of employees may be exempt from California’s overtime laws if they spend over half of their time performing duties and tasks meeting the legal definitions of exempt work. If an employee spends 49 percent of their time on exempt work, such as managerial tasks, but the other 51 percent of their time on nonexempt work, they do not qualify for the exemption. “Given California’s uniquely quantitative approach … [citation], some proof about how individual employees use their time will often be necessary to accurately determine an employer’s overtime liability [on a classwide basis].” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 27.)
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It was alleged that all members of the roughly 400-person “Exempt” class, despite having a variety of different job titles and working in different offices throughout the state over a 10-year period, all performed the same allegedly nonexempt job the same way, all the time. One problem with this theory was that several cohorts within the class, e.g., “Branch Managers,” indisputably did perform exempt work on a regular basis. The issue then became how to make a classwide showing that, despite variation among and between class members, none met the 51 percent threshold.
In the Branch Manager example, plaintiffs elicited testimony from roughly 15 percent of the cohort (about 24 out of 156 people) and argued the work habits and experiences of those witnesses could be relied upon as representative of the entire group. The Duran opinion rejects such reasoning as scientifically invalid. “If sampling is used to estimate the extent of a party’s liability, care must be taken to ensure that the methodology produces reliable results.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 42.) A valid extrapolation model requires expert input to determine the appropriate sample size and margin of error, and the sample group of witnesses must be randomly selected. (Id. at pp. 42–43.) None of those requirements were met.
Without common proof of employee misclassification, the trier of fact “may have sufficient evidence to make judgments as to particular individuals, but lacks a basis to extrapolate from those findings to a class-wide judgment.” (Marlo v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2008) 251 F.R.D. 476, 485 (Marlo).) The absence of common proof leaves the alternative of hearing individual testimony from hundreds of class members, which turns the class action device on its head. In the “liability phase,” the trial court imposed limits on how many witnesses could testify. The number was arbitrarily set at approximately 100 witnesses for each side to prove or refute the claims of all 700 people comprising both classes. The court later authorized individual testimony from all members of the “Exempt” class in the second phase of trial (such authorization being the main reason for appointing a referee) but prohibited the employer from questioning the witnesses on matters related to its exemption defenses. The exemption defenses were deemed to have failed on a classwide basis in the first phase of trial.
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As held in Duran, “decertification must be ordered whenever a trial plan proves unworkable.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 32.) Here, the obligation to decertify both classes was apparent during the initial phase of trial. Failure to decertify the “Exempt” class, in combination with the other prejudicial errors, warrants reversal and a decertification order by this court. (Id. at pp. 24, 50.) The cause will be remanded for retrial of the named plaintiffs’ individual claims. “The trial court is of course free to entertain a new certification motion on remand [as to the “Exempt” class], but if it decides to proceed with a class action it must apply the guidelines set out here.” (Id. at p. 33.)
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https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F085389.PDF
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Flowers Food, Inc. v. Brock (US 24-935 per curiam 5/28/26) FAA Exemption | Workers Engaged in Interstate Commence
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) requires courts to enforce many private arbitration agreements, but it also provides that “nothing” in the law shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving the “contracts of employment” of any class of workers “engaged in . . . interstate commerce.” 9 U. S. C. §1. This case poses the question whether someone can qualify as a worker under the §1 exemption if he never crosses state lines and never interacts with vehicles that do. Flowers Foods, Inc., is a large producer of packaged baked goods with bakeries in 19 States. To get its products to market, the company depends in part on franchisees who buy the distribution rights to Flowers’s products in specific geographic territories. Angelo Brock is one such franchisee serving the Denver area; he picks up Flowers’s products from a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without leaving the State. In 2022, Brock sued Flowers in federal district court alleging that the company had underpaid him and other distributors in violation of various federal and state laws. Flowers moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the FAA generally requires courts to stay or dismiss cases when the parties have agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration and that Brock had signed a distribution agreement promising to arbitrate any disagreement. The district court denied Flowers’s motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Resting its decision on 9 U. S. C. §1, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Brock belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce and thus the court lacked authority to compel arbitration.
Held: A worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for §1’s exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. Pp. 3–8.
(a)The statutory text does not support a rule requiring workers to cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do. When the FAA was enacted, to “engage” meant to “take part in” something or to be “employ[ed]” or “involve[d]” in that thing. Black’s Law Dictionary 661. And “interstate commerce” meant “[t]raffic,” “intercourse,” or “the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states . . . or from or between points in one state and points in another state.” Id., at 1001. Nothing in those terms requires an individual to cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does. Interstate commerce includes transporting products “between points in one state and points in another state,” ibid., which involves not just crossing state lines but intrastate activity too; “a continuous carriage” may begin inone State and end in another while “much of the journey” takes place“within the limits of a single state,” Cyclopedic Law Dictionary 548. And at least sometimes, a person can take part, be employed, or be involved in that continuous journey without leaving a State or touching vehicles that do. Pp. 4–5.
(b) Historical precedent supports this interpretation. In The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, the Court held that a steamer transporting goods entirely within Michigan was “engaged in commerce between the States” because it “was employed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods brought from without . . . Michigan.” Id., at 565. The Court explained that “[t]he fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one State, and some acting through two or more States, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction.” Ibid. Other cases are to similar effect. See, e.g., Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114. Pp. 5–6.
(c) Flowers’s counterarguments are unavailing. Flowers observes that the cases above interpreted the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, not §1 of the FAA. The Court does not suggest that the scope of §1 is coterminous with the scope of the Commerce Clause as interpreted at the time of the FAA’s adoption in 1925. However, cases using the same language as §1, or formulations very close to it, offer probative evidence of what an ordinary person at the time of the FAA’s enactment would have understood its terms to mean.
Flowers hints at other reasons why Brock might not qualify for §1’s exemption, including that Flowers conducts its business with Brock through a distribution agreement with an independently operated company Brock owns, and that he orders and purchases Flowers’s goods, taking title to them, before selling them to local stores—facts that some lower courts have found relevant. However, while Flowers discusses these facts in passing, it does not ask the Court to decide their legal significance, instead venturing all upon one cast by asking the Court to adopt a bright-line rule that an individual can never qualify for §1’s exemption unless he crosses state lines or interacts with vehicles that do. The statutory text cannot support such a rule. Pp. 6–8.
121 F. 4th 753, affirmed.
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GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
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https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-935_k53m.pdf
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M & K Employee Solutions, LLC, et al. v. Trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund (US 23–120 5/21/26) ERISA
Pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, an employer that stops participating in an underfunded Multiemployer Pension Plan (MPP), must pay the plan “withdrawal liability,” i.e., the employer’s share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits (UVBs). See 29 U. S. C. §1391. Withdrawal liability is calculated based on the plan’s UVBs “as of ” the statutory measurement date—the last day of the plan year preceding the employer’s withdrawal. §§1391(b)(2)(E)(i), (c)(2)(C)(i), (3)(A), (4)(A). Determining the value of a plan’s UVBs depends upon both hard data (such as the number of beneficiaries and the value of the plan’s assets) and a variety of actuarial predictions about the future. One key actuarial assumption is the discount rate, which is the interest rate “used to discount future benefit payments to their present value.” 87 Fed. Reg. 62317.
Petitioners are four employers who withdrew from the IAM National Pension Fund (Fund)—an underfunded MPP—between April and December 2018. The Fund assessed each employer’s withdrawal liability “as of ” December 31, 2017 (the measurement date). In making this calculation, the Fund applied a discount rate of 6.50%, which it had adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018. The Fund had previously used a discount rate of 7.50% to value its UVBs. Petitioners each initiated arbitrations challenging their assessments. In each case, the arbitrators determined that the assessments were erroneous because the Fund had applied actuarial assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The arbitrators instead required the Fund to use the actuarial assumptions that were “in effect” on the measurement date— i.e., the 7.50% discount rate. App. 293. The Fund sought review in Federal District Court. The courts disagreed with the arbitrators and held that actuaries could use assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The D.C. Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal. Its decision conflicted with a decision of the Second Circuit, and this Court granted certiorari to resolve when actuarial assumptions may be selected for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability.
Held: The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability—§§1391 and 1393—do not require the actuarial assumptions underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measurement date. Pp. 6–11.
(a) Section 1391 requires withdrawal liability to be calculated based on the value of a plan’s UVBs “as of ” the measurement date. Petitioners contend that §1391’s “as of ” language establishes a deadline for the selection of actuarial assumptions. But §1391 sets no such deadline. The term “as of ” is understood “to assign an event to one time and the recognition of it to another.” W. Follett, Modern American Usage 41. Section 1391’s “as of ” language thus means that the hard data that feeds the UVB calculation must be fixed on the measurement date, but the calculation itself can be performed after that date. Actuarial assumptions are not observable facts about the plan; instead, they are predictive judgments used as tools to calculate UVBs. Accordingly, while §1391’s “as of ” requirement sets the reference point for factual inputs, it has no bearing on when actuaries must select their assumptions. Pp. 6–8.
(b) Section 1393, which governs the use of actuarial assumptions for assessing withdrawal liability, states that the assumptions must be “reasonable,” “tak[e] into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations,” and “offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.” §1393(a)(1). Section 1393 provides no deadline by which actuaries must select their assumptions, and the Court does not generally read limitations into statutes that do not appear in their text. Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil Group, Inc., 590 U. S. 212, 215. Indeed, because Congress included a deadline for the selection of actuarial assumptions in a different section of the statute, but imposed no similar limit in §1393, the Court presumes that the omission in §1393 is intentional. See Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23. Moreover, §1393’s instruction that actuarial assumptions reflect the actuary’s “best estimate,” §1393(a)(1), supports the conclusion that actuaries can select their assumptions after the measurement date. Requiring actuaries to use assumptions selected before the measurement date could prevent them from relying on the most up-to-date data when selecting their assumptions, resulting in assumptions
that do not reflect their “best estimate.” Pp. 8–10.
(c) Petitioners’ remaining arguments do not overcome the absence of a textual deadline for adopting actuarial assumptions. First, petitioners point to a different provision of ERISA that prohibits plans from applying any new “plan rule or amendment” to an employer’s withdrawal liability if the rule or amendment is adopted after the employer withdraws. §1394(a). But the retroactivity limits in §1394 concededly do not apply to actuarial assumptions. Congress chose not to enact a similar antiretroactivity rule in §1393, and inferring one would override Congress’s choice. Petitioners fall back on a policy argument, contending that allowing plans to adopt actuarial assumptions after the measurement date will invite manipulation, enabling plans and their actuaries to retroactively select assumptions in order to increase withdrawing employers’ liability. But petitioners’ proposed rule does not address these concerns, and in any event, “policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v. Garland, 596 U. S. 328, 346. Congress chose which limits to impose on the selection of actuarial assumptions, and it is not the role of the Court to supplant Congress’s choices. Pp. 10–11.
92 F. 4th 316, affirmed.
JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/23-1209_i3kn.pdf
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Husband v. Target Corp. (CA2/5 B342334 5/21/26) FEHA | Known Disability
California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA) defines and prohibits several unlawful employment practices, including (1) “discriminat[ing] against a person” because of a “physical” or “mental disability,” (2) “fail[ing] to make reasonable accommodation” for a “known physical or mental disability,” and (3) “fail[ing] to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process . . . to determine effective reasonable accommodations.” (§ 12940, subds. (a), (m)(1) & (n).) An employer’s knowledge of an employee’s disability is a prerequisite to FEHA liability under any of those theories: An employer cannot discriminate against an employee on the basis of a disability if it does not know of that disability (Avila v. Continental Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1247 (Avila)), and an employer cannot fail to reasonably accommodate (or fail to engage in an interactive process to reach such an accommodation) if it does not know of a disability necessitating accommodation (§ 12940, subds. (m)(1) & (n) [requiring a “known” disability]).
When an employee has not disclosed his disability to his employer, under what circumstances will the employer be charged with knowledge of that disability (and hence potentially liable under FEHA)? For purposes of a FEHA claim for discrimination, an employer’s knowledge of a disability will be inferred “only . . . when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.” (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 237, italics added (Brundage).) For purposes of FEHA claims for failure to make a reasonable accommodation or failure to engage in the interactive process, an employer’s knowledge of a disability will be inferred only if the disability is “obvious” or its “observed symptoms” “are so obviously manifestations of an underlying disability” that the existence of a disability “always follow[s]” from the observed symptoms (E.g., Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 601 (Soria); Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 724-725 (Pensinger), overruled on other grounds in Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6.) Applying these standards, is an employer charged with knowledge that an employee suffers from an undisclosed diagnosis of bipolar disorder because, on two occasions, the employee was unusually “aggressive” and made “irrational” comments that caused his supervisor to be “concerned for his . . . mental state”? We hold that the answer is no, as a matter of law, and accordingly affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B342334.PDF
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Dept. of Human Resources v. Cal. Correctional Peace Officers etc. (CA3 C100353 5/15/26) Public Employee Discipline | First Amendment and MOU
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Tracylyn Lopez (Lopez), a correctional officer and union representative at Salinas Valley State Prison (the prison), received a notice of adverse action for directing profanity at two other officers. She later posted materials from the disciplinary action on a union bulletin board near the main entrance to the prison. The posted materials revealed the nature of the discipline against Lopez, and the unique surnames of the other officers.
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Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Department of Human Resources (collectively, CDCR) suspended Lopez for 60 workdays for the posting. Lopez appealed the discipline to the State Personnel Board (SPB), arguing the posting served as commentary on CDCR’s disciplinary practices, and was thus protected by the First Amendment. She also filed a contractual grievance alleging the discipline violated the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between respondent California Correctional Peace Officers Association (CCPOA) and the State of California, which incorporates the Ralph C. Dills Act (Gov. Code, § 3512 et seq.; Dills Act) and prohibits retaliation for engaging in protected activities. CCPOA, which represents correctional officers, sought arbitration of the grievance on Lopez’s behalf. This appeal arises at the intersection between these proceedings.
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The SPB ruled for CDCR in October 2020. The SPB acknowledged Lopez’s right to express opinions about disciplinary matters, but found the posting fostered a “code of silence,” and thus constituted an inexcusable neglect of duty and failure of good behavior (§ 19572, subds. (d) & (t)), which justified the 60-workday suspension. Whether the discipline constituted retaliation for engaging in protected activity under the MOU and Dills Act was not an issue before the SPB. That issue was reserved for the arbitration proceedings, which took place some 18 months later.
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An arbitrator entered an award in favor of Lopez and CCPOA in June 2022. The arbitrator sustained the grievance, finding CDCR violated the MOU by discriminating and interfering with protected speech and representational activity. She rejected CDCR’s argument that Lopez lost any potential protection by promoting an unlawful objective (i.e., fostering the code of silence). She also found CDCR punished Lopez for the protected activity, and failed to show it would have imposed the same penalty regardless of that protected activity. Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered CDCR to rescind the notice of adverse action for the posting, make Lopez whole by issuing backpay and restoring any other benefits and rights lost as a result of the 60-workday suspension, and post a notice at the prison stating CDCR discriminated and interfered with Lopez’s and CCPOA’s protected union activities under the MOU. In so doing, the arbitrator effectively offset the 60-workday suspension reviewed and approved by the SPB.
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CDCR filed a petition to vacate or correct the arbitration award. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1285, 1286.2, & 1286.6.) CCPOA responded with a counter petition to confirm the award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1285.) The trial court denied CDCR’s petition to vacate the arbitration award and CCPOA’s counter petition to confirm the award. However, the trial court granted CDCR’s petition to correct the award and struck the portion ordering CDCR to rescind the notice of adverse action for the posting and make Lopez whole by issuing backpay and restoring any other benefits and rights lost as a result of the suspension.
CCPOA appeals, arguing the trial court erred in granting CDCR’s alternative petition to correct the award. Specifically, CCPOA argues the trial court erred in concluding the arbitrator exceeded her powers in entering the award, and thus lacked statutory authority to correct it. We agree. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment denying the petition to confirm the arbitrator’s award and granting the petition to correct the award, and remand with instructions to enter a new judgment confirming the award as issued by the arbitrator.
​
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C100353.PDF
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Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties (US 25-83 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 5/14/26) Arbitration
This case presents the question whether a federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims, even when the motion to confirm under §9 or the motion to vacate under §10 does not independently present a basis for federal jurisdiction on its face.
Between 2017 and 2020, petitioner Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont Hotel in Los Angeles, California. When the hotel ended his employment in March 2020, Jules sued in Federal District Court in New York, alleging that respondents unlawfully discriminated against him in violation of federal and state law. Citing an arbitration agreement Jules had signed before beginning work at the hotel, respondents moved to stay federal proceedings pending arbitration under §3 of the FAA. The District Court held that the arbitration agreement covered Jules’s claims and stayed proceedings. Jules then commenced arbitration against respondents. The arbitrator issued a final award, ruling against Jules on all claims and awarding approximately $34,500 in sanctions to respondents. Back in the same District Court that had previously stayed Jules’s claims pending arbitration, respondents moved to confirm the award under §9. Jules opposed confirmation while cross-moving to vacate the arbitral award under §10 on various grounds. Jules argued that, under Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U. S. 1, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the award because the §9 and §10 motions neither presented federal questions nor satisfied the requirements for diversity jurisdiction. The District Court disagreed and confirmed the arbitral award. The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Badgerow involved a freestanding action commenced for the sole purpose of vacating an arbitral award, but that the present action was distinct because it started as a federal-question suit before it was stayed pending arbitration. The Second Circuit held that a court with the power to stay an action under §3 has the further power to confirm any ensuing arbitration award, regardless of whether there is an independent jurisdictional basis for the §9 and §10 proceedings.
Held: A federal court that has previously stayed claims in a pending action under §3 of the FAA has jurisdiction to confirm or vacate a resulting arbitral award on those claims as prescribed in §9 and §10 of the FAA; nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction regarding live claims pending before a federal court. Pp. 7–16.
(a) Unlike with the freestanding applications at issue in Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, and Badgerow, assessing jurisdiction over a §9 or §10 motion in a case originally filed in federal court does not require “ ‘looking through’ ” the filed action “to the parties’ underlying substantive controversy” outside of court. Vaden, 556 U. S., at 62. Instead, the court may assess its jurisdiction by looking at the suit that is already before it. As Badgerow explained, “[j]urisdiction to decide [a] case includes jurisdiction to decide [a] motion” within that case, and usually “there is no need to ‘look through’ the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.” 596 U.S., at 15.
The District Court had original jurisdiction, under 28 U. S. C. §1331, over Jules’s federal claims, and it was that very jurisdiction which authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of Jules’s claims under the parties’ contract before staying litigation pending arbitration pursuant to §3. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated. When the parties returned to court after arbitration with §9 and §10 motions, the court had the same “jurisdiction to decide the case,” and thus “jurisdiction to decide th[ose] motion[s],” that it possessed from the start. Badgerow , 596 U. S., at 15.
This case therefore is not, as petitioner asserts, “ all over again.” In , the first and only thing that had occurred in federal court was the confirm-or-vacate dispute under §9 and §10. In that circumstance, there were only two places a court could look to find federal jurisdiction: the face of the FAA motions or the underlying dispute that “was not before” the court. ., at 9. Here, however, there is an obvious third place to look for jurisdiction: the original claims themselves, which were sufficient to establish the District Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1331.
The fact that the arbitral award may have resolved Jules’s original claims only underscores why the District Court’s original jurisdiction extended to the parties’ §9 and §10 motions. Those motions required the District Court to assess whether there were grounds to vacate the award. The motions were thus integral to determining whether the award would continue to serve as a valid defense to the original claims that had been stayed, but were still pending, in District Court until the court confirmed the award.
Jules notes that, unlike dismissal based on an affirmative defense, a §9 motion goes further and asks a court to convert an arbitral award into a judgment of the court. That is correct, but federal courts have the power to incorporate private settlements into orders of the court when resolving claims that are the subject of those settlements, as recognized in , 511 U.S. 375, as well as in the context of consent judgments and class-action settlements.
The FAA’s structure further confirms jurisdiction here. In , 601 U. S. 472, the Court held that §3 requires a stay rather than dismissal, which “comports with the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” including “assist[ing] parties in arbitration . . . and facilitating recovery on an arbitral award.” ., at 478. Under the rule the Court adopts today, this scheme continues to work well: The FAA requires a stay so that a court that has granted a §3 stay can superintend the arbitration to the end, including through confirmation or vacatur under §9 or §10. Pp. 7–11.
(b) Jules’s remaining counterarguments are without merit. First, Jules overreads Badgerow, which did not convert the nonjurisdictional FAA into a comprehensive jurisdictional scheme that requires an independent jurisdictional basis for all §9 and §10 motions. The problem for the losing party in Badgerow was that, without the look-through approach authorized by §4, there was no federal jurisdiction to be found in the case. See 596 U.S., at 9, 12. Because §9 and §10, unlike §4, did not provide a textual basis for applying the look-through approach, the Court held that it was not available. Id., at 14. Respondents here, to the contrary, are not asking for any “highly unusual” look through rule, id., at 12, but merely ask the District Court to use the tools provided by the FAA to finally resolve the federal claims Jules filed in federal court under 28 U. S. C. §1331.
Second, Jules argues that §9 and §10 applications should be treated as entirely “new federal actions” for purposes of assessing jurisdiction, even when filed in pre-existing suits, because §9 and §12 of the FAA require service and notice of such applications. That argument fails. The Court has explained that §3’s mandatory stay is aimed at “avoid[ing] [the] costs and complications” of “bring[ing] a new suit.” 601 U. S., at 478. Jules concedes, moreover, that service of §9 and §10 motions is not required in all cases. The service provisions in §9 and §12 do not impose the strict jurisdictional rule he favors.
Third, Jules’s reliance on §8 of the FAA, which governs certain maritime arbitrations, is unavailing. Section 8 merely instructs that in one class of admiralty cases involving in rem jurisdiction over a vessel, the court holding the vessel must retain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate such award. It does not shed light on how jurisdiction should function in other FAA disputes.
Finally, Jules’s policy concerns lack force. His concerns about encouraging parties to engage in useless federal litigation to create a jurisdictional anchor are conjectural, and there is no evidence suggesting that his concerns about manufactured federal jurisdiction will come to pass. Moreover, it is not anomalous for federal jurisdiction to turn on how litigation proceeded, as “actual litigation” generally “define[s] the parties’ controversy.” , 556 U. S., at 68. In any event, countervailing policy concerns favor the Court’s rule. Jules’s rule would significantly diminish “the supervisory role that the FAA envisions for the courts,” , 601 U.S., at 478, and would undermine the efficiency interests at the heart of the FAA by forcing parties to launch a fresh state-court proceeding to secure confirmation or vacatur of an arbitral award. Jules’s approach could also lead to unnecessarily complex dual-track litigation where confirm-or-vacate proceedings commence in state court just as arbitrability appeals begin in federal court. Pp. 11–16.
Affirmed.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-83_3e04.pdf
Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC (US 24-1238 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 5/14/26) Transportation Broker Liability for Negligent Hiring
Petitioner Shawn Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries after his tractor trailer was struck by a truck driven by respondent Yosniel Varela-Mojena. Varela-Mojena was driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois for respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. Respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.—a transportation broker—had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued all respondents in Federal District Court and alleged, among other things, that C.H. Robinson was liable for his injuries because it negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe Transport. Montgomery claimed that C.H. Robinson knew (or should have known) from Caribe Transport’s safety rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others. The District Court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA)—which preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of the trucking industry, 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(1)—expressly preempted Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson. The District Court further held that the claim did not fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers like C.H. Robinson that coordinate shipments in the transportation industry.
Held: A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles” under the Act. Pp. 4–8.
(a) Even if the FAAAA otherwise preempts Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim against C.H. Robinson, the safety exception saves it. The relevant text provides that the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A). All agree that common-law duties and standards of care form part of a State’s authority to regulate safety. Negligent-hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in employing a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical harm. The preemption question thus boils down to whether negligent-hiring claims of the type Montgomery presses are “with respect to motor vehicles.” Because the FAAAA supplies no definition of “with respect to,” the Court gives the phrase its ordinary meaning. Following dictionary definitions, the Court has construed the same phrase in the FAAAA’s preemption provision to mean “concern[s].” 569 U. S. 251, 261. The FAAAA defines “motor vehicle” as “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.” §13102(16). Putting the pieces together, a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” if it “concerns” the vehicles used in transportation. Here, requiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim thus falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption. Pp. 4–6.
(b) C.H. Robinson’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. Construing the safety exception as Montgomery requests does not mean that it saves everything preempted by the FAAAA’s express preemption provision. The safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety. State laws related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted.
C.H. Robinson argues that Montgomery’s interpretation of the safety exception creates surplusage. But surplusage exists however the disputed phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” is defined, because any overlap comes from the reference to a State’s regulatory authority over “safety.”
Finally, C.H. Robinson asserts that interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection (b) of the FAAAA, which preempts state regulation of “intrastate” rates, routes, or services “of any freight forwarder or broker.” §14501(b)(1). Unlike subsection (c), subsection (b) does not contain a safety exception. C.H. Robinson invokes this textual difference as a reason that subsection (c)’s safety exception should be read to exclude brokers. While it is not obvious why Congress included a safety exception in (c) but not in (b), it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort—the negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury—is not an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” under §14501(c)(2)(A). The text of subsection (c)(2)(A) controls. Pp. 6–7.
124 F. 4th 1053, reversed and remanded.
BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-1238_1b7d.pdf
Reges v. Cauce (9th Cir. 24-3518 5/14/26) First Amendment Retaliation
The panel filed (1) an order amending the opinion and dissent filed on December 19, 2025, and reported at 162 F.4th 979 (9th Cir. 2025), and denying a petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion and dissent. In the amended opinion, the panel reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of University of Washington officials (UW) and remanded for further proceedings in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by UW teaching professor Stuart Reges, alleging First Amendment violations when UW investigated, reprimanded, and threatened to discipline him for contentious statements he made in a class syllabus mocking the University’s recommended indigenous land acknowledgment statement.
Recognizing that debate and disagreement are hallmarks of higher education, the panel held that UW violated the First Amendment in taking adverse action against Reges based on his view on a matter of public concern.
Specifically, the panel first held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to UW on Reges’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Reges established a prima facie retaliation claim in that he experienced adverse employment actions, including a lengthy disciplinary investigation and reprimand, because of his protected speech. The speech was protected speech, not government speech, because Reges spoke in his own capacity as a professor, and not on behalf of his employer, and he unquestionably spoke on a matter of public concern. The panel held that UW did not meet its burden under the balancing test of demonstrating that its legitimate interests outweighed Reges’s interest in speaking on a matter of public concern in the university setting. Even assuming that more tangible evidence of disruption beyond student unrest receives further weight in the analysis in this context, the disruption alleged on this record suffered from problems of proof. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment for defendants and directed that summary judgment be entered for Reges on his First Amendment retaliation claim.
Because Reges’s viewpoint discrimination claim was also subject to the same analysis, summary judgment for Reges was warranted on this claim as well. The record is clear that the University took action against Reges as a result of the views he expressed in his mock land acknowledgment statement. On remand, the district court should determine the appropriate relief on the retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims.
The panel held that the district court erred by dismissing under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Reges’s overbreadth and vagueness facial challenge to UW’s Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy, which targets “any conduct that is deemed unacceptable or inappropriate, regardless of whether the conduct rises to the level of unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.” Because the district court’s limiting construction of the policy conflicts with the policy’s plain text, it was improper. The panel remanded for the district court to determine, in the first instance, whether the policy was unconstitutional, taking into account how the policy has been enforced and applied in practice.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge S.R. Thomas agreed with the majority that the balancing test applies to Reges’s First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. However, he disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Reges’s speech interests outweighed the University of Washington’s interests. Universities have a responsibility to protect their students. This University, like other universities in the American West, has a particular obligation to its Native students. The disruption Reges’s speech caused to Native students’ learning outweighed his own First Amendment interests. Judge Thomas also disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the University’s Nondiscrimination and Affirmative Action policy was not readily susceptible to the district court’s limiting construction.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/05/14/24-3518.pdf